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DEDICATION
ELI JARMEL
By ROBERT B. YEGGE*
The law school, legal education, the legal profession, the concerned society have lost an advocate, a colleague, a friend.
Eli Jarmel was born on March 9, 1929 in New York. Unexpectedly, on September 20, 1975, he died, a young man in the
prime of his career in life, at the threshold of contributions to the
community, legal education, and the legal profession even greater
than he had already made.
Of humble, dedicated parents, Eli Jarmel early decided that
he would make important contributions to humanity. Not without significant sacrifices, he completed his undergraduate work
at Brooklyn College in 1950. He served in the United States Army
Infantry after which he labored toward the realization of a life
dream: to attend law school. But law school was not enough; he
insisted that he should, concurrently, earn a masters degree in the
School of Education at the City College of New York, which he
was awarded one year after his graduation from New York University School of Law.
Once his education was completed in 1958, he was determined to make a contribution to education through the law. He
served at Rutgers University School of Law and the American
University School of Law, interrupted by government service at
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, where he served
as consultant to the general counsel. During his first nine years,
he established and directed the Institute for Continuing Legal
Education at Rutgers University, leaving that post in 1970 to
devote his full time and attention to teaching at the Rutgers
University School of Law. While he was serving the bench and bar
in Continuing Legal Education, he frequently appeared as a
* Dean, University of Denver College of Law.
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spokesman for the law to the public, for example, as moderator
of a ten week series on WNBC television, and he led the efforts
of the Association of American Law Schools by chairing the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of that association.
Unsurprisingly, during his service to the bench and the bar,
he authored more than a dozen books and monographs on a wide
range of subjects of deep and significant interest to the bench and
bar; in addition he edited all of the books that were published by
the Institute for Continuing Legal Education in New Jersey during his nine years' service to continuing legal education.
The University of Denver first officially met Eli Jarmel when
he was a participant in the Social Science Methods in Legal
Education Summer Institute in 1969. Shortly thereafter he joined
the College of Law faculty as a Visting Professor of Law during
the summer of 1970. Because of his recognized abilities and capabilities, the College of Law at the University of Denver again
appointed Eli Jarmel as Visiting Professor of Law for the academic year of 1972-73. Only a few months after the beginning of
his service as Visiting Professor of Law, the faculty extended a
permanent offer with tenure to Professor Jarmel to become a
regular member of the faculty.
Eli Jarmel's academic and compelling interests were single
minded. He was insistent that legal services be extended to a
wider and deeper segment of Americans and he argued successfully that this goal could be accomplished most effectively by
questioning and potentially redesigning the system of delivery of
legal services. As early as 1967 he was a respected commentator
on law and poverty, and he was beginning to develop ideas about
new legal personnel: paraprofessionals. This deep concern for justifying the announced principles of a democratic society matured
into universal recognition of Eli Jarmel as an expert and distinguished scholar in those areas dealing with the equitable delivery
of legal services to all segments of the population. As a scholar,
he was the author of the leading case book on legal representation of the poor and he is known as an unquestioned authority on
problems of paralegal personnel and the design of new systems for
delivery of legal services.
During his career, at each stage he rightfully earned the recognition of the community and the profession. Indeed, in every
endeavor, he was cited for his excellence and quality of contribu-

1975

DEDICATION-ELI JARMEL

tion. This included recognition of his athletic prowess which resulted in his near-career as a professional athlete: he was a member of the All-American Soccer team.
Eli was a native Easterner, yet when he and his intelligent
wife and three fine children moved to Colorado, he became a
Coloradan. He served with distinction throughout the University
of Denver and he served the community as a member of the Board
of Trustees of the Colorado Rural Legal Services and as President
of the Colorado Institute for Legal Systems. Naturally, he continued to serve the nation as a member of the American Bar Association Sub-Committee on Standards for Certifying Non-Credit Paralegal Programs, as a regular faculty member at the National
College of the State Judiciary and of the American Academy of
Judicial Education. For this and other service, he was awarded
the distinction as an Outstanding Educator of America in 197475.
The death of Eli Jarmel is a stunning blow to all of us at the
College of Law. While a regular member of the faculty only since
1972, he has left a profound mark on it. His intellectual, philosophical, and spiritual leadership have strengthened all of his
colleagues and have greatly advanced the mission and reputation
of the College. His students and colleagues have lost an inquiring,
productive educator and mentor. Personally, I have lost a dear
friend and frequent collaborator, without whom my own work in
the future shall suffer.
The legal profession, including all of us at the College of Law,
shall long remember Eli for his continuing and unrelenting inquiries about the structure and goals of the profession-all toward
insisting that our system of law is just, fair, and available to all
under its announced protection. Eli sets an example for all members of the legal profession. Our greatest tribute to him is to
attempt, by precept and example, to meet the expectations he
taught us.

ELI JARMEL
By VED P. NANDA*
When Eli Jarmel joined the University of Denver College of
Law faculty as a visiting professor of law during 1972-73, he had
already established himself as a visionary legal scholar, a leader
of the legal profession, and an innovator in legal education. As the
founding director of the Institute for Continuing Legal Education
at Rutgers-an office in which he served with distinction from
1961 to 1970-Eli began to probe into the system of delivery of
legal services. This inquiry became the primary focus of his professional interest during the last ten years of his life. This interest
can be attributed to his concern with the need to understand the
role of paralegals in the legal profession and of the lawyer in
meeting the needs of the poor. One of his many major contributions was to provide the definitive studies of these subjects. In
addition, Eli wrote and edited more than a dozen books and
monographs on a wide range of subjects. His contribution as a
legal scholar is of lasting significance for the bench and the bar
and for law students as well.
Most of these accomplishments were known to Eli's colleagues at Denver when he joined us initially in the summer of
1970 and again in 1972-73 in a visiting capacity. However, what
came as a pleasant surprise to most of us was the man himself-a
warm human being, an unpretentious legal scholar, and a respected and effective teacher who inspired his students to achieve
the highest standards of excellence.
The students with whom I have talked fondly remember one
of Eli's qualities best: that he could somehow see one's hidden
potential and bring it out. Time and again, he would challenge
and provoke a student known for lack of desire to participate in
class discussion and bring about a transformation-forcing the
student to think, by refusing to accept rhetoric and easy answers,
and by encouraging and eliciting pertinent responses.
Eli brought out the best in his colleagues as well. What
struck me and others on the faculty here as perhaps his most
remarkable traits were his willingness to provide an example of
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.
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excellence through his own professionalism, and his immense
consideration and respect for his colleagues.
He insisted that the law school setting reflect the faculty's
concern with rigor and scholarship. His work with Continuing
Legal Education was an expression of his concern with upgrading
the knowledge and skills of the practicing bar. However, his constant reminder to the law student and the practicing lawyer was
that a good lawyer is one who delivers legal services efficiently
and competently to an ever larger number of people. He was
concerned that despite the increasingly large number of law graduates entering the legal profession each year, the system of delivery of services was still severely deficient.
The acute sensitivity and awareness of the problem did not
turn Eli into an alienated cynic. Far from it, for he had seen the
system work and had faith in modifying and improving it to meet
societal needs.
Eli was always striving for excellence in himself and he encouraged those who knew him to do so. He somehow touched most
of the people with whom he came in contact and in many instances gave a new direction to their lives. All who knew Eli have, at
his untimely death, suffered a deep and personal sorrow. Eli will
always be remembered as a devoted husband and father, a loving
son and brother, a loyal, committed friend, and a dedicated humanitarian. We are grateful for the opportunity to have known
him and are determined to carry on his unfinished task.

LEGISLATING THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL LAW
By

LAWRENCE

P.

TIFFANY,* CARL

A.

ANDERSON**

INTRODUCTION

The necessity, or choice of evils, defense has not been raised
very frequently. This is, no doubt, partly due to the relative rarity
of such situations and to the fact that police and prosecutors
screen out most of those cases that do come to their attention.
The importance of this body of law, however, may increase as
recodification of criminal law spreads. About 24 new criminal
codes have been adopted in the past dozen years, and almost as
many are in the legislative process. Many of these new codes have
a section dealing with the necessity defense. This analysis is
based largely on these new statutes and proposals, whether or not
they have been enacted, as they are likely to be interpreted in
light of the existing, but rather meager, case law of this defense.'
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; A.B., 1961, LL.B., 1963,
Washington University; S.J.D., 1967, University of Wisconsin.
**B.A., 1972, Seattle University; J.D., 1975, University of Denver College of Law.
' The statutory analysis in this article is based on the following documents. The
status of these materials is in flux and should be checked by the reader if an up-to-date
citation is required. Hereinafter, we will cite the source as noted.
Alaska: S. Bill 6, 9th Legis., 1st Sess. § 11.13.020 (undated) and H. Bill 524,
7th Legis., 2d Sess. § 11.13.020 (1972) [these provisions are identical and are
hereinafter cited as ALAs.].
Arkansas: Ark. Crim. Code, Act 280 of 1975 § 504 (effective Jan. 1, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as ARK.].
California: Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code,
The Criminal Code § 610(b) (Staff Draft, undated) [hereinafter cited as
CAL.]. This proposed statute is not included in S. Bill 565 (unamended
version, 1975).
Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
CoLO.].
Deleware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DEL.].
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 302 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
HAWAII].

Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18-302 (Supp. 1972, repealed 1972) [hereinafter cited
as IDAHO].
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1961) [hereinafter cited
as ILL.].
Indiana: Criminal Law Study Commission, Indiana Penal Code § 35-11.15-7 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) [hereinafter cited as IND.].
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
KY.].
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Our analysis leads to two general conclusions: legislation recognizing the defense is needed; and the proposal of the Model
Maine: S.P. 113-L.D. 314, An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, tit.
17A, § 103 (enacted June 1975, effective March 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as ME.].
Maryland: Commisson on Criminal Law, Proposed Criminal Code §
35.05(2) (1972) [hereinafter cited as MD.].
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Criminal Law Revision Commission,
Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts § 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
MAss.]. S. Bill 200 § 40 (1972), which contained the necessity defense, failed
to pass.
Michigan: Special Committee of the Michigan State Bar for the Revision
of the Criminal Code and Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence of the State
Bar of Michigan, Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 605 (Final Draft 1967)
[hereinafter cited as MICH.].
Missouri: The Committee to Draft a Modern Criminal Code, The Proposed
Criminal Code for the State of Missouri § 8.040 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Mo.].
Nebraska: Legislative Bill 329, 83d Legis., 1st Sess. § 60 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NEB.].
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as N.H.].
New Jersey: New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Comm'n, Vol. 1: Report
and Penal Code & Vol. II: Commentary § 2C:3-2 (Final Report, 1971) and
Assembly No. 3282 § 2C:3-2 (1975) [hereinafter cited collectively as N.J.].
New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.].
Oklahoma: Committee Substitute for S. Bill 46, 35th Legis., 1st Sess. § 1303 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OKLA.].
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1973 Replacement Part) [hereinafter
cited as ORE.].
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 503 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PA.].

South Carolina: Proposed Draft of the South Carolina Criminal Code §
12.10 (1971) and S. Bill 278 § 12.10 (1973) [hereinafter collectively cited as
S.C.].
Tennessee: Law Revision Commission, Tennessee Criminal Code and Code
of Criminal Procedure § 39-721 (Proposed Final Draft, 1973) and S. Bill 600
§ 721 (1975) [hereinafter collectively cited as TENN.].
Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TEX.].
Vermont: Proposed Criminal Code of Vermont § 202 (1970), deleted from
H. Bill 419 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VT.].
Washington: Revised Washington Criminal Code § 9A.16.020 (1970), deleted from Substitute Bill 2092, 44th Legis., 1st Sess. (enacted 1975, effective
1976) [hereinafter cited as WASH.].
Wisconsin: WiS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Wis.].
A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL PENAL CODE].
Kommentarii Kugolovnomu Kodeksu RSFSR (Commentary on the Criminal Code of
the R.S.F.S.R. § 14, Moscow 1971) [trans. by T. Larkovich and H. Clark] [hereinafter
cited as U.S.S.R.].
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Penal Code is superior to later legislative efforts to improve upon
it.
I.

THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT DISTINGUISHED

The necessity defense always involves a voluntary choice on
the part of the actor and should, therefore, be distinguished from
the "defense" based on the absence of a voluntary act.2
[T]o treat leaving the ship under stress of perils of the sea as not
distinguishable on principle from being torn bodily away from it by
tempest . . . is one of the oldest fallacies of the law. The difference
between the two is the difference between an act and no act. The
distinction is well settled in the parallel instance of duress by
threats, as distinguished from overmastering physical force applied
to a man's body and imparting to it the motion sought to be attrib3
uted to him.

A frequent problem from the defendant's perspective is that his
claim of involuntariness will be wrongly classed by the court as
necessity. Thus, attention is focused on the desirabilityof compliance with the law, rather than on the possibility of compliance,
which is the true issue in involuntariness cases. The involvement
of natural forces often leads some authorities to misinterpret a
defense based on the lack of a voluntary act and to misclassify
the case as one of necessity. This misclassification occurred in one
case where the defendant was under an obligation to maintain a
'

The word "necessity" ... is somewhat misleading. Strictly speaking there
is no necessity in the sense that the thing is inevitable or unavoidable. For
if it were, then there would be the legal defence that the accused's act was
not voluntary. In reality the position is that the person (perhaps with very
good reason) much prefers to do the thing which he does rather than something else, which would be more unpleasant.
KENNY'S OUrLINES OF CRIMINAL LAw 67 (J. Turner ed. 1962).
[T]he word "necessity" is only used by the defence to a charge of crime in
what is the vain hope of making the criminal deed appear to have been the
result either of involuntary conduct, or of some irresistible external compulsion, instead of being what it really was, the result of a voluntary choice of
that alternative which the accused felt to be the less disagreeable to himself.
1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 93 (J. Turner ed. 1964).
Mr. Justice Holmes in The Eliza Lines, 199 U.S. 119, 130 (1905). Jerome Hall
distinguishes "harms caused solely by the operation of physical forces and harms which
were inflicted under pressure of such forces" and relies upon Aristotelian metaphysics to
develop the term "teleological necessity" to describe the act which is the proper subject
of the necessity defense. J. HALL, GENERA.L PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 425 (2d ed. 1960).
See also Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 390, 82 N.E. 781, 781 (1907), wherein the court stated,
"there must be, if not a physical, at least a moral, necessity for the act." (dictum).
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road that could not be maintained because of natural forces;4 and
in another case where a ship, because of a storm, was forced upon
the shore of a foreign country without the required entry permit.5
Most of these cases, as Jerome Hall points out, involve an omission to perform an affirmative duty.' It should be clear that a
failure to act without the ability to act does not involve the justification of necessity. There is no crime to justify. Similarly, where
the defendant was caught in a traffic jam, conviction for illegal
parking could not be upheld; not because defendant made the
right choice, but because he had no choice.' Courts have also applied the doctrine to cases where a more appropriate analysis
would justify the defendant's conduct on the theory that it did
not cause the harm anticipated by the statute or, in the alternative, that the defendant's action was not within the harm sought
to be avoided by the statutory prohibition.'
II.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE HARMS

Codification of the necessity defense has tended, in most
instances, to increase the stringency of the required relationship
of the harm committed to the harm avoided.9 At common law the
Regina v. Bambler, 5 Q.B. 279 (1843).
The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 (1868). See generally The Struggle, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 71 (1815); The William Grey, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (No. 17,694) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810);
The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 240, 165 Eng. Rep. 450 (In. 1801).
J. HALL, supra note 3, at 424; Commonwealth v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 202
Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909).
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434 (1868).
Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905); State v.
Burris, 10 Ore. App. 297, 500 P.2d 265 (1972), and cases cited therein.
I A comparison of foreign jurisdictions reveals a variety of formulations of the relation: Argentina: "caused a harm in order to avert another greater and imminent harm,"
[1963] Anales de Legislacion Argentina art. 34 (Argentina Penal Code). See also 6
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 28 (G. Mueller ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN SERIES]. Denmark: the interests to be sacrificed to avoid the harm must be of
"relatively minor importance," DANISH COMM'N ON COMPARATIVE LAW, DANISH AND SWEDISH
LAW ch. 9, § 23 (1963). Egypt: "the danger must be great, not merely great in proportion
to the gravity of the offense committed [and it] must be one of bodily evil," Egyptian
Penal Code, art. 61 (1937). Greenland: "necessary to prevent impending damage to persons or property, when the offense is relatively insignificant," Greenland Criminal Code
§ 6 (1954). See also 16 AMERICAN SERIES 16 (1970). Japan: "the injury produced by such
act is not out of proportion to the injury which was sought to be averted," Penal Code of
Japan, Art. 37. But see J. TAKEUCHI, A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE
OF JAPAN, art. 14 (1964), which states "the harm resulting therefrom does not exceed the
harm sought to be averted." See also 8 AMERICAN SERIES 23 (1964). Norway: speaks of
the "danger as extremely significant in relation to the damage his act might cause,"
Norwegian Penal Code § 47 (1902). See also 3 AMERICAN SERIES 29 (1961). Poland: "the
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required relationship was that "the evil inflicted by [the defendant's act] was not disproportionate to the evil avoided."' 0 The
Model Penal Code and some of its adherents require the harm
avoided to be "greater than" the harm done," but some states go
further and require that the harm averted "clearly outweigh" the
harm caused. 2 The New York code is the strictest. It requires that
"the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.' 3 Whether
this issue can be clarified through objective criteria provided by
legislation seems doubtful. The commentary to the Texas code,
which adopts the New York language, underscores this point:
"[W]hat is 'harm' and what 'harms' are greater than others are
questions purposefully left for case-by-case determination ....
[T]his is inevitable in stating a general principle . . . ."" Furthermore, some crimes deal with behavior that has no harm component. 1
New York introduced a further explicit limitation on the
balancing of the evils: "The necessity and justifiability of [the
defendant's] conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in
its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder."' 6 The New York comgood sacrificed does not represent a value manifestly greater than the good being rescued,"
Polish People's Republic Penal Code, art. 23 (1969). See also 19 AMERICAN SERIES 39 (1973).
Republic of China: "the act averting danger [may not be] excessive," Republic of China
Criminal Code art. 24; see 2 COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 187 (D.
Kang ed. 1971). Soviet Union: the "harm caused is less significant than the harm prevented," R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) § 14 (amended through July 1965)
(U.S.S.R.). See also SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 149 (2d ed.
H. Berman & J. Spindler transl. 1972); Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56
YALE L.J. 803 (1947).
J. STEPHAN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, art. 32 (1878). See also Chesapeake &
O.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905).
* MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); see ALAS.; HAWAII; IDAHO; ILL.;
IND.; Ky.; NEB.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.; WASH.
* See CoLo.; DEL.; ME.; MD.; MICH.; N.Y.; ORE.; S.C.; TEX.

13N.Y.
" TEX., Comment.

"5 It is precisely this absence of harm which makes much police work known as
encouragement legally acceptable; see Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of
Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963).
" N.Y. States which have adopted New York's limitations are: ARK.; COLO.; DEL.;
IND.; MD.; MICH.; MO.; ORE.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

mentary points out that this provision renders the necessity defense "unavailable to the mercy killer, the crusader who considers
a penal statute unsalutary because it tends to obstruct his cause,
and the like."'"
The thrust of this limitation is aimed at withholding the
defense from persons attempting to justify acts of civil disobedience. However, courts have obtained the same result in the absence of legislative guidance by finding defendants unable to satisfy other elements of the defense, including imminence, 8 lack of
alternatives, 9 and a reasonable nexus between the defendant's
act and the harm sought to be avoided. 0 The doctrine of necessity
is generically inappropriate to justify acts of civil disobedience,
since the defendant's conduct, rather than attempting to directly
avoid a specific harm, attempts to transcend accepted democratic processes and seeks to change a political decision of society
which may only secondarily avoid a particular harm or evil.2'
'1 N.Y., Comment. In order to avoid possible confusion in interpreting the restriction,
the commentary to the proposed Maryland statute says
[t]he New York provision states that the defense may not rest on considerations pertaining "only" to the morality and advisability of the statute; this
suggests that such considerations may properly be considered as a partial
contribution to the defense. The Commission believes that they should not
be relevant at all, and has therefore deleted the word "only".
MD., Comment.
" Where prisoners in a correctional institution held guards and civilians as hostages
under threats to kill them if needed improvements in living conditions within the institution were not made, a New York court denied the necessity defense since the conduct could
not be found to be "necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or
private injury which is about to occur." People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d
342, 347 (1972).
11Finding that alternative opportunities for noncriminal protest were available; and
that "the harmful acts to be prevented by defendants' actions were, at best, only tenuously connected with the situs of the crime" and were "not reasonably designed to
actually prevent the threatened greater harm." State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 458, 509
P.2d 1095, 1109 (1973), upheld the conviction of defendants on charges of criminal trespass
to private property during an attempt to stop "war crimes" by a major defense contractor.
1 In United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972), defendant was convicted
on charges of having destroyed government property. The court found an essential element
of the necessity defense to be that "a direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated
to exist between the defender's action and the avoidance of harm," and held that it was
unreasonable for defendant to assume that burning local draft board records would terminate United States involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. Id. at 518.
21 Where defendant burned selective service records during an antiwar protest,
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971), the court rejected defendant's
necessity defense and concluded that:
[olne who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own hands
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III.

LIMITATIONS ON THE HARM THREATENED

At common law it seems to have been a generally recognized
requirement of the necessity defense that the harm threatened be
"imminent," although there is some confusion about the term's
meaning. Under the current statutes and proposals it is unclear
if there is a division of opinion on the "imminence" question. The
Model Penal Code and many others have no such explicit requirement. On the other hand, New York and its followers appear to
be quite rigid, requiring that defendant's conduct be "necessary
as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private
injury."2 Under codes taking the Model Penal Code approach of
omitting an explicit reference to "imminence," a court could, of
course, infer such a requirement
from the words "necessary" or
''emergency measure. ' '23
Where imminence is thought to be a requirement, however,
its meaning may be misunderstood, resulting in an erroneous
limitation on the defense. The lay definition of "imminent" is
"likely to happen without delay. "21 However, given the purposes
served by the necessity doctrine in criminal law, the proper use
of the imminence requirement is to focus attention on the probability of the threatened harm actually occurring. While immediacy is obviously relevant to making that determination, the mistake sometimes made is to assume that it is all that is relevant,
obscuring the point that other factors are also potentially relethereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine policy
is superior to democratic decision making. [Defendant's] professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of
arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate.
Id. at 392. See also Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972). The judicial concern towards this attitude about
law is nicely represented by R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEAsoNs 66 (1960):
More: [Would you] cut a great road through the law to get after the
Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round
on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast. . . and if you cut them down
. . .d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
21N.Y.; Wis.
1 Texas requires the actor's conduct be "immediately necessary." TEX. Tennessee
has used the same language. TENN.
" WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTONARY (2d College ed., 1970) (emphasis added).
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vant. Furthermore, the existence vel non of reasonable alternatives ought to be relevant to determining whether the threatened
harm is imminent: the threatened harm should not be considered
imminent if there were alternative ways of preventing it other
than by the commission of a crime.
In Aldrich v. Wright 5 the court observed:
The term "imminent" does not describe the proximity of the
danger by any rule of mechanical measurement. . . .The law does
not fix the distance of time between the justifiable defense and the
mischief, for all cases, by the clock or the calendar. The chronological part of the doctrine of defense, like the rest of it, is a matter of
reasonableness; and reasonableness depends upon circumstances.2

The strongest recognition of this view is found in the commentary
to the Missouri Proposed Code which, being patterned after New
York's, includes the "imminent" requirement:
[Ilt must be remembered that what constitutes "emergency measure" and "imminent" does not depend solely on the interval of time
before the injury sought to be prevented will occur. Additional circumstances of the particular fact situation must also be evaluated.
Thus, if under the circumstances, the mere passage of time is such
that a reasonable man would perceive no viable alternatives to his
present course of conduct the fact that the injury sought to be prevented will not take place for some time hence, e.g., six hours, will
not prevent the use of the defense of justification under this section,
provided it is otherwise available."

Yet, of all the states that use the same or an equivalent term, only
the Missouri commentary makes it clear that imminence is not
exclusively a temporal component.
In the context of the more specific justification of selfdefense, it has been pointed out that "[i]f the threatened violence is scheduled to arrive in the more distant future, there may
be avenues open to the defendant to prevent it other than to kill
or injure the prospective attacker; but this is not so where the
attack is imminent." 8 Thus, temporal "imminence" of the threat
53 N.H. 398, 16 Am. Rep. 339 (1873). See also Reid, Of Men, and Minks, and a
Mischievous Machinator,1 N.H.B.J. 23 (1959).
2 53 N.H. at 402, 16 Am. Rep. at 344-45.
Mo., Commentary (1973). See also R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) §
14 (amended through July 1965) (U.S.S.R.), where "[e]xtreme necessity" is a defense
when, inter alia, "such danger cannot be eliminated by other means," but the threat must
be "real and immediate." Id. at 37.
2"

W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 394 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &

Scorr].
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may be defense evidence of a lack of alternatives, but the absence
of temporal "imminence" is not proof of the existence of alternatives. A hypothetical self-defense case has been described as follows:
[A] cuckholded husband [who] imprisons and chains his wife's
latest lover in an abandoned cellar with the announced intention of
killing him after the passage of sufficient time for the stir over his
absence to quiet down, probably several months. Must the intended
victim wait until the final moment when the husband is about to
commit the fatal act, or may he kill the husband in self-defense at
any time during the period of imprisonment he can succeed in laying
hands upon him?"

Surely the answer to the question is clear. If the defendant has
no alternative, the threatened harm need not be imminent in the
lay and literal meaning of that term, that is, in time.
The second major failure of the case law development of
necessity, even when recognizing that the purpose of the imminence requirement is, in part, to focus attention on the question
of whether there were alternative and less drastic courses of action that would have averted the harm, has been the proclivity
of judges to find, after the fact, the existence of unrealistic or
unreasonable alternatives. In the famous case of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens,'"the jury made a special finding of fact that at the
time defendants killed, they had no reasonable prospect of rescue.' In discussing this case, Justice Cardozo said: "who shall
know when masts and sails of rescue may emerge out of the
fog?"3 Under such a view, is death by starvation ever imminent?
Jerome Hall has pointed out that:
It is therefore clear that neither the English court nor Cardozo
considered the ethics of the doctrine of necessity. They rejected the
It is sometimes said that the defense of necessity does not apply except in
an emergency-when the threatened harm is immediate, the threatened
disaster imminent. Perhaps this is but a way of saying that, until the time
comes when the threatened harm is immediate, there are generally options
open to the defendant, to avoid the harm, other than the option of disobeying
the literal terms of the law-the rescue ship may appear, the storm may
pass; and so the defendant must wait until that hope of survival disappears.
Id. at 388.
S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 497 (1969), evidently
based on Edgar Alan Poe's "The Cask of Amontillado."
14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
31 Id.
32 B. CARDOZO, Li\AW AND LITERATURE

113 (1930).
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doctrine because, in effect, they denied that a state of necessity
could ever exist. Such repudiation of the doctrine of necessity
amounts not to the invalidation of the principle to conserve the
maximum value possible but to such a challenge of it on empirical
grounds as to guarantee that it could never be applied."

The persistence of these problems is clearly illustrated by a
consideration of the prison escape cases when necessity is raised
as a defense. One of the worst examples of this is found in State
v. Green.3 The 19-year-old defendant had been repeatedly attacked and homosexually raped by a number of inmates. After
several unsuccessful requests for protection from prison officials,
he was allegedly told to defend himself, submit, or "go over the
fence." On the day of his escape, the defendant was confronted
by five inmates who threatened him with death or serious bodily
injury if he did not agree to submit to homosexual acts during the
remainder of his term at the training center. They were going to
return that night. That evening, before the inmates returned, the
defendant escaped. The Missouri Supreme Court held the necessHALL, supra note 3, at 434.
To say that a threat of future harm is not sufficient is to ignore the fact that
the nature of a threat is to hold out a future harm. All danger to the "duressed" is in the future, for if it were in the present it would no longer be a
danger or a threat but would be an accomplished harm. Wherever danger is
the spring for human action, as when one seeks to avoid it, such avoidance
implies a temporality not coterminous with the harm threatened. It is
equally true that all harms done have been past threats, since these threats
occur before the "duressed" acts. Thus, where the courts have required present danger to life rather than past or future fear of danger to life, such
distinctions are meaningless. To be present, the threat or harm threatened
would have to occur contemporaneously with the act done ....
A better approach would be to ... state that the threat ... must occur
the harm ....
within a "reasonable" time before ...
Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 313, 32829 (1957).
1 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972); Note, Necessity As

J.

a Defense, 37 Mo. L. REV. 550 (1972). Even the most gruesome and intolerable living
conditions historically have afforded no justification. Aderhold v. Soileau, 67 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1933); People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); State v. Palmer, 45
Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (1950); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 N.W. 191 (1923); State v.
Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. Rep. 563 (1880). However, an inmate may leave a burning
prison to save his life. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921). The distortion of the
necessity defense in prison escape cases-cases to which it clearly applies-undoubtedly
results from the courts' own "necessity" predicament. Those courts which reject the
defense in that context are simply making the value judgment that recognition of the
defense would lead to harms greater than the threat to escaping prisoners who raise the
defense.
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ity defense unavailable, since defendant had not adequately pursued alternative courses of action. They not only stressed alternatives that may have resulted in Green's death, but also held that
the threatened danger which occasioned his escape was too remote in time from the commission of the offense. 5 The one dissenting justice pointed out the illusory nature of any alternative
remedies, due to the reality of prison life and the defendant's
previous experience. 6 The requirement of temporal immimence
does not serve its normal purpose in this situation; the mere
passage of time does not make reasonable alternatives available.
The recognition in the Commentary to the Missouri Proposed
Code that "imminence" is not exclusively a temporal concept
may help overturn the majority opinion in Green.
A Michigan court of appeals, in a similar situation in People
v. Noble,3" had earlier refused to allow the defense. However, a
different Michigan court of appeals, in People v. Harmon,3 disagreed with the decision in Noble stating that "[t]he facts in
[such a case] were more than sufficient to require the submission
of the defense . . . to the jury" and that "whether the alleged
danger was immediate or imminent is, in all but the clearest
cases, to be decided by the trier of fact taking into consideration
all the surrounding circumstances, including the defendant's
opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm. '31
The court in Noble recognized that conditions in Michigan
penal institutions were in need of reform, but maintained that
such a reform was properly left to the legislature. However, while
agreeing with the statement that "penal reform by the Legislature is the best solution to this difficult problem," the Harmon
court did not "because of that fact, preclude a defendant from
presenting available defenses.""0 Five years after the decision in
Noble, and in the same year as Harmon, the division of the court
" 470 S.W.2d at 568. It should be noted that in Missouri, a person may use such force
as is reasonably necessary to prevent a forcible attack of sodomy, even if such force results
in the death of the attacker. State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1959); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.040 (Vernon's 1953).
470 S.W.2d at 568-71.
'7 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
3 People v. Harmon, 58 Mich. App. 482, 484, 220 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1974).
Id. at 485, 220 N.W.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
0 Id.
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of appeals that had decided Noble held in People v. Luther' that
it was error to instruct a jury that necessity was not a defense to
a charge of escape. Noble was not even cited. This year the Su43
2
preme Court of Michigan affirmed both Luther" and Harmon
and took the position that Noble did not really address the issue
at hand. In Harmon, the Michigan Supreme Court pointed out
that the defendant did not leave the prison until 24 hours after
the homosexual threat, and nevertheless affirmed the opinion of
the court of appeals, presumably indicating approval of the language quoted above from that decision." Unfortunately, the court
refers to the defense as "duress" thereby further confusing the
distinction between duress and necessity.
In 1929 a California appeals court also rejected the defense
of necessity in a prison escape case, People v. Whipple.4 5 The
court stated that "if no statutory excuse or justification apply as
to the commission of the particular offense, neither the common
law nor the so-called 'unwritten law' may legally supply it." Since
the existing California Penal Code did not recognize a justification of necessity, neither did the court, despite the claim of "brutal treatment of extreme atrocity" by prison authorities. 8 People
v. Richards4 7 later upheld Whipple by rejecting a nonstatutory
justification of necessity. There the defendant's escape was not
found to be justified by duress, 48 since the threats were intended
to force the defendant to commit homosexual acts, and were not
intended to force him to escape. 4 However, a different California
appellate court, in People v. Lovercamp,5 ° held the necessity defense to an escape charge a "viable defense," but placed "rigid
limitations" on that "viability" by making it available only under
53 Mich. App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812 (1974).
232 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. 1975).
43 232 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. 1975).
" Id. at 188.
"

42

100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); a similar result was reached in State v.
Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964).
," 100 Cal. App. 261, 267, 279 P. 1008, 1009-10 (1929). See also Note, Duress and the
Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1062 (1972); Comment,
Escape: The Defenses of Duress and Necessity, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 430 (1972).
,1 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969), citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West
1969).
1 Id. at 773-74, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
49 Id.

43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
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certain conditions.5 ' Thus, the appellate courts of California are
now divided on whether the necessity defense is available in
prison escape cases. The Supreme Court of California has yet to
address the question.
The Arizona Supreme Court 5 has followed the WhippleRichards line of cases. Lack of imminence was also stressed by
the Kansas Supreme Court in what was technically a duress
situation,53 when a deputy warden, according to defendant's offer
of proof, threatened to kill him if he did not escape:
Two other cases may provide some inferential support for the
Harmon-Lovercamp approach allowing the defense. In Matthews
v. State,5" the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in rejecting the defense argument that it was error to refuse to let the defendants
present their evidence to the jury, stressed the fact that:
[T]he failure of a prisoner to immediately return to lawful custody
after the impending danger has been avoided, is within itself an
escape and prevents a defense of escape because of necessity ....
In the instant case the prisoners not only made their immediate
escape from the alleged impending danger, but they continued to
flee farther away from the place of their lawful confinement."

The court also appears to have been influenced by the fact that
the defendants had used a gun to effectuate their escape, a fact
also present in the Arizona case."
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case is less clear. In People
Id. at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack
or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time
for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints
which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time
or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There is no evidence of force or
violence used towards prison personnel or other "innocent" persons in the
escape; and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities
when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
Id. at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (footnote omitted). Although an inmate may be
justified in escape from a penal institution, to thereafter remain at large on his own
volition constitutes the crime of escape. United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746, 749-50
(5th Cir. 1972).
"2 State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973).
13 State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581, 516 P.2d 984 (1973), decided under KAN. STAT. ANN.
21-3209(1) (Supp. 1972) (a compulsion statute).
288 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1974).

Id. at 714.
State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973).
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v. Barker,57 the defendant was threatened by other prisoners. Defendant contended the trial court had committed error by refusing his motion for a directed verdict. The court said:
Whether or not defendant's theory of the case constituted a
viable defense to the crime of escape is beyond the pale of our immediate concern; nonetheless, this theory of duress [sic] as an excuse
was fully presented to the jury by the trial court in its instructions.
The jury, by its verdict, found the facts othewise than as contended
by the defendant and his witnesses."

Whether any weight was given on appeal to the fact that
Barker did not turn himself in is unclear. The state's brief quoted
from that part of the Matthews opinion quoted above, and
pointed out that Barker was arrested in California almost a year
after the escape. 9 While the court did advert to the fact that the
defendant was arrested in California, if the jury was properly
instructed on the necessity defense and found the escape unjustified, there was no reason for the court to go into the matter.
The courts are divided on the escape cases. Some stress the
limitation on the defense of necessity that the harm threatened
must be "imminent," and then find that it was not. They also
stress unreasonable alternatives. Other courts require the defendant to terminate the continuing nature of the harm done (escape) by turning himself in when he has reached safety, and there
is slight authority in these cases that the harm of escape must not
be enhanced by use of a deadly weapon. It should be noted that
none of these cases was decided under a modern necessity statute.
The already all too common judicial practice in prison escape
cases of stressing unrealistic alternatives and the judicial habit
of assuming that "imminence" is to be "measured by the clock"
even in the prison context have both been given recent impetus
by the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Robertson,6' an
opinion that not only perpetuates these approaches, but significantly expands them.
First, the defendant was not convicted of escape but of possession of a weapon in prison.' The defendant testified that he
7 538 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1975).

Id. at 109-10. While the court used the term "duress," presumably the reference
should have been to necessity.
1, Answer Brief for Appellee at 4, People v. Barker, 538 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1975).
0 No. 75-088 (Colo. Ct. App., Sept. 3, 1975), 4 CoLO. LAWYER 2130 (Nov. 1975).
11CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-203(I)(b) (1973).
"
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left his cell in the morning of the day of the offense and locked
it. When he returned later in the day it was open and his mattress
had been moved. He looked under it and found a knife. He
testified that he did not want to turn the knife in to the authorities for fear other inmates would learn of his cooperation. He said
he was caught with the knife on his way to try to dispose of it
himself. An official evidently partly corroborated his testimony
regarding his fear of assault if he became known as one who
cooperated with prison authorities. Thus, Robertson is the first
necessity case to arise in the prison context that does not involve
outright escape.
Secondly, Robertson is the first prison case to be decided
under a modern necessity statute. The Colorado statute provides
in part:
[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure
to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to
occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no
conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought
to be prevented by the statute
2
defining the offense in issue.

Thirdly, the appeal was taken because the trial court took
the necessity defense from the jury and decided on its own that
the defense was not made out by the testimony offered at trial.
A trial court has statutory authority to do this under the Colorado
provision that
[w]henever evidence relating to the defense of justification is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the consideration
of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law whether the
claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a
justification."

This language originated in the New York statute and was copied
in the Michigan proposal which served as the model for Colorado.
The commentary to the Michigan code states:
To control possible misuse of the "choice of evils" concept, the trial
judge is to screen the evidence offered by the defense before the jury
62

Id. § 18-1-702(1).

- Id. § 18-1-702(2).
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hears it; if the matter is mishandled it becomes a question on appeal. 4

The Colorado Court of Appeals held that "an allegation by
a defendant of a generalized fear of retaliation will not support
the defense. Put simply, the threat to defendant's person must be
so definite, specific, and imminent as to rise beyond mere speculation." 5 This application of the statutory "imminence" requirement was derived from People v. Lovercamp, the California
Court of Appeals decision discussed earlier.
There is an even more troublesome question about this case
quite apart from the overly stringent definition of imminence. If
one steps back a very short distance from this opinion, that question becomes clear: Why is Robertson being punished for what he
did? He harmed no legally protected interest. He did not even
increase the risk of harm to anyone as escape cases may tend to
do. In fact, his conduct may have tended to decrease risk-he was
trying to secretly dispose of a weapon.
The heart of the necessity defense involves a balancing of
harms-the harm threatened against the harm done. How can the
balance be tipped against a defendant who did no harm solely
because the harm threatened might be thought by some to be too
remote to satisfy a strict interpretation of the term "imminent"?
No matter how improbable or temporally remote the threatened
harm, should not the scales be tipped in favor of a defendant who
sought to avoid that threatened harm by an act that posed no
threat to anyone? The answer, we believe, lies not in the holding
that the defendant's testimony did not satisfy the Colorado statutory definition of the necessity defense; the point rather seems to
be that no one believed Robertson. Thus, despite the necessity
defense being raised under a modern statute-indeed, largely
because of it-defendant was allowed to be convicted of a harmless act (if the defendant's version is to be believed) in a prison
setting without even being allowed to take his defense to the jury.
We have serious questions regarding the consistency of this practice with the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial."

"

MICH. at 61.
4 CoLO. LAWYER at 2131.

See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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In addition to the imminence requirement, some jurisdictions further require the action of the defendant to be an "emergency measure." New York finds this necessary so as to closely
"limit its application and to preclude extension beyond the narrow scope intended. '"6 Maryland has also added this phrase, finding that it "is probably sound caution; true necessity situations
involve emergencies. ' 70 The commentary to the Massachusetts
proposal refers to an "emergency situation," although the statute
itself is silent on the point. 71 The Colorado Court of Appeals could
as well have relied on this limitation to affirm Robertson's conviction.
Apart from the imminence limitation and the relational requirement that the harm threatened be greater than the harm
done, most proposed codes and existing statutes do not limit the
threats of harm which justify a person in committing what would
otherwise be a crime. While most jurisdictions merely require
that a "harm" or a "harm or evil" be avoided or sought to be
avoided, 72 Illinois, New York, and some others require a "public
or private injury, ' 7 even though there appears to be no significance intended in the distinction. Wisconsin, however, requires
a threat of public disaster, death, or great bodily harm. 7 California added "serious damage to property" to the Wisconsin formu75
lation.
Most new codes require that the actor entertain a "reasonable belief in the necessity of his conduct. 76 However, the New
York statute and the states following it insist the actor be
right-not just reasonable. The defense is available only when
"such conduct is necessary" to avoid the injury. 77 None of the
commentaries to statutes taking the New York approach explain
" See, e.g., ARK.; CoLO.;

DEL.; MD.; MiCH.; Mo.; N.Y.; OREs.
N.Y., Comment. See also People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
" MD., Comment.
7 See, e.g., MAss.
0

'2
73

See, e.g., PA.
ILL.; N.Y.

74Wis.
CAL. Maine restricts it to "physical harm to himself or another." ME. The limitation found in Wisconsin and California is comparable to the limitations on the duress
defense at common law. LAFAvE & ScoTr at 374.
7 See note 125 infra.
' See note 114 infra.
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why criminal liability should depend on the actor being right,
rather than reasonable. And since necessity is composed of three
elements-perception of a threat of harm, absence of less drastic
alternatives, and a value choice-under the New York formulation, the actor is required, presumably, to be right about all three
of these components. Most jurisdictions require only that the
actor be right in his value choice, not in his assessment of the
necessity for such a choice. Other defenses, including the use of
deadly force, are less restrictive.
What constitutes an acceptable source of the threatened injury has been categorically limited by some authorities to a force
majeur or the "physical forces of nature.""8 This limitation requires the defendant to argue the duress justification rather than
necessity when "natural" forces are not involved. The duress defense is usually (and inexplicably) more limited than is the necessity defense. Among other differences, it is required that some
person intended by his conduct to coerce the defendant to commit
a crime. Hence, duress is not available when defendant escapes
prison to avoid harm to himself from authorities or other prisoners, since they did not intend defendant to escape.79 To improperly classify defendant's necessity defense as a duress defense
will, therefore, cause him to lose. To insist upon a duress-ornothing approach, merely because human agency was culpably
involved in bringing about the choice of evils situation, is clearly
wrong. Indeed, it is often possible to find culpable human activity
7 LAFAVE & Scorr at 381. However, a contrary view has been expressed.
[Tihere would be grave difficulties if a person's right to protect himself or
another against, for instance, a danger created by fire, or an animal, turned
on whether some person had caused the fire or had failed in his responsibility
to control the animal. There is nothing to suggest that English law makes
any such distinctions.
Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMB. L.J. 87, 89 (1972)
(footnote omitted). See also U.S.S.R. at 36:
A danger that is alleviated in the state of extreme necessity can originate
from different sources: from the action of natural forces (floods, fires started
from lightening, etc.), or any mechanism (for instance a car without brakes),
or from the attack of an animal. Danger can be provoked also by a man who
is harming or threatening harm to any legally protected interests.
(Footnotes omitted.)
7'Duress was properly relied upon in State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581, 516 P.2d 984
(1973), because defendant was told by a deputy warden that he would kill him if he did
not "run off." Id. at 583, 516 P.2d at 985. Defendant still lost his appeal on the "imminence" requirement.
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behind the problematic situation even when it is conceded that
the case is properly one of necessity. For example, if one leaves
the scene of a car crash to rush an injured person to a hospital,
human agency brought about the choice of evils situation, but no
one would suggest that the driver's defense is duress-or-nothing.
This is recognized by the codes in their virtually universal rejection of any limitation on the defense because of the source of the
threatened harm. The lone exception is Wisconsin, which requires the "pressure of natural physical forces." ' 0 Classification
problems will continue to exist even though, except in Wisconsin,
choice of evils is not restricted to force majeur situations. The
reason is that, given an adequately drafted necessity statute,
there is no need for the more limited justification provided by the
duress or coercion statutes.
A further question arises concerning the nature of the harm
sought to be avoided-must the event threatened actually involve
a harm or will it suffice if it is a crime? For instance, may the
actor steal and destroy another's cache of marijuana, in order to
prevent the other person from using or selling it? It is perhaps for
cases such as this that the Model Penal Code uses the phrase "to
avoid a harm or evil."'8 If the actor is limited to preventing "in-

jury," as in New York, his case appears more difficult than if he
is permitted to avoid "evils" as well.
At one time, the question whether a person who stole food as
the only means of preventing his imminent death by starvation
could be justified by necessity gave rise to considerable discussion
U Wis.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).

"

MR. SMITHERS: I have perhaps a picayune one. Is the word "evil"
defined anywhere in this Code?
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: No, it is not. It was used deliberately
rather than "harm" which is in some ways more conventional, because we
thought it a word of broader meaning. If you are thinking only of personal
crimes, crimes of personal violence, "harm" would be a better word; but we
must have in mind even regulatory offenses, for example, given in the comments. There is the illustration of a physician who dispenses a limited drug
in what he considers to be an emergency without prescription.
There I think that all the evils that the Harrison Act is directed at would
have to be taken into account in determining whether the emergency justified the violation.
It is, incidentally, the word that Holmes used in The Common Law in
his essay on the criminal law.
ALI PROCEEDINGS 229 (1958).
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among legal scholars.8 2 Although legal scholars remained rather
evenly divided on the subject, moral philosophers generally
agreed that such an act was not ethically culpable.13 There is no
American case which directly addresses the question. In State v.
Moe"4 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the defendants for grand larceny and riot when, during a
demonstration in support of a demand for a greater allowance of
flour from the Red Cross relief committee, the crowd entered a
nearby store and "helped themselves to groceries." The court
stated that "economic necessity has never been accepted as a
defense to a criminal charge. 8' 5 The precise issue in the case arose
because the trial court excluded general "evidence of economic
conditions at and before the time the offenses charged occurred
....

"8

The comment to the proposed Washington State necess-

ity statute, a statute which was not adopted, concluded that "this
section is not inconsistent with Moe, if for no other reason than
the implicit holding in the case that that particular conduct produced greater harm or evil than the harm or evil it was designed
to avoid." ' The court in Moe was correct in denying the defense
because an imminent threat was not alleged nor was it alleged
that he lacked reasonable alternatives.8 The difficulty with the
opinion is that that court classed the defendant's defense as "economic necessity" and then held that "economic necessity" is
never a defense. This is too broad and subject to misunderstanding. If all the other elements of the necessity defense are satisfied, it is of no significance that the cause of the immediate harm
See generally G. WILuAmS, CRIMiNAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 236 (2d ed. 1961).
See, e.g., T. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE H-11, q. 66, a. 6; and V. BOURKE, ETHICS
389 (2d ed. 1966). Blackstone took the position that the defense in these circumstances
was "an unwarranted doctrine" and "antiquated, the law of England admitting no such
excuse." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 31.
8 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1929). See also United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663,
665 (9th Cir. 1972); Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
" 174 Wash. 303, 307, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (1929).
u Id. at 306, 24 P.2d at 638.
"7 WASH., Comment.
0 Although defendants had demanded more flour from the Red Cross, it was never
alleged that defendants or others were suffering from starvation or malnutrition or were
threatened with any type of bodily injury due to a shortage of food. The fact that they
did not possess as much flour as they may have liked, does not constitute the "harm or
evil" required now by statute nor then by common law. Nor was it alleged that defendants
were without reasonable alternatives for procuring food.
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may be "economic." None of the new statutes place an "economic
necessity" limitation on the defense.
Whether the defendant was successful in averting the threatened harm appears to be irrelevant. This is most clear under
statutes which refer only to the harm "sought to be avoided" 9 or
"the harm which the actor seeks to prevent.""0 Less clear are
statutes, such as New York's, which refer to defendant's conduct
which "is necessary . . . to avoid . . . injury."'" To require the
defendant to in fact avert the threatened harm would, of course,
predicate the existence of the defense in many circumstances
upon purely fortuitous events entirely outside the defendant's
control.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE HARM DONE
Taking the life of an innocent person has been the subject of
much speculative commentary. An "innocent" person is evidently one not committing a crime and the limitation, where
there is one, is confined to intentional killings. The only American authority on the question is a federal district court opinion,
United States v. Holmes.2 Following a ship wreck, crew members
lightened the load threatening their life boat at the expense of a
number of passengers. One of the crew members was indicted for
manslaughter and a jury convicted him of that offense. Defendant received a 6-month jail sentence. The trial court seemed to
have been willing to hold that had due deference been paid to the
different status of passengers and crew members, and if lots had
been used to select from each group, the defense of necessity
might have been available. That dictum was rejected in an English counterpart, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 3 in which defen-

90

HAWAII.
CAL.

" N.Y.
,2 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383), 1 Wall Jr. 1 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
" 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). See also, Comment, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and
ProceduralAspects of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 34 U. CIHI. L. REv. 387 (1967), where
the author observes that "Victorian juries customarily convicted in hardship cases, confident of royal reprieve. It is true that by the way [the trial judge] posed the choice between
conviction and special verdict, he effectively deprived the prisoners of a chance of acquittal," id. at 396, and that "[bly removing the genuineness of threat to Dudley and Stephens through the royal prerogative system, the judges left themselves freer than they
might otherwise have been to decide the case on abstract rather than human-or even
realistic-considerations." Id. at 405. See also Brody, Son of the Speluncean Explorer, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1233 (1970); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HAJv. L. REV.
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dants killed the weakest passenger of their open boat for food.
Perhaps the rejection of the Holmes dictum by the English court
was dictum there, as well, because the defendants did not use a
random method of selection which the Holmes court had suggested was "the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to
God, for selection of the victim."9
The common law rejection of the defense when the intentional killing of an innocent person was involved,9" appears now
to be almost universally rejected itself." The most common statu616 (1949); Hicks, Human Jettison, 1 LAW. Q. REv. 387 (1927); Stephen, Homicide by
Necessity, 1 LAW. Q. REV. 51 (1885).
" The trial court specifically rejected the Holmes dictum on the drawing of lots as
an appeal to providence as it "would seem almost to verge upon the blasphemous."
Comment, supra note 93, at 392.
" Justice Cardozo observed:
Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on
the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is
no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their
going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and
make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the darkness for
them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety.
If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others,
the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. Who shall
choose in such an hour between the victims and the saved?
B. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE 113 (1930). In R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949), the court, in determining the application of
language in an insurance policy, stated in dictum that it "appears to be established . . .
that necessity will never excuse taking the life of an innocent person.
...
Id. at 605.
Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So.
301 (1893).
a MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
It would be particularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal conduct from
the scope of the defense . . . .For recognizing that the sanctity of life has a
supreme place in the hierarchy of values, it is nonetheless true that conduct
which results in taking life may promote the very value sought to be protected by the law of homicide. Suppose, for example, that the actor has made
a breach in a dike, knowing that this will inundate a farm, but taking the
only course available to save a whole town. If he is charged with homicide of
the inhabitants of the farm house, he can rightly point out that the object
of the law of homicide is to save life, and that by his conduct he has effected
a net saving of innocent lives. The life of every individual must be assumed
in such a case to be of equal value and the numerical preponderance in the
lives saved compared to those sacrificed surely establishes an ethical and
legal justification for the act.
Id. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701
(1937).
So too a mountaineer, roped to a companion who has fallen over a precipice,
who holds on as long as possible but eventually cuts the rope, must certainly
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tory approach is to provide, merely, that if the other conditions
of the defense are all satisfied, the actor's "conduct" is justified.
The major exceptions are Wisconsin, where it is provided that "if
the prosecution is for murder, the degree of the crime is reduced
to manslaughter,"9 7 and Kentucky and Oklahoma, where it is
provided that "no justification can exist under this section for an
intentional homicide."' The Missouri proposal would limit this
defense to "conduct which would otherwise constitute any crime
other than a Class A Felony.""
Yet, as clear as the majority of state statutes and commentaries appear to be on the point, the Commentary to the Tentative Draft of the Model Penal Code, when directly confronting the
problem posed in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, says: "Such a
case must be decided if it arises but a legislator may consider that
the course of wisdom is to go no further than to state a valid
principle for its determination, without anticipating the decision
to be made."'0
Another situation involving the taking of the life of an innocent is euthanasia. At one point in the American Law Institute
discussion about the Model Penal Code, it was stated: "I do not
think [the proposed statute on the necessity defense] could
be granted the defense that he accelerated one death slightly but avoided the
only alternative, the certain death of both.
Id. at 738-39.
The Norwegian Penal Code Commission accepts the same position. Professor Andenaes commenting on their decision labels it "rather hardboiled justice." J. ANDENAES, THE
GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY § 16 (1965). There is no doubt that such
a result is of utilitarian value; however, the question remains whether it is in fact "justice." If as the Model Penal Code states, "the sanctity of life has a supreme place,"
Comment at 8, it is not sufficient that the problem be resolved on quantitative terms
alone. To allow the killing of an innocent person with intent to do so, even for the common
good, is manifest injustice to the person killed.
11Wis. The draft of the Indiana Penal Code refers only to "conduct," yet on the
question of taking life, the Comments state that the actor "arguably" would be justified
in "killing some persons to save a greater number." IND., Comment at 41.
" Ky. § 410. See also OKLA. § 1-3-3A. K. BRICKEY, KENTucKY CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1974),
takes the view that "[t]he penal law has traditionally reflected the value judgement that
the intentional taking of innocent life is never privileged." (Footnote omitted.)
" Mo.
'® MODEL PENAL CODE,

Comment at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). It has been sug-

gested that where there is no social consensus on a major question such as whether the
intentional taking of the life of an innocent person is ever justified, "the jury, as a cross
section of the social unit, can through its finding of guilt or innocence apply the existing
moral standards of the community to the case." Brody, supra note 93, at 1246.
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apply in the case where there wasn't that numerical differential
as to the lives saved, nor do I think that it could apply very well
in cases of euthanasia, so-called, because while the doctor may
act to alleviate pain I don't think a court could hold that pain was
a greater evil than death, which is the evil sought to be averted
by the law defining homicide.' 101 But when pressed on the matter
later, ("The question I had is whether or not the advisers and the
reporter intentionally left this question open for possible adjudication, or whether it is your considered judgment that this section
could not apply to a case of euthanasia."),10 2 the reply was that
"if the euthanasia problem were to be put explicitly, I have no
warrant for saying what position the advisers would take or the
position of the Council, and maybe.it will have to be faced. But I
thought that if it were to be faced it should be faced under homicide and not here." 103 In the Commentary to the proposed statute
on "Causing or Aiding Suicide"''0 it is noted that "Under the
draft, as under the present statutes dealing specially with aiding
or encouraging a suicide, [that] special provision applies only
when the actor goes no further than aid or solicitation; if he is
himself the agent of the death, the crime is murder notwithstand05
ing the consent or even the solicitation of the deceased.'"
A question which needs to be clarified is posed by LaFave
and Scott: "A, driving a car, suddenly finds himself in a predicament where he must either run down B or hit C's house and he
reasonably chooses the latter, unfortunately killing two people in
the house who by bad luck happened to be just at that place
inside the house where A's car struck ...
"o
, It is urged that A
is not liable in this situation because "it is the harm-reasonablyexpected, rather than the harm-actually-caused, which governs." 0 7 This conclusion is based on the language of the Illinois
statute which provides that the defendant must avoid an injury
which would be "greater than the injury which might reasonably
result from his own conduct." 08 The difficulty is that only the
PROCEEDINGS 228 (1958).
Id. at 235.

201ALI
202

Id. at 236.
:o MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"' Id. at Comment 2.
LAFAVE & Scorr at 386.
"°

107Id.
210ILL.
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Illinois statute and the California Proposed Code make this conclusion clear.
Of course, the defendant in this case is guilty of no crime to
begin with. Were defendant charged with manslaughter (reckless
homicide), the difficulty would be that recklessness means a conscious disregard of a risk that is "substantial and unjustifiable."'' 9 The same is true of crimes defined in terms of negligence.
Defendant needs no general justification defense when charged
with a crime based on recklessness or negligence since it is implicit in the charge itself that the defendant's conduct was not
justified; unjustifiability of conduct becomes an element of the
charge itself and must be proved by the state.
It has been maintained that the necessity defense does not
apply to strict liability crimes." ' This is incorrect. What is meant
is that "one cannot act by accident from necessity.""' In other
words, defendant must act with the conscious object to avoid a
greater evil, and his discovery after the fact that he did avoid a
greater evil will not satisfy the requirements of the defense. Thus,
one who intentionally violates a traffic law because of necessitous
circumstances may avail himself of the necessity defense even
though the crime charged is a strict liability crime.
The Model Penal Code may have inadvertently included an
additional limitation on the harms that can be justified. In a
little-noticed provision near the end of the Article dealing with
justification, and following the detailed provisions on the use of
force, the Code provides as follows:
Section 3.10. Justification in Property Crimes.
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure, or destruction of,
damage to, intrusion on or interference with property is justifiable
2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
W'
Where
the statute prohibited possession, regardless of possessor's intent, necessity
was not recognized as a defense. People v. Norris, 40 Mich. App. 45, 198 N.W.2d 430
(1972); Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970); Commonwealth v. New
York C. & H.R.R., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909).
.. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 8,1958). A child may be kept
from school for reasons of health without permission of school board as a statute required,
State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902); a motorist may leave the scene of an
accident in which he is involved because of fear of bodily harm if he remained at the scene,
Greer v. State, 108 Tex. App. 356, 300 S.W. 640 (1927); Isom v. State, 37 Ala. App. 416,
69 So. 2d 716 (1954); and a motorist may leave the scene of an accident in which he is
involved where his passenger is injured and in need of medical care and he leaves so that
she may receive treatment, Woods v. State, 135 Tex. App. 540, 121 S.W.2d 604 (1938).
'

MODEL PENAL CODE §
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under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in
a civil action based thereon, unless:
(1) the Code or the law defining the offense deals with the
specific situation involved; or
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
otherwise plainly appears."'

It was said at the 1958 Proceedings that:
Section 3.10 is a self-contained provision-it does not depend on any
other provision-which says that if you are charging a crime against
property, if the defendant can show that the conduct would have
been privileged in tort, then it is privileged in crime unless the Code
is inconsistent with that privilege .... "

The problem arises when defendant is charged with a property
crime and cannot satisfy the defense provided for by section 3.10.
For example, suppose defendant acted out of private-not public-necessity and caused a loss of property by his actions. In this
situation he would have only an incomplete privilege under tort
law and would be civilly liable for any damages he caused."'
Because section 3.10 does not distinguish between complete and
incomplete privileges, as does tort law, the statute is ambiguous.
Because the defense under section 3.10 may be unavailable, the
defendant would want to defend under the more general section
3.02, Choice of Harm or Evils."' But can he? Section 3.02 may
be limited by section 3.10, which deals with property crimes. Yet,
would it not be odd if a defendant who commits an act that would
amount to a property crime may be found guilty because his
justification defense is limited to section 3.10 and he cannot satisfy the privilege requirement of that defense, while a defendant
who causes personal injury might have a defense under section
3.02 under otherwise similar circumstances?
The uncertainty in this situation is compounded by the fact
that two of the illustrations provided under section 3.02 involve
property offenses: "Property may be destroyed to prevent the
spread of fire;" and "A cargo may be jettisoned . . . to preserve
the vessel.""'
112

MODEL PENAL CODE

"'

A.L.I.

"'

§ 3.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
(1958) (remarks by Professor Wechsler).
126 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

PaOCEEINGS, 225-26
W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS

OF TORTS §

263, at 495 (1965); Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict IntentionalInvasions of Interests
of Property and Personality,39 HAIv. L. REV. 307 (1925-26).
",

MODEL PENAL CODE.

,' Id., Comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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It is perhaps for these reasons that section 3.10 has been so
poorly received. This is speculation on our part, since not one of
the commentaries to the necessity provisions in the new codes or
proposals even advert to the existence of Model Penal Code section 3.10. Thus far, section 3.10 has been enacted only in Pennsylvania." 7 It is included in legislation pending in Alaska"' , and New
Jersey."' It was included in the Idaho code, which adopted the
Model Penal Code in toto, but that entire code has been repealed.' 0 It was originally included in the Vermont proposal,' 2 '
122
but has since been dropped from pending legislation.
V. THE FAULT LIMITATION
Much of the law of necessity is rather vague, but the requirement that defendant be without fault in occasioning or developing the situation is especially so. It appears that the common law
required the predicament to develop through "no fault" of the
actor, and this requirement is perpetuated under many codes. 3
It has been said, for example, that a person lost in the wilderness
may break into a cabin to seek food to prevent starvation, unless
he was to blame in bringing about the situation.'24 Such an example provides little assistance in resolving the problem, since it
neglects to provide a formula to determine what degree or type
of fault would preclude the defense. It can hardly be supposed
that liability of one lost in the wilderness for burglary of a cabin
would be determined by reference to whether a reasonable person
would have taken better maps, or whether'the lost person recklessly crashed his airplane into a mountainside, or whether he
took along the amount of food he should have taken.
If the level of culpability in occasioning or developing the
situation is understood to be the same as that which would suffice
for the commission of the crime charged in any event, the limita117

11

PA.
ALAs.
N.J.

"'
2 IDAHO (repealed the same year).
121 VT.
122 Id.

i2 See, e.g., CAL.; DEL.; ILL. ("without blame"); IND.; MIcH.; Mo.; N.Y.; S.C. It
should be noted that the statutes of three states do not provide a "fault" limitation: ORE.;
TEx.; Wis.
"' MD. § 35.05, Comment, citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment at 9 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1958).
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tion appears reasonable. For example, if because of reckless driving, the defendant is required to make a choice-of-evils decision
that results in death, there is little problem in holding the defendant liable for manslaughter of the reckless homicide variety. It
is an entirely different matter, however, to conclude that negligent backpacking should result in denying the defendant his defense to a burglary that was necessary to save his or another's life.
Furthermore, the meaning of the term "without fault" is not
clear from the cases. In an English case,' 25 defendant, while
drunk, awoke to discover that the car he was occupying was moving. He controlled the car and was convicted of driving while
intoxicated. It is difficult to understand how the defendant was
at fault, unless intoxication itself is enough to establish fault.
In another case, a Texas court upheld the denial of the defendant's tendered jury instruction on the necessity defense and
his conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated. The defendant testified that he took the wheel of the automobile in
which he was a passenger only because the driver appeared more
intoxicated than himself, and solely for the purpose of stopping
the automobile. The court stated that "[ilf appellant here is
found in a predicament, it is of his own doing, and he may not
by such conduct claim the benefit of a defense to which he is not
entitled."'2 6 In an earlier Texas case the defendant testified that
he and a companion had been drinking during the night and when
he returned home at about 1:45 a.m., he received a blow to the
head and was rendered unconscious. When he awoke shortly
thereafter he was lying in a pool of blood, and, since he lived alone
and had no telephone in his apartment, he decided to drive himself to the hospital. 127 The defendant conceded that he was driving
while intoxicated, but maintained he did so out of necessity,
"only for the purpose of seeking medical treatment for a serious
head injury." The court upheld the conviction and stated "[w]e
are aware of no such defense and decline to hold that an intoxicated driver of an automobile upon a public highway commits no
offense if it be shown that a necessity existed, or that it appeared
to him to be necessary that he make the journey."'2 8 Thus, it
'

2,
"
"'

Regina v. Kiston, [1955] 39 Crim. App. 66.
Sansom v. State, 390 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
Butterfield v. State, 317 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
Id. at 943.
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appears that in Texas the mere fact of defendant's intoxication,
no matter how unrelated to the necessity situation, is sufficient
to vitiate the defense, at least where intoxication is an element
of the crime. It may have been the existence of these cases that
led the drafters of the Texas statute to omit the fault limitation. ,29
The Colorado code stands alone on this issue. It provides that
the situation must be "occasioned or developed through no
conduct of the actor ... ."11o No mention is made of any kind
of fault in bringing about the situation.
Besides the defendant's fault in occasioning the situation, his
culpable behavior will limit the defense in other ways as well. The
Model Penal Code addresses these limitations simultaneously in
the following provision:
When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the
situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the
necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section
is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness
or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 3,

Another provision makes it clear that the actor must make a
correct value choice, and if he does not, the other questions will
not arise.
When the actor has made a proper choice of values, his belief
in the necessity of his conduct to serve the higher value exculpates-unless the crime involved can be committed recklessly or
negligently. But when the latter is the case, recklessness or negligence in bringing about the situation requiring the choice of evils or
in appraising the necessity for his conduct may be the basis of conviction. This treatment of the matter, which is followed elsewhere
in the Article [dealing with the use of force], precludes conviction
of a purposeful offense when the actor's culpability inheres in reckI"

TEX.

COLO. (emphasis added).
,3,
MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The following states are
''

in accord: ALAS.; ARK.; HAWAII; IDAHO; Ky.; ME.; MD.; MASS.; NEB.; N.H.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.;

WASH. In the Oklahoma proposed legislation the words "wanton" and "reckless" are used
but are defined as recklessness and negligence. OKLA. §§ 1-107(3) & (4).
The need for a special defense of necessity arises only with intentional acts.
If the act charged is one of negligence, there is no need to introduce the
technical doctrine of necessity, for the same result is achieved by inquiring
whether the defendant has behaved like a reasonable man. The adjudication
of negligence requires the same kind of value judgment as is involved in the
doctrine of necessity.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 734.
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lessness or negligence, while sanctioning conviction for a crime for
2
which that kind of culpability is otherwise sufficient to convict."'

In determining whether defendant made a proper value
choice, evidently the facts are taken as he perceived them.M
However, even given a proper choice as the defendant understood
the facts, he still may be liable if he was negligent or reckless in
appraising those facts that, in his mind, gave rise to the necessity
for committing a crime.134 In the case of the negligent or reckless
backpacker who commits burglary, the defendant would still
have a complete defense because burglary cannot be committed
negligently or recklessly and there probably is no lesser included
offense that could be charged (unless one can find a prohibition
of reckless trespass). But the reckless driver who chooses to kill
A to avoid killing B and C could still be guilty of manslaughter.
Presumably, also, the general effect of intoxication would remain
the same in this context. That is "[w]hen recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been
'
aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.' M
The question of the reasonableness of the appraisal does not
arise under the approach taken in New York and other states,
where there is no necessity defense unless "such conduct is necessary.' ' 3 On the other hand, other codes only require that the
defendant "reasonably believes such conduct was necessary,"131
,' MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
'3 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 745.
"I R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 956 (2d ed. 1969). The case law has developed a variety

of formulations in articulating the limitation: "well founded fear," R.I. Recreation Center,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949); "well-grounded apprehension," Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); "if they acted bona
fide upon reasonable grounds," United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14,470)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834); "well-grounded apprehension," Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137,
141, 13 So. 2d 54, 56 (1943); "reasonable grounds to believe," Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644,
674, 187 So. 392, 409 (1939); "reasonably seemed to be necessary," Frasher v. State, 8 Md.
App. 439, 449, 260 A.2d 656, 662 (1970); "reason to believe," State v. Goff, 79 S.D. 138,
139, 109 N.W.2d 256, 257 (1961); "founded on some reasonable ground," Morgan v. State,
35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 475, 480 (1856).
,3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
,3, See, e.g., ARK.; CAL.; COLO.; DEL.; MD.; MASS.; MICH.; Mo.; N.Y.; ORE.; S.C.
,57See, e.g., ALAS.; ILL.; IND.; TENN.; WASH. Evidently the same approach is taken
under the Soviet Code. U.S.S.R. at 37 states that "[ilf a person on the basis of circumstances did not and could not understand that the danger in reality did not and could
not exist and if a person has done an act to alleviate this imagined danger . . . what was
done cannot be considered an offense."
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but since no other provision is made, a defendant who negligently
brings about the situation or who is negligent in appraising the
facts evidently loses the defense completely. Unlike New York,
however, a defendant is only required to be reasonable, not right.
Under the Model Penal Code it is only required that the defendant believe his conduct to be necessary, and this requirement is
qualified by the language quoted above.'38 Some states which
follow this approach have, nevertheless, considered it necessary
to qualify this language by adding "reasonably believe."'' 9
VI. LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION
Most of the codes provide that '[t]he issue of competing
values must not have been foreclosed by a deliberate legislative
choice," and follow the language of the Model Penal Code requirements that:
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides
exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved;
and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does
not otherwise plainly appear."'

For example, the specific defense of duress will govern those particular situations to which it applies, even though necessity may
be involved and even though the necessity defense is usually
broader than the duress defense. Duress defenses are often limited by what type of threats are required and by what harms can
"I See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); HAWAII; IDAHO; Ky.; ME.;
NEB.; N.H.; OKLA.; PA.; VT.
"
The commentary to the Washington proposal said:
The word "reasonably" has been inserted to indicate that any defense of
justification must be based on something more than simply a "good faith"
belief in the necessity of the conduct.
WASH., Comment 1. But at the same time the statutory provision retains the qualifying
language that if defendant is negligent or reckless in "evaluating the necessity for defensive conduct," he may be guilty of any offense for which such negligence or recklessness
suffices. Id. Suppose defendant is negligent in deciding he must intentionally kill A to save
B and C. The Washington proposal says that when the defense is not established because
of criminal negligence then, in effect, defendant would be guilty of criminally negligent
homicide. That is the same result that would be obtained under the Model Penal Code.
This modification of the Model Penal Code simply introduces a redundancy despite the
fact that the Washington commentary refers to it as "narrowing of the MPC provision."
Id. at Comment 1. The Washington proposal is also evidently the only one which confines
the fault limitation to the question of evaluation of the necessity to act; it does not apply
to bringing the situation about.
'" MODEL PENAL CODE

(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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be done, while the trend in necessity statutes is to avoid such
limitations.'
The major effect of this limitation involves the use of force.'
All modem codes contain exhaustively detailed provisions on the
use of force and deadly force by a variety of persons in many
circumstances. The general justification of choice of evils is
meant to deal only with those situations to which the legislature
has not specifically addressed itself.43 As one commentary to a
necessity statute points out, "homicide committed by a private
citizen to effect an arrest is not justified because [another statute] so provides.""'
It is repeatedly said that the legislature is free to make specific value choices and to have its decision prevail when it does.'4

One may suppose, however, that these statements are overdone.
In Cross v. State, 1 the Wyoming legislature had enacted a comprehensive game law for the protection of wild animals which
enumerated those circumstances in which animals could be killed
and which omitted the right to kill animals in the protection of
" See notes 72-75 supra.

The commentary to Washington's proposed code states that the section does not
apply to the use of force because other statutes deal with that subject. WASH. at 65. This
seems clearly wrong. The Washington statute is based essentially on the Model Penal
Code and its commentary is largely devoted to the problem of taking life and, indeed, the
hypothetical used in the Washington commentary deals with homicide.
"0 See particularly the Practice Commentary to Naw YORK PEmAL LAW § 35.10 (1967).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the most commonly cited example of a case in which the
legislature has already resolved the question of value choices was legislation regulating
abortion. See generally G. WuJuMzs, THE SAcrrry OF LiE (1958); THE Mos~ar OF
AaOEMON (J. Noonan ed. 1970); Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L.
REv. 126 (1938).
'"Tx.,
Comment at 83.
,' "The defense of necessity is available only in situations wherein the legislature has
not itself, in its criminal statute, made a determination of values. If it has done so, its
decision governs." LAFAvE & Scorr at 382. A Georgia court upheld the conviction of
defendant for taking alcoholic beverage to a church for the use of his sick wife stating "the
privilege given by law to the physician is by the same law withheld from the layman. The
statute itself fixes the exceptions to the operation of the law. To these we cannot make
any addition." Bice v. State, 109 Ga. 117, 118, 34 S.E. 202, 203 (1899). Where defendant
was convicted of operating a snowmobile upon the shoulder of a highway, the court
rejected defendant's necessity defense on several grounds, one of which was "that the
legislative intent was to prohibit, with but two exceptions, the operation of snowmobiles
upon the roadway" and that defendant's conduct was not within the stated exceptions.
State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971).
-- 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962).
"'
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one's property. The state argued that no further exceptions, specifically the necessity defense, could therefore be permitted. The
court, however, recognized the defense, holding that protection of
one's property is a constitutional right and that "[i]f it is true
that the legislature intended that constitutional rights of persons
could not be asserted in this connection, then it clearly exceeded
its authority."'' 7 Although the Wyoming constitution lacks a specific provision directly granting a right to property, the court
found it was an "inherent and inalienable" right of the people,
contained within the state constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."" 8 And, of course, state legislatures had made their
value choices in abortion cases, but this view did not prevail. 49
Thus, it is clear that legislative value choices are as amenable to
constitutional review-both state and federal-in this context as
in any other.
VII. WHO DECIDES WHAT?
While it is clear that the defendant must make a "proper"
value choice in trying to avert the threatened harm, it is less clear
who is to determine the propriety of the defendant's choice.1N
There is universal agreement that a defendant raising the defense
must subjectively believe that he has correctly decided the issue,
but it is just as certain that satisfaction of this requirement is not
by itself sufficient. Someone must make an after-the-fact determination that the defendant did or did not make an accurate
value choice, depending upon the jurisdiction, either in fact or
"IId. at 374. The court stated that its holding was supported by the following cases:
Cotton v. State, 31 Ala. App. 399, 17 So. 2d 590 (1944); State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 152
N.W. 501 (1915); Commonwealth v. Masden, 295 Ky. 861, 175 S.W.2d 1004 (1943); State
v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86 (1940); Commonwealth v. Riggles, 39 Pa. D. &
C. 188 (1940); Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937); State v. Burke, 114 Wash.
370, 195 P. 16 (1921). 370 P.2d at 375.
10 370 P.2d at 376-77. The court also rejected the state's contention that a less drastic alternative was available to defendant since any property owner whose property is destroyed by a wild animal may file a claim for damages sustained. The court held that this
was not "an adequate remedy" since, under the statute, defendant would logically be
forced to watch a wild animal invade and possibly destroy even his home and if such
invasions were of a continuous nature, would be forced to repeatedly file claims and
perhaps engage in protracted litigation. Id. at 378.
.. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. Cmni. L. & C. 289, 296-98 (1974).
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given the facts as he perceived them. Most statutes avoid the
question by following the Model Penal Code:
The draft does not attempt ...

to resolve how far the issue raised

by the defense should be determined by the court as one of law or
submitted to the verdict of the jury. The Council thought this question best remitted to the law that generally governs the respective
functions of the court and jury. 5'

When the issue has been addressed directly by legislation, the
New York statute is usually followed:
Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this
section is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter
of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.12

Presumably, the trier of fact must still make the underlying factual determinations, but the court's resolution appears conclusive
in either direction, subject only to defendant's right to appeal.
While some courts have reached the same result as New York
without a statute by treating the claim as an offer of proof and
deciding the question as a matter of law,'13 a statutory provision
such as New York's may be useful in avoiding procedures like
those used in United States v. Kroncke.' 54 There the trial court
allowed extensive testimony by a number of witnesses on the
necessity defense, but ultimately took the question away from the
jury in its final instructions. This could have been accomplished
more efficiently with an offer of proof.
A different view is expressed in an optional provision of the
South Carolina draft code:
Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this
section is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule initially on
the matter out of the presence of the jury, according to the procedure
used in determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession."5
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
N.Y. The relevant part of the Maryland statute follows the New York provision,
but adds that "the court shall rule as a matter of law on its admissibility, according to
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense."
MD. This addition appears only to clarify rather than modify the New York language;
Maryland thought it necessary in order "to avoid any problem with the jury-as-judge-ofthe-law provision of the state constitution, by making it clear that the judge is ruling only
on a question of admissibility of evidence." MD., Comment.
53 See, e.g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073
(1972).
459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
"'
But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975).
MODEL PENAL CODE

"'

2
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The adoption of such a procedural formulation may, depending
upon the jurisdiction, result in disadvantage to the defendant. In
some jurisdictions the confession procedure rules make the
judges' determination final; in others the jury is instructed that
they may find the confession involuntary even though the judge
did not. The use of the word "initially" suggests that the court's
determination is not final. If so, it would require that even if the
judge finds the evidence sufficient to establish the defense, the
jury is to be instructed that they are free to disagree and to
convict. The redetermination by a jury of the voluntariness of a
confession is, in those jurisdictions, designed to give a defendant
two chances of winning on that issue. The South Carolina necessity provision, however, appears designed to give the defendant
two chances of losing the defense.
Although the existence of the necessity defense is subject at
least in part to resolution as a matter of law, it is unclear precisely
to what extent this is so. Consider the Texas statute:
Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; and
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the
conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.'"

The New York procedural approach, alluded to above,'57 clearly
makes the determination under sections (2) and (3) a matter for
the court. It is less clear, however, whether section (1) in all
circumstances is to be resolved as a matter of law. Suppose, for
example, a rush-to-the-hospital case in which the court concludes
there was indeed need for harm avoidance and defendant's high
speed driving was the lesser evil, but that defendant should have
known that there was another hospital much closer to him on a
safer route and that defendant was negligent in not knowing this
fact. Does the defense go to the jury or is the judge to resolve it
against the defendant? Ordinarily, of course, if defendant could
satisfy section (2) above he could also satisfy the reasonableness
'"

TEX.

"
We refer, of course, to section 3.02, not section 3.10. We also have reservations
about trying, in legislation, to resolve in advance the question of taking innocent life.
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requirement of section (1); but not so in a case such as this, where
the actor has made an improper assessment of his alternatives,
given an acceptable emergency situation.
CONCLUSION:

CODIFICATION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE

The most important issues regarding the necessity defense
are whether it should be codified, and, if so, with what degree of
detail. It is our view that the Model Penal Code provision ought
to be adopted without modification.5 8 We have surveyed in some
detail the various attempts to improve upon that draft. Most of
those states which have not accepted that version have ended up
placing more restrictions on the availability of the defense and we
are not convinced that all those restrictions were intentionally
included. This is true, for example, of the common requirement
that defendant be correct in his assessment of the need for action,'59 and Colorado's unique requirement that the situation not
be brought about by defendant's "conduct."'' 0 Those restrictions
are unreasonable and almost certainly would not be imposed by
most courts if left greater latitude to develop the scope of the
defense.
Apart from the highly restrictive proposals based on the New
York model, there are three major approaches to the legislative
problem: (1) the New Jersey approach; (2) non-codification; and
(3) the Model Penal Code.' 6 ' New Jersey takes a singular approach to codification of the defense by declining to adopt any
particular statutory formulation, but incorporating the necessity
defense into the Code
to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the Code nor
other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative
purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
2
plainly appear."1

Although there were no prior New Jersey statutes or criminal
cases dealing with the issue, the Revision Commission maintained that it was
See note 153 supra.
See note 64 supra.
l See note 118 supra.
''
Texas and those states following that model do not depart significantly from the
Model Penal Code.
'5'
"'

162 N.J.
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more appropriate to leave the issue to the Judiciary [since] [tihe
rarity of the defense and the imponderables of the particulars of
specific cases convince us that the Courts can better define and
apply this defense than can be done through legislation.11

This position is consistent with New Jersey civil case law development which recognizes the justification of necessity as "a natural
right, of which government cannot deprive the citizen," but
which is nevertheless
a right not susceptible of any very precise definition, for the mode
and manner and extent of its exercise must depend upon the nature
and degree of necessity that calls it into action, and this cannot be
determined until the necessity is made to appear."'

It is also interesting that the Commentary refers the courts to the
Model Penal Code and the New York statute for guidance-those
statutes are in conflict on most of the important questions that
will arise.
The English took a similar approach in the late nineteenth
century. Sir James Stephan's Criminal Code Bill of 1878 contained a provision dealing with the necessity defense, but it was
deleted from the Draft Code of 1879, because of an inability to
articulate the situations in which the defense would be available.
Parliament resolved the problem by leaving the doctrine where
they found it-a common law defense." 5 Stephan himself stated:
[Ilt is just possible to imagine cases in which the expediency of
breaking the law is so overwhelmingly great that people may be

justified in breaking it, but these cases cannot be defined beforehand ....

I see no good in trying to make the law more definite

than this, and there would I think be danger in attempting to do
so.160

13 Id., Commentary.
" Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 729 (1848), afl'd sub. nom. American Print Works
v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 (1851).

The common law doctrine of necessity is one that is now too firmly established to be drawn in question, and yet, perhaps, necessarily from its very
character, it seems somewhat undefined as to its application and extent.
Id. at 604. See also Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation
Case, 3 Amuz. L. Rv. 264 (1961); Note, Necessity as a Defense, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 71
(1921). For the development of the doctrine in the law of torts, see generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 114, at § 24; Bohlen, supra note 114.
" G. WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 724. See also Glazebrook, supra note 78.
"'
2 J. STEPHAN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 109-10 (1883).
[Tihe law of cases of necessity is not likely to be well furnished with precise
rules; necessity creates the law, it supersedes rules; and whatever is
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Glanville Williams also takes the position that "[t]he peculiarity of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility of formulating it with any approach to precision."'' 7
Other American authorities have enumerated the difficulties
in codification of the defense.1 8 The Study Draft of a New Federal
Criminal Code by the United States Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (the Brown Commission) contained the
following codification of the necessity defense:
Conduct which Avoids Greater Harm. Conduct is justified if it is
necessary and appropriate to avoid harm clearly greater than the
harm which might result from such conduct and the situation developed through no fault of the actor. The necessity and justifiability
of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to
the morality and advisability of the penal statute defining the offense, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder.'

This section of the Code, however, was deleted from the Final
Report of the Commission. The Comment to section 601, dealing
with justification in general, includes this explanation:
Congress has never enacted the rules which justify or excuse the
use of force against another or which generally provide a justification
or an excuse for the commission of otherwise unlawful conduct.
Chapter 6 sets them forth: to change some undesirable judicial decisions, to clarify areas which are not clear under existing law and to
codify aspects of the federal law on the subject. This partial codification is not an attempt to freeze the rules as they now exist. It may
therefore be desirable to be explicit that the statutory definition of
these rules is not intended to preclude the judicial development of
other justifications. For example, the so-called "choice of evils" rule,
i.e., that emergency measures to avoid greater injury may be justified, has not been included in this Chapter on the view that, while
its intended application would be extremely rare in cases actually
prosecuted, even the best of statutory formulations (see N.Y. Pen.L.
§ 35.10) is a potential source of unwarranted difficulty in ordinary
cases, particularly in the context of the adoption of the broad mistake of fact and law provisions found in the Code. Codification, as
reasonable and just in such cases, is likewise legal; it is not to be considered
as matter of surprise, therefore, if much instituted rule is not to be found on
such subjects.
The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 266, 165 Eng. Rep. 450, 459 (In. 1801) (Sir W. Scott).
, G. WILIAMS, supra note 82, at 728.
"'
MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8,1958).
New York City Bar Association, The New CriminalCode Proposed by the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 15 (1972).
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opposed to case-by-case prosecutive discretion, is regarded as premature. On the other hand, some Commissioners believe that a
penal code is seriously deficient if it does not explicitly recognize
that avoidance of greater harm is, if not a duty, at least a privilege
of the citizen. 70

It seems to us that there ought to be some legislative recognition of the defense-even as limited as the New Jersey approach-for two overlapping reasons. First, there are some states
where the courts have flatly refused to recognize the defense in
the absence of a statute.' Secondly, whether or not a court previously recognized it, the new codes are so comprehensive in their
treatment of defenses in general that failure to include a necessity
statute might well be taken as a legislative rejection of it, unless
the code clearly indicates that it is not exclusive as to defenses,
as few have. We have found only two states that make it clear by
statute that while the codes are exclusive as to definitions of
crimes,' 2 they are not intended to be exclusive as to the existence
or scope of defenses. 7 3 The matter is presently ambiguous in
states with no significant legislative history available to indicate
whether non-inclusion means non-recognition.
Indeed, the question might be raised whether a legislature in
fact has the power to abolish the necessity defense or even severely restrict it as Wisconsin, New York, and some other states
have done. Does there reside in the courts an inherent
power-protected from infringement by the legislative branch by
the separation of powers doctrine-to recognize necessity as a
defense? The same question might be raised under the federal
constitution with respect to those state courts which have flatly
denied the existence of such a defense-does not due process
1 Hearingson Reform of the Fed. Crim. Laws and ProceduresBefore the Subcomm.
on Crim. Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 43 (1971).
'
See, e.g., State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1929).
'7 Washington has retained a curious provision:
Sec. 9A.04.060. COMMON LAW TO SUPPLEMENT STATUTE. The provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the
punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the constitution and
statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes of this state and
all persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state
having jurisdiction of the offense.
Laws of 1975, ch. 260, 44th Legis., 1st Sess. (effective July 1, 1976).
"I These two states are California and Vermont. A similar provision is also found in
S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
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require recognition that a person may not be convicted of drunk
driving when he took the controls of a vehicle solely to save himself from serious bodily injury or death? Or when he escapes from
prison for the same reason? Surely in those cases the defense must
be recognized. Yet, no one has advocated restricting the defense
to what must constitutionally be recognized. The defense furthers
utilitarian objectives that go beyond the actor's own interests and
the defense ought to be recognized in that context as well.'
We agree that "it is better to be allowed a defense of uncertain ambit than none at all." '75 But to conclude, as the New
Jersey Revision Commission has, that because all future situations cannot be anticipated none should be, goes too far in the
other direction from those who have over-legislated the matter.
The Model Penal Code: (1) distinguishes the defense from the
defenses of duress and involuntary act; (2) requires only that the
harm sought to be avoided be greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law violated; (3) eliminates limitations on the
harm threatened and the harm done; (4) omits reference to imminence; (5) includes a fault limiter but, unlike many of the
codes, it is defined and the consequences of the limitation are
made explicit; (6) recognizes legislative preemption; and (7)
leaves to local law the allocation of decision making at trial.
The Model Penal Code is broad, to be sure. But the only
danger in legislating broadly is that the statute might be thought
to protect persons beyond what the legislature intended because
of the impossibility of foreseeing all that might arise. But in the
end, a court and jury will have to determine whether the claimed
defense is reasonable.
Given the uncertain status of the defense under existing case
law, given the uncertain power of the legislature to restrict courts
in recognition of the defense, and given the unforeseeability of the
myriad cases which will arise, we think it unwise to attempt to
improve upon the Model Penal Code. The legislatures should
codify what it is useful to codify or what must be codified. But
legislative definition of the entire scope of the necessity defense
'7

H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 113-18 (1968).

'7

MODEL PENAL CODE at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1959).
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is probably not useful and certainly not required.7

6

' In Glazebrook, supra note 78, it is argued that if the draftsman is careful in
drafting the specific substantive statutes, there is no need for general recognition of the
necessity defense. He says:
A legal system in which a general defense of necessity was constantly invoked
over a wide range of offenses would have no special merit, for that would
simply reflect the draftsmen's failure to provide in advance for special cases.
Id. at 90. He later provides an example of the ad hoc approach to the necessity defense:
Section 24(3) of the Sexual Offenses Act 1956, for instance, provides that "A
woman shall not be liable to any legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal,
for taking away or being found in possession of any clothes she needed to
enable her to leave premises on which she was for the purpose of having
unlawful sexual intercourse or to leave a brothel."
Id. at 107. It is our contention that any criminal code that needs Section 24(3) is itself
deficient.
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And during all those busy hours,
Filled with estates, wills, companies' powers
In closing deals-court work-now
A genuine lawyer thou.1

The purpose of this article is to explore the role of the female
attorney vis-A-vis the judicial role. While it is clear that women
involved in the practice of law have their days filled with much
of the same kind of work as their male colleagues, including the
items mentioned in the quotation above, the sociological concept
of role includes more than the fulfilling of certain defined functions. Sociologically, a role is both a set of patterned behaviors
and a set of expectations on the part of others about the appropriate activity the role should encompass.' Thus, the concept of role
has to be viewed in a framework that takes into account both the
reiterated, structured behavior of the person playing out his or
her part in the social situation and the expectations of the others
in that situation about how the part should be played and the
success these others assign to an individual in meeting such expectations.
Unfortunately, however, the expectation component of role
oftentimes contains more than simply what the role should encompass or how the role should be played. It may also include an
expectation of who should play the role. If this expectation is not
met at the outset, the role incumbent may then experience difficulty in being recognized as an adequate player even if the basic
occupational or behavioral elements are in fact fulfilled and fulfilled well. Therefore, sociologically, it is not enough that women
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, Regis College, Denver, Colorado; Criminal Justice
Consultant, Denver Police Department; Ph.D., 1972, University of Colorado.
** B.A., 1966, Chatham College; M.A., 1969, Carnegie Mellon University; J.D., 1975,
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*** B.A., 1969, Loyola University; Candidate for Juris Doctor Degree from the University of Denver College of Law, 1975.
Wigle, Sisters in Law, 5 CAN. B. REv. 419 (1927).
M.L. DEFLEUR, W.V. D'ANTONIO, & L.B. DEFLEUR, SOCIOLOGY: MAN IN SOCIETY 41-

2 (1971).
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graduate from law school, pass the bar, and actually engage in the
practice of law. A key question must also be the recognition that
is given women attorneys as equal members of the bar. The answer to this question will in turn hinge on the expectations that
others hold concerning the role of attorney including expectations
about who should play the role.
Such a question is of more than academic interest since a
lack of professional recognition can also mean a lack of professional success. If law school deans, professors, colleagues in practice, judges, and even clerks all hold the expectation that lawyering is essentially a man's occupation, the female practitioner can
expect to have a much more difficult time than her male counterpart in achieving eminence and the income that attends it. The
lack of professional recognition also has consequences beyond the
immediate plight of the individual woman attorney. The recognition given or withheld from women attorneys by functionaries in
the legal system can affect the decisions of judges, the decisions
of juries, in short the fate of clients and the principles upon which
our legal system is based. If a person's chances of obtaining justice are excessively influenced by the sex of that individual's
counsel, the whole system of justice is seriously called into question.
This paper will concentrate primarily on the interactions of
women attorneys with judges during the course of trial. Judges
are, however, merely a part of the legal system and occupy only
one role that has influence on the course of justice. Therefore,
where appropriate, the treatment accorded women by other functionaries of the system will be described and commented upon.
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A review of the literature dealing with judicial views of
women generally and female attorneys specifically indicates a
need to explore this issue. The literature suggests that such views
are in a state of flux, with the earlier literature indicating a definite judicial bias against women, and the modern literature indicating a movement away from more blatant forms of sexism.
Historically, the judiciary has not shown itself to be a champion
of women's rights. In an article by Doris L. Sassower, the rather
dismal record of the courts in this area is reviewed.' The case of
I

Sassower, Women and the Judiciary: Undoing "The Law of the Creator",57 J. AM.

1975
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Bradwell v. Illinois4 in 1873-where the Supreme Court sustained
the denial of Bradwell's application to practice law in Illinoisset the tone for many of the future judicial views regarding the
place of women. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Bradley
dismissed the contention that the fourteenth amendment conferred upon women the right to pursue any legitimate employment, including the practice of law. He said:
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. 5

This case is of special significance since it portended a rather
rough going for women in general and female attorneys in particular as they pursued goals through the bar of justice.' Sassower
goes on to describe a number of early judicial decisions through
1948 in which courts continued to base decisions on the "Law of
the Creator," particularly in the area of restricting employment
opportunities .'
Admittedly, presently the status of women in all aspects of
American society is in a state of flux. However, while certain
decisions may provide encouragement for those seeking legal
equality for women, certain other cases leave room for doubt. As
late as 1961 in Hoyt v. Florida,"the Court continued to view the
place of women as belonging primarily in the home by upholding
statutes limiting women's participation on juries. This decision
was called into question only this summer? The Court has only
found two classification schemes based upon sex to be a violation
Soc'y 282 (1974).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
Id. at 141 (concurring opinion).
A year after Bradwell, the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874), denied women the right to vote under the fourteenth amendment. A
constitutional amendment was thus needed in order to obtain for women the franchise.
' In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), for example, a case heard by the Supreme
Court in 1908, state statutes were upheld that restricted the number of hours a woman
could work, how much she could lift, the payment of minimum wages, and so forth. Forty
years later the Court was still attempting to restrict women in terms of employment as
the case of Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), shows. There the Court said that
women could be denied licenses to be bartenders. Sassower, supra note 3, at 283.
8 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975). The Court distinguished Hoyt by stating
that it had not involved the question of a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
decision from a fair cross section of the community nor the prospect of a denial of that
right by the systematic exclusion of women as a class.
JUD.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

of equal protection: statutes giving preferences to males for appointment as estate administrators' and regulations forcing only
women armed services members to prove dependency of their
spouse to collect housing allowances and medical benefits."
These cases appeared to suggest a "same situation, same treatment" test. However, other cases have allowed different treatment: property tax deductions only for widows,' 2 longer time
before a nonpromoted Navy female officer can be mandatorily
discharged, 3 denial of unemployment compensation benefits for
pregnancy leave,' 4 and denial of the right of a married woman to
have a driver's license issued in her maiden name.'" As a result
of the way the Court has dealt with the cases, there is disagreement among the courts and the commentators as to whether sex
is a suspect category and thus entitled to the stricter new equal
protection standards.'"
The implication of some of these decisions is clear. Certain
judges tend to place women in traditional roles. That is, they hold
the expectation that women will or should stay in the home, or
at least in those occupations suited to the unique talents they
possess because they are women. This type of stereotypical response to women contains two elements, both of which constitute
what has been termed the conservative or traditional view of
women. 7 First, there is the notion that certain occupational roles
are "woman" roles, and, second, the notion that women inherently possess certain job related skills because of gender. The
tendency for some members of the judiciary to take this traditional view of woman's role is perhaps best illustrated in this
quote from Chief Justice Burger during the oral argument before
the Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation:'"
"

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 671 (1973).
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
" Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
" Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationand the Definition of Sex
Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975); Annot., 27 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1971); Annot.,
17 A.L.R. Fed. 768 (1973).
'" A. COLLINS, THE ATrrUDES TOWARD WOMEN SCALE: VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND SUBRI
"

SCORE DIFFERENTIATION

(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Maryland

Library) (Aug. 3, 1973).

Is 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (oral arguments), cited in L.
SOCIETY, CASES AND MATERIALS

54 (1973).
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Burger: Well I have to assume up to this time, Mr. Senterfitt, that
the reason you have 75 or 80 percent women is that again something
that I would take judicial notice of, from many years of contact with
industry, that women are manually much more adept than men and
they do this kind of work better than men do it, and that's why you
hire women ...

After some discussion of this point, the Chief Justice went on to
state:
Burger: The Department of Justice, I am sure, doesn't have any
male secretaries. This is an indication of it. They hire women secretaries because they are better and you hire women assembly people

because they are better and you make the distinction between
women who have small children and women who don't; so it appears
on the record."

A question arises as to the effect on female attorneys of the
holding of such views by members of the judiciary. Do judges who
have a traditional outlook concerning the role of women negatively sanction female counsel, since at the outset she does not
meet the judge's expectation about the appropriate role for
women? At this point, the answer to the question is at best hypothetical. However, it is evident that some female practitioners
feel judges do discriminate against them because of gender. Thus
judges are seen as exhibiting a conservative male bias toward
women not only in the decisions they render, but also in the job
related interactions they have with women lawyers. This was the
concern of women attending the Fifth Annual National Conference on Women and the Law held in Austin, Texas in 1974. Those
women attorneys involved in the litigation of Title VII actions
"charged that judges, who must award 'prevailing' fees to an
1 Id. The case arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held
the company could not refuse to hire women with preschool children if it continued to hire
men with children that age. However, the Court remanded with the suggestion that this
hiring policy could be salvaged if the company could prove conflicting family obligations
could be demonstrated to be more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a
man.
More recently, Time Magazine has reported an exchange in a state court in much the
same vein as the above remarks.
"You're getting a divorce?"
"No, my client is."
"You're the secretary?"
"No, I'm the lawyer."
"You're the lawyer?"
TIME, May 26, 1975, at 40.
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attorney winning a Title VII case, consistently award lower fees
to women attorneys."
Some women attorneys feel, therefore, that their sex is definitely taken into account by judges and that their gender does
affect the process of judicial decision making. This perception on
the part of some women practitioners that their sex is an issue in
the fulfilling of their occupational role also extends to the profession at large. An article in the New York Times reporting on
another national conference on the place of women in law held at
Stanford in March 1975 summarized this view, by saying that
professors still make jokes about women, male judges still treat
women-even women judges-differently than they treat men, and
women still feel less than welcome, if welcome at all, in the legal
profession."

The most thorough study done of women attorneys is White's
classic study, Women in the Law2 which was published in 1967.
More recent articles on women attorneys generally refer to the
White study and give updated figures on law school enrollments
and percentages of attorneys in the United States who are
women.? Even though it is dated, White's results are still valid
as indicating trends in the profession. The study indicated that
women law graduates are discriminated against in terms of the
types of jobs available to them, and the financial remuneration
they receive from the practice of law. Concerning income, White
found that during the first year of practice there was an average
differential of $1,500 in the income of male attorneys as opposed
to female attorneys, and that the differential between the two
groups increased each year until the difference was some $8,300.24
The women in White's sample also showed a heavy concentration
25
in federal, state, or local government work as compared to men.
This fact, together with White's finding that 57 out of 63 placement directors questioned reported that discrimination against
female law graduates in hiring is significant or extensive, suggests
that women have been restricted regarding the types of jobs avail2 Stein, Women and Law Conferences '74, TiAL, July/August 1974, at 32.
21 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1975, at 28, col. 1.
2 White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1967).
3 TIME, May 26, 1975, at 40-41.
2 White, supra note 22, at 1057.
2 Id. at 1075.
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able to them."6 This interpretation is strengthened by noting the
findings of other researchers in this area. Dorothy W. Nelson,
quoting an item in the October 1970 issue of the American Bar
News, states that 9 out of 10 large law firms refuse to interview
women lawyers." Discrimination in hiring is also noted by Janette Barnes in the Journal of Legal Education.21 Finally, White's
study indicates that well over half of his female respondents
(N = 1148) felt that they had been discriminated against in seeking employment within the legal profession. His sample of female
attorneys reported 1,963 separate occasions of potential employthat there was a polers' actually stating to a female respondent
2
icy against the hiring of female attorneys.
The view of the legal profession toward women participants
can also be ascertained by noting the place of women in law
school. A review of this data leaves some room for encouragement,
although the historical perspective is rather negative. In 1967, 4.3
percent of the people entering law school were women; in 1970,
7.8 percent; in 1972, 16 percent;30 and, in 1974, 20 percent of the
incoming students were women. 3 1 While this indicates a lessening
bias on the part of law school admissions committees, it is unclear
as to whether this lessening bias came about because of changed
views or because of legislation against both racial and sexual
discrimination.
In 1972, women constituted 38 percent of the work force, but
they were only 3.5 percent of all lawyers, a proportion that had
undergone little change since 1910. In 1910 they were 1.0 percent
of the legal profession, but the progress to 3.5 percent in 1972 had
not kept pace with women's increased attendance at college and
in the general work force. 32 Data from 1974, however, clearly
shows that in the last 2 years more change has taken place in this
regard than during the preceding 62 years. The American Bar
" Id. at 1085.

" Address by Dorothy W. Nelson, University of Oklahoma College of Law Enrichment Program, Apr. 6, 1973, in 26 OKLA. L. REV. 375 (1973).
" Barnes, Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 276 (1970).
White, supra note 22, at 1085-86.
" Bysiewicz, 1972 AALS Questionnaireon Women in Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL
ED. 503 (1973).
TnME, May 26, 1975, at 41.
2 Id.; Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraintand Personal Choice in
the Formation of ProfessionalIdentity, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 462, 465-66 (1972).
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Association's most recent report indicates that women now comprise between 5 and 7 percent of the nation's 400,000 practicing
33
attorneys.
Clearly, then, certain strides have been made by women in
the profession of law. Not only have their numbers increased in
both admissions to law schools and in participation at the bar,
but the traditionally male structures of the legal profession are
undergoing slow but sure modification. Many schools have added
special courses on women's legal rights and a few even use a
desexified casebook written by two Harvard professors.3 4 Yet, on
the whole, female law students are still faced with structures that
reinforce the traditional view of women held by some members
of the legal profession. An example from a typical property textbook illustrates the stereotyped character women students are
sometimes ficed with: "for, after all, land, like woman, was
meant to be possessed. .. .
In reviewing the literature on women and the law, then, certain points stand out. Historically, the judicial view of women has
tended to place them in traditional roles. Although this is changing somewhat, there are still indications that a number of judges
are reluctant to abandon this perspective. Whether or not this
expectation affects judicial views of women attorneys is at this
juncture an open question, 6 although again there are clear indications in the literature that some female practitioners perceive
that this is in fact the case. 7
Given the above discussion, it is rather surprising to find that
little research has been done regarding the specific role interactions of female attorneys and judicial functionaries. This lack of
specific research is a surprise for a number of reasons. First, the
available literature seems to indicate that there may be some
33 TIMe, May 26, 1975, at 41.

u Id.

u C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE, cited in Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by
the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law Schools, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 480 (1971).
u In summarizing what seems to be the historical attitude of judges toward women
colleagues, an observation from the autobiography of Florence E. Allen appears apt. In
1934 she was appointed to the federal bench and she states that her fellow judges so
disapproved of her appointment that they would not even look at her during the working
sessions of the court, let alone talk to her cordially. Sassower, supra note 3, citing F.
ALLEN, To Do JusTLY (1965).
" See text accompanying notes 20 & 21 supra.
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cause for concern that the sex of the attorney does influence judicial action. Second, it is apparent that this issue is perceived by
some female practitioners as an important one and one that needs
investigation. Third, the situation is apparently fluid and in some
state of change. Since this seems to be the case, the topic should
be of current interest to both researchers and the public at large.
Yet no specific studies of judicial actions or attitudes toward
female attorneys were uncovered. Because of the lack of such
specific research, then, this study is of the nature of an exploratory effort. That is, it merely hopes to indicate some areas for
future investigation, and at the same time offer some tentative
data on the nature of judicial interaction with female attorneys.
Such an exploration can accomplish two things. It can pinpoint
some of the problems women might encounter as they go about
the practice of law. More importantly, perhaps, it can also lead
the way to a further understanding of the judicial role in the
context of how justice is administered. It is this understanding
that can help insure the equal treatment of all groups before the
bar of justice.
II.

METHODOLOGY

The question this research addresses is whether judges, by
their words and actions during courtroom proceedings, recognize
and attribute to women full professional standing as members of
the bar; i.e., are the expectations they portray regarding the role
of attorney the same regardless of the sex of the role incumbent.
In attempting to answer this question, this study utilizes as its
primary methodology participant observation. This approach is
particularly apt since the field being explored is relatively unstudied. Although numerous studies have been done on the process
of judicial decision making, including the relevance of background factors, political party affiliation, and so forth, 8 no data
exists on the judicial view of women in the court and how or
whether such views affect judges in conducting trials where
clients are represented by women lawyers.
Since this is, therefore, a new area of exploration, a questionnaire approach is at this stage an inappropriate tool to use in
I See, e.g., Nagel, JudicialBackground and CriminalCases, 53 J. CamM. L. 333 (1962)
and sources cited in Danelski, Toward Explanation of Judicial Behavior, 42 U. CiN. L.
REv. 659 (1973).
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investigating the issue under consideration. A necessary first step
in exploring an uncharted domain of social life is the gaining of
an overall sense of the scene in which the interactions one is
interested in take place. If this step is left out and one immediately attempts the invasion of the scene with questionnaires and
elegant statistical analysis, there is a very real danger that the
resultant data will reveal nothing but the author's adeptness at
statistical abstraction. A questionnaire, in order to be both valid
and reliable, must have some relationship to the actual situation
the respondent is a part of, or risk a number of problems. Hence,
questionnaire items relating to judicial attitudes towards women
may in fact be nonsensical if the researcher has no idea of the
context in which the attitude may be portrayed. Another difficulty may arise because of a respondent's reluctance to answer
certain kinds of questions. There have been indications from past
research on judicial decisionmaking that some judges are hesitant
to answer certain kinds of questions, and, indeed, take affront at
the investigation of various facets of their decisionmaking process. This reluctance was experienced in certain instances when
an attempt was made to research judicial sentencing behavior in
cases of selective service violators.3 Such a problem could well be
exacerbated if the items were not related to the types of situations
judges would encounter relevant to the issue. Another area of
difficulty a researcher may encounter, if he skips the first step of
observational research, is wasted time, money, and effort. Only
after the broad framework of judicial behavior has been described
and analyzed can one ascertain those areas relevant and important for future research efforts. All of these reasons for using
participant observation as an exploratory research strategy are
best summarized by David J. Danelski in his article "Toward
Explanation of Judicial Behavior":
The most fruitful way of conducting exploratory research, in my
opinion, is direct observation of judges at work-in court, in chambers, in conference, and so forth. Similar studies have been done of
congressmen, but they are yet to be done for judges. Exploratory
studies based on direct observation will lay foundations for future
research by protraying accurately the contexts of judicial behavior,
by describing the dynamics of decision processes, and by indicating
variables likely to have greatest explanatory power."
a Frankel, Comments of an Independent, Variable Sentence, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 667,
671 n.8 (1973).

0 Danelski, supra note 38, at 659-60.
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With these statements as guides, the following research was
based on approximately 6 months of observation by law students
of judges as they interacted with women attorneys in courtroom
situations. Approximately 17 observations were recorded and
analyzed. 4 These 17 observations were conducted of 15 separate
proceedings. In two cases, two observers were used to record the
interactions of one trial. Most of the courtroom appearances involved both a male and a female attorney, although in one instance two female attorneys were adversaries. By observing proceedings in which both a male and female counselor were present,
observers could compare the treatment of one or the other by the
same judge. Observers were asked to record judicial facial expressions, hand motions, language, and all other items that might
relate to the tone set by judges during a trial or courtroom proceeding where a woman attorney was present.42 They were asked
to be particularly aware of and record any differences in treatment of the male attorney from the female attorney by the judge.
This reference was, however, the only one made to the purpose
of the study. Observers were not told to look for discriminatory
behavior, or behavior reflective of anti-feminine bias on the part
of the bench. Neither were observers exposed to the literature
discussed previously. Instructions were given in a general way,
and observers were told not to draw conclusions or express opinions, but merely state what went on during the time they were in
court.
As indicated, this was an exploratory effort, and, therefore,
no attempt was made to have a random selection of judges.
Whether a particular judge was picked for observation depended
on whether he was to be faced with a female attorney. Nevertheless, different levels of the judiciary were in fact observed, includ" Our goal was to have as many observations as possible, but, as anyone connected
with trial work would be aware, the following factors served to limit the number of observations which could be accomplished: the limited number of women attorneys actively
involved in trial work; the limited number of cases in which a female attorney opposed a
male attorney; routine postponement of trial dates and times; variable schedules of student observers; and the inability to ascertain in advance the names of attorneys presenting
cases at certain court levels.
dl Trial lawyers have for a long time been aware that those items can affect the
outcome of trials. Conner, The TrialJudge, His FacialExpressions, Gestures and General
Demeanor-Their Effect on the Administration of Justice, 1965 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE
251.
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ing appellate courts, trial courts, and juvenile proceedings. Included in the appellate court and trial court categories were observations at both the state and federal levels.
Participant observation can yield a rich and detailed picture
of a social scene. However, when a researcher uses this method,
two cautions must be kept in mind. First, people see and record
different things. Thus, all observations are filtered through the
idiosyncratic eye of the beholder. To control this phenomenon, all
recorded observations were compared for points of similarity. If
a group of observations conducted by different persons contain
similar descriptions of the same kinds of behavior, the researcher
is on safe ground in assuming that the pictures presented are
essentially accurate. Therefore, in this report, the commonalities
present in all 17 observations are described and commented upon.
Second, researchers in analyzing the data from participant observation may perceive different elements and hence draw conclusions at variance with one another. In short, bias can also enter
into the data at the level of analysis. To guard against this, after
the observations were concluded, ten interviews were conducted
with women attorneys in order to have some check on both the
observations and their analysis. The inclusion of the interview
technique in this effort was to check the reliability of the observations and to see whether the perceptions of these attorneys
matched the analysis of the researchers. Both techniques, then,
taken together, formed a powerful methodology for an exploratory
examination of judicial behavior toward women lawyers, and,
hopefully, this combination checked the bias likely to occur if
participant observation was used exclusively.
Since the study was, however, largely participant observation, its major focus is on the area of judicial discrimination and
behavior, not attitudes. Again, this focus is deemed to be a necessary first step in understanding the process of judicial decisionmaking. The relationship between attitudes and behavior is by
no means a simple one, and it is only after behavior is recorded
and analyzed that questionnaires measuring attitudes can be
constructed. Once this initial step is completed, and only then,
can meaningful questions be asked and attitudes interpreted in
the context of ongoing behavior.

III.

THE DATA

St. Francis of Assisi must have had a bit of the trial lawyer
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and the social psychologist in him, as this story quoted from
Leslie L. Conner's article, "The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General Demeanor-Their Effect on the
Administration of Justice," indicates:
St. Francis asked a novice one day to accompany him down to the
city where he was going to preach to the people. The two walked
about the streets of the city for several hours in complete silence and
then started back to the monastery. The surprised novice asked him:
"I thought you were going to preach to the people?" St. Francis
answered, "We were preaching all the time while we were walking
by the way we walked, by the way we looked and conducted ourselves, and, without saying a single word, the people got our mes3
sage."

Apparently saints, social psychologists, and trial lawyers are
all well aware that it is not only what a person says, but how he
says it in the silent language of gestures, demeanor, and facial
expressions that determines the real message a person is communicating. Thus, by examining the language, both spoken and unspoken, of trial judges during a courtroom proceeding some insight can be gained concerning the message certain judges get
across about their own role and the perceptions they hold regarding female attorneys. Concerning their own role, judges in this
research seemed to be presenting at least one dominant message.
Judges seemed to present themselves as disinterested observers,
thus conveying to those around them the impression that they
had no vested interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The
following excerpts from the field notes of the observers illustrate
this point.
Notes from an Appeals Court Session-Three judges presiding.
Scene I: Male attorney presenting arguments: Judge A playing
with nose, B and C are writing.
C is looking at papers.
B asks a question, A is still playing with his nose, C looks asleep.
B has his face on his hand.
A is looking away, looking around the room.
C has hand on chin, still looks asleep.
Scene II: Female attorney presenting arguments:
Judge A and C are writing, B is leaning over arm of chair.
C is still writing. A has his fingers on face.
B is looking down, maybe writing.
11Id. at 251-52.
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A is looking away and scratching his ear.
C is still writing.
And from a State Court-one judge presiding-case involves
second degree burglary and conspiracy charges.
Scene I: Witness being questioned by D.A.-male.
Judge: Face leaning against hand, elbow on desk.
Looking at witness and head down writing a little.
Now just looking down. Picks up papers, reading.
Doesn't seem to be listening. Still reading.
Scene II: People's Exhibit A-D.A. points out large diagram.
Judge: Is watching exhibit.
Judge is still watching, witness is pointing things out. Judge is attentive.
Judge is rubbing eye. He picks up more papers.
Reading. Witness is still at exhibit.
Scene III: Cross examination-Public Defender-female. Public
defender is at exhibit asking questions. Judge is watching. Public
defender walks back to podium asking questions at the same time.
Judge is watching the witness, not the public defender. The public
defender dismisses the witness.
Scene IV: Next witness called by D.A.
Judge staring into space while waiting.
He is scratching his neck.
Judge is reading. He puts book back and begins writing. Judge has
his hands on his face; continues writing. Judge glances up when the
witness identifies defendant, then goes back to writing. Judge
glances up and looks at witness's hands. Public defender objects to
description of defendant's cuts by witness. Judge sustains
objection-smiles and goes back to writing.

An analysis of these brief excerpts points to what appears to
be a dominant ritual adopted by most judges observed during this
study. Their actions might best be termed a ritual of noninvolvement. Ritual as used here refers to a set of actions habitually
practiced as a part of a defined role. Judges in our system of
justice are expected to take a rather limited part in the actual
trial proceedings. The model of third-party disinterest is held up
as an ideal role judges are expected to play. This is opposed to
the role model judges are instructed to emulate in civil law countries, where they take a much more activist role in the conducting
of the trial." Thus, in our study it appears that judges do indeed
attempt to play the role of a disinterested third party and thereby
" See Reiss, Lessons in JudicialAdministration from European Countries, 37 J. AM.
JUD. Soc. 102 (1953).
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meet the role expectations appropriate to an American interpretation of the judicial function. This attempt to meet one's role
expectations is engaged in by practicing a ritual. The notion of
ritual fits well with a dramaturgical model of society.15 This sociological model views participants in a social situation as actors.
People are seen as playing out parts or roles in such a way as to
convince both others and themselves that the performance is
credible, i.e., meets the expectations appropriate to the role being
played. Hence, an individual in a role seeks to give a meaning to
that role which is logical, coherent, and credible from both his
own perspective and the perspective of other actors or the audience viewing the performance.
For practicing trial attorneys, the dramaturgical model may
not at first blush appear startling or new. Most trial lawyers are
probably well aware of the theatrical aspects of their court appearances and the procedures publicly engaged in by others,
including judges, during such appearances. However, this model
underscores what many may overlook; namely, that much of the
public ritual is designed to give the appearance of justice and is
not necessarily engaged in to achieve an actual state or outcome
of justice. Appearance rather than fact becomes paramount.
Thus, judges may seek to appear impartial whether they are in
fact so, and their public performances or rituals may disguise
attitudes and opinions that are less than impartial.
The dramaturgical model as applied to'judges can be further
exemplified by noting some of the elements of the scenes described above. Certain striking features stand out: the apparent
effort to avoid eye contact with participants, the hands regularly
near the face to hide or disguise facial expressions, and the tone
of disinterest that judges attempt to set by reading, writing, or
engaging in activity seemingly unrelated to the scene taking
place. All of these things seem designed to convince others that
judges are in fact impartial, disinterested observers."
However, our system of justice has written an extremely dif, For a further discussion of the dramaturgical model, see E.
(1959).

GOFFMAN, THE PRESEN-

TATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE

" Obviously, the courtroom itself is designed to assist this management of impressions. The judge is seated apart from the attorneys and the jury upon a raised dias. He
wears special clothing to set him apart from the other participants, who wear street

clothing.
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ficult script for judicial actors. The part of judge calls for a person
to act as a disinterested third party during proceedings in which
in reality he is interested and has a central role to play. It appears, then, that in order to pull off this rather demanding role,
certain judges adopt an exaggerated ritual which preaches to
those present a message of third party disinterest. The ritual is
exaggerated since judges end up trying to balance the message of
disinterest with one of concern and attention. They periodically
show interest .at what they might consider to be appropriate or
crucial moments of the proceeding. But, once having gone over
to the side of interest and involvement, they must then try to
retip the scales to the side of impartiality and disinterest. Thus,
during less crucial moments, a ritual of noninvolvement is enacted, an exaggerated portrayal to convince others of a credible
performance, a performance that retrieves and maintains the
message of impartiality. Since this is such a difficult role, though,
less than perfect performances can be expected to occur on occasion. When actors catch themselves not following the script, they
will probably try to assume the ritual of noninvolvement in order
to salvage the performance. The following excerpt illustrates this
dynamic:
Notes from a federal court civil proceeding:
Judge smiles very broadly several times in succession as the attorney
talked. However, judge covered face most of the time. Judge will sit
back in chair, sort of moving it back and forth and half smile, then
raise hand to cover the lower half of face so that expression cannot
be seen by anyone.

The judge in this sequence was apparently having a difficult time
staying in character. But again, when this lapse was realized, an
attempt was made to salvage the performance by adopting some
of the mannerisms contained in the portrayal of noninvolvement
given by other judges in the sample.
Not all of the judges observed used this same acting technique to get across a message of impartiality. A second technique
that was observed might be termed a ritual of active interest.
Here, the judge portrays impartiality by involving himself with
the participants in the proceedings, but interacting with all of
them in the same way. A judge might be rude, for example, but
if he is rude or feisty with all participants in the situation the end
result is a message of impartiality as the following sequence
points out:
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Notes from a state appellate court hearing, four justices present:
Scene I: Male attorney for appellant spoke first and Judge I interrupts asking in a rude manner, "Are you aware of our decision on
the constitutionality of other state's statutes?" Male attorney continues argument only to be interrupted by Judge I again who in a
curt tone asks, "They said he shot and killed him during a robbery,
didn't they? How could he shoot him if he wasn't armed?"
Scene II: Male attorney representing the State begins presenting
his answering argument, when Judge I cuts him off abruptly
indicating there is no need to go into the issue he was addressing.
Scene III: Female attorney representing appellant in a different
case begins her argument when Judge I interrupts her in the same
manner as the previous two attorneys were interrupted. "Are you
saying probable cause for extradition is the same as probable cause
for a search warrant?" Female attorney begins to respond only to be
interrupted again by Judge I asking if she were aware of their decisions saying all that was required for extradition was something
approaching probable cause. She answered that she was aware of
those decisions but did not think the case at bar showed anything
approaching probable cause.
When the two prior male attorneys were arguing the other justices sat quietly (one asked one question) and sometimes wrote but
otherwise did nothing. At this point in the woman attorney's argument, two of the justices wrote notes to each other. Otherwise, they
wrote on pads in front of them or sat quietly.

This example shows that impartiality can be portrayed either by adopting a ritual of noninvolvement or a ritual of active
interest. The former method seems to be the one used by three
of the justices. The latter is clearly the style of Justice I, although
again, since all were treated similarly by this actor, the end result
is a message of impartiality.
By using one or the other of these rituals, judges who were
observed as a part of this study generally set a tone of impartiality
during the public proceedings. Therefore, little evidence emerged
that would indicate judges treat female attorneys differently from
their male colleagues during public performances. In fact, in only
one instance was the sex of the attorney alluded to by a judge.
This instance is from a municipal court proceeding in a Denver
suburb. The female defense attorney is explaining to the jurors
the purpose of the voir dire.
Attorney: The purpose of the voir dire is to ask you questions to
obtain a jury as fair and impartial to the city as to the defendant.
Does anyone have a quarrel with this idea? Tell us.
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Judge: I should have asked, Miss X, if they have any quarrel with
a female attorney.
All laughed.
Attorney: It's too late now.
She then proceeded with her questioning of the jury.

It would appear that this episode describes more an attempt at
humor, rather than a clear indication of a negative judicial bias.
Granted, the attempt at humor may have been in poor taste;
nevertheless, the attorney did not appear in this instance to take
offense at the reference to her sex. The experiences recounted by
the women attorneys interviewed corroborated the data reported
by the participant observers. Only one respondent mentioned a
current example of obvious, public judicial bias. This example
involved a judge who would always let her go first in presenting
her case, no matter how many other attorneys were waiting.
To summarize the results of the observational part of the
study, it appeared that judges did not generally show any difference in treatment of female adversaries during courtroom proceedings. In order to further test the validity of this impression,
ten women attorneys were interviewed to see whether they had
experienced differences in treatment by judges, or whether their
impressions matched those gleaned from our observations.
The ten attorneys interviewed ranged in age from 25 to 57
years, with an average age of around 32 years. There was a wide
variation in the time each had practiced, the range being from 9
months to 29 years. All but one was involved in either state or
local government work, the exception being a legal aid attorney.
Three, however, had experience in private practice. All ten were
asked the following question: "Have you found the behavior of
judges toward you any different than their behavior toward male
attorneys?" The responses to this question are noted below. Persons answering are only identified by a number for two reasons.
First, since many answers are similar, biographical data on the
respondent did not seem critical. More importantly, identifying
biographical data is omitted from the responses to protect the
anonymity of the individual answering the question. Thus, the
rather sketchy background data presented above will have to
suffice, although, again, given the similarity of certain of the
answers, the omission does not appear critical.
QUESTION: Have you found the behavior of judges toward you
any different than their behavior toward male attorneys?

WOMEN ATTORNEYS AND THE JUDICIARY
Respondent I: No. Not really. I'm trying to think if I've ever run
into a courtroom problem. I think judges for the most part are much
more gracious and generally very willing to talk with women attorneys and listen to their arguments than most other attorneys, male
attorneys. I've found that the judges once you appear before them
and if you're prepared and know what you're doing, they're just as
willing to listen to you, probably more so. In fact, if anything I think
they probably lean over backwards and sometimes I suppose that
could be patronizing, but I haven't had any real problem with a
judge patronizing me. I've had a lot of problems with other attorneys
patronizing, but not judges.
Respondent II: I never detected it and that may be my own insensitivity. But, I have never in this state or any state I've practiced in
detected what I felt was any difference in treatment by reason of my
being female rather than male. I'm speaking now solely of the bench
of judges.
Respondent III: I think outside of the courtroom there definitely
is. The judges are more friendly with the male attorneys and their
attitudes with the women attorneys are more obviously male-female
type of encounters. They don't know quite how to respond
to-they're not quite willing to accept you as just, I think, a lawyer
or just someone they can come in and chat with in their chambers.
Generally speaking this seems to be true. In the courtroom I would
say again the older judges are more polite than they are with the
men. They go out of their way to make sure that you're not feeling
offended, I think-or left out. I think that's just a superficial thing.
Respondent IV: No difference, and if anything it's an advantage
as opposed to a disadvantage, but I would say I'm treated just like
anybody else who goes up there.' 7 It's terrific.
Respondent V: No. Not really.
Respondent VI: No. There may be a difference but it is not an
offensive difference. It is a difference which comes, I think, from a
theatrical function of the courtroom and the fact that the judge feels
and even I feel that if they're gonna scream at me, they should do
it in a different way than they do it with a male lawyer. In other
words, if they find something that I have done objectionable, they
tend to handle it more softly, somewhat more tactfully than they do
with a male lawyer, but I think that's a jury trial function. I think
they don't-in chambers the reverse is almost true, but I think really
it's the, it's they don't, they want to seem like gentlemen in front of
the jury. And indeed they always are in front of a jury. It is different
but I don't find it offensive. It fits the theatrical moment. I don't
think it would be appropriate for them given the acculturation of the
jury and the lawyers, not to deal with it somewhat more softly. If I
,1 This respondent had just done appeals work.
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keep going after this don't object. I keep trying to rephrase the
question. There tends to be somewhat more exasperation and less
anger, but I think that's a theatrical thing. It never struck me until
you asked the question. That's the way they deal with it. They get
exasperated with me but it's a gentler-they just blow [up] at
males right in front of the jury. They don't to me, but I think it's
because of their own function with the jury. I have discovered, and
I suspect most of the judges know this, that defense counsel-when
I was doing a lot of county court prosecution-whose ordinary trial
tactic is to chew up the prosecutor and scream and yell and holler,
you know, if they did that with me I always won no matter how lousy
the case was because a jury will overreact to that. They wonder why
is that nasty man picking on that nice lady and I think judges are
almost afraid of the same reaction so that they do-if they think I've
done something that they just disapprove of-they tend to squash
me less abruptly, no less firmly but less abruptly and I think really
it may be a function of how they view their role with the jury-that
they had best be gentlemen and if that involves being a little more
tactful, a little more gentle because they are dealing with a female,
then it is, in fact, appropriate. And I'm not sure it isn't because I,
you know, a judge can't turn the jury off either because if he does
who's going to follow his instructions? So, I suspect, although there
is a difference, it is not as much in trial that you see it. It's almost
like you see a different face than you do in chambers.
Respondent VII: Purely on the basis of male-female, no. With one
possible exception. A little bit of paternal attitude I can think of on
one, about one judge, a little bit of this-not anything serious at all.
A little bit of a young, here we have this young girl in here to try a
case.
Respondent VIII: Well, I just haven't noticed adverse behavior. I
think there may be a little more paternalism. It's like they would
come down on and yell at more the average male lawyer.
Respondent IX: Sure, I mean there are differences. Judges don't
like to yell at women. A lot of them can't bring themselves to do
that. It's kind of, I don't feel that there's a prejudice.
Respondent X:

No.

An analysis of the above answers pinpoints a number of interesting items. First, it is apparent that none of the female attorneys interviewed felt that judges during their public performances generally acted in a negative way towards them or as a rule
preached a message that these practitioners were less competent
than their male colleagues. Thus, the perceptions of these respondents did not seem to indicate that judges regularly play out their
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public role in a manner that would indicate they hold different
expectations regarding these practitioners.
Six of the respondents did note that some judges tend to be
more polite or paternalistic. However, the overall tone of the responses was to view this as a positive factor, or at least as a factor
called for by the script for the judicial role. Hence, it appears that
at certain points in a courtroom proceeding, as for example when
a mistake is consistently being made by counsel, certain judges
drop the ritual of noninvolvement and engage in a ritual of chastisement. This ritual is different from the one of active interest.
Clearly, in the chastisement ritual, attorneys are not treated in
the same manner. The one who regularly makes a mistake or
irritates the bench is singled out for a special type of interaction.
It is within the context of this ritual, however, that judges also
appear to discriminate (meaning simply that they treat differently) between male and female attorneys. In fact, it is this difference in treatment that underscores the ritualistic aspects of chastisement. There is a regularity of response on the part of judges
that is triggered by attorney error, but is not shaped simply by
the error. Male attorneys seem to be subject to the full brunt of
judicial wrath. Female attorneys, on the other hand, are less
likely to be the receivers of the full chastisement ritual, but are
instead treated in a more "gentlemanly" manner.
Again, the dramaturgical model can perhaps offer some insight into this phenomenon. As one attorney stated (Respondent
VI), this differential treatment may in fact be just an extension
of the theatrical role of judge. She noted that by treating the
female attorney less harshly, the judge does maintain a role
whereby he avoids influencing the jury. If she is correct in her
observations, the judicial attempt at maintaining impartiality is
a more complex phenomenon than first appeared. Judges, in
order to show others that they are impartial, in order to convince
others that their performance is a credible one, have to play out
their part in accordance with the expectations the audience has
regarding what is a legitimate performance. Thus, the game has
to be played according to how these others define what is impartial. In our culture it has not been a generally acceptable sign of
impartiality to "yell" at women or to engage in the ritual of
chastisement with women in precisely the same way as one engages in it with men. Therefore, it seems that some judges do
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treat women differently in the chasetisement ritual, in order to
give the appearance of impartiality.
The perceptions of the respondents corresponded to the data
reported by the participant observers in that neither group perceived judges as acting in a more negative way toward female as
opposed to male attorneys. Differences that were noted in the
area of politeness appeared to be situationally anchored, so that
judges did use a different chastisement ritual when lawyers made
mistakes in their own performances. While some respondents
mentioned paternalistic behavior on the part of certain judicial
functionaries, this did not appear to be a predominant problem,
and in some instances it was interpreted as merely being an extension of the theatrical role judges play for the sake of credibility
with the jury. A review of these data also seems to indicate that
in some instances paternalism is a function of the age of the judge
and also the age of the advocate, and is therefore not related in
all cases simply to the sex of the attorney.
A second interesting point that emerges from these interviews is the concern shown about the negative paternalism of
other attorneys. This concern about other attorneys is more
clearly elucidated in the following comments.
I don't think it's the judges. I think it's attorneys mostly at a
trial (Respondent X).
I've had a lot of problems with other attorneys patronizing, but
not judges (Respondent I).
When I moved to Denver, for the first time I encountered what
I had read about and never believed. That there was I felt a discrimination. It wasn't uniform but it was certainly far more widespread.
But it was at the level of fellow lawyers, not the bench, not the
judges (Respondent II).

It seems, then, that some respondents are more concerned with
paternalism among fellow practitioners, and that further this paternalism is perceived in a more negative way than that noted
about judges.
Thirdly, some concern was also expressed about the role
judges play when they are offstage (i.e., in chambers). As noted
previously, the dramaturgical model focuses attention on the fact
that public performances may not be indicative of what is actually occurring or of the true state of participants in a social
scene. Thus, judges who portray a nonbiased, impartial attitude
toward female practitioners, if they are simply play acting, will
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present a different face away from the audience. Relating to
judges offstage, these comments taken from the interviews previously quoted are instructive.
It's almost like you see a different face than you do in chambers
(comment by Respondent VI on the politeness of judges in court).
They're not quite willing to accept you as just, I think, a lawyer or
just someone they can come in and chat with in their chambers
(Respondent III).

These comments suggest that women practitioners face a
more difficult task in being accepted in the informal settings of
the legal profession than the task they confront in being accepted
and treated as professionals in the formal setting of the court.
Informally, there may well be an atmosphere of male camaraderie
that is threatened by female intrusion. Thus, either resentment
or negative paternalism is experienced by women in these backstage interactions. The data suggest, then, that a crucial area of
examination is the acceptance of women in the "clubhouse" even
after admission has been gained and status recognized in the
arena of play. This acceptance is crucial because many pretrial
conferences, which can be viewed as backstage rehearsals, make
public presentations a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, other
elements of legal work, such as negotiations with other attorneys
or with judges, take place behind the scenes, in the offices and
chambers hidden from public view. Failure to be recognized as an
equal in these settings can have the same adverse consequences
for the individual attorney and the course of justice as the same
failure in a public setting. This fact is well demonstrated in the
following observation by one of the respondents.
Just straight drunk driving, petty theft. I'm the only D.A. I know
whom the judge tried to browbeat into disposing of the cases that
were on his docket and that's a judge whom I-I think if I had been
a male he would have tried but we would not have gotten to the
point where I had to say to him, all right, you can take the plea if
you want to, but you do it over the objection of the district attorney
and he finished it. I think there's a tendency in judges who by and
large are nice middle class, aggressive males, to try to push females
more in settlement. I found this true on the civil side with civil cases
that I handled because I used to handle civil cases for the firm I was
with right up to trial. I felt-maybe I felt more pushed but I also
thought that when . . .my [male] partner came in, boy, did they
then back down, you know, and they-judges like to keep their
docket clean, somehow they think that's part of their judicial function. I don't think it is (Respondent VI).
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This comment not only hints at the importance of being
accepted as an equal offstage and the apparent difficulty some
women may encounter in this regard, but it also points at another
element contained in the administration of justice and the judicial system. This system in part shares the characteristics of any
bureaucracy in our society. Most notable is the tendency for bureaucracies to rationally coordinate their activities in order to
maximize efficient production. The courts, too, are involved in a
quest for efficient production, though in this instance the product
is the number of cases which are disposed of. Some judges, then,
try to clear their docket, and an efficient way of doing this is to
attempt to avoid the cost, both in terms of time and money, of a
trial. Negotiations, therefore, and acceptance in the negotiating
milieu are crucial.
Finally, because the court is in part a bureaucracy, it also has
within it actors who play the role of bureaucrats-that is, managers of schedules, files and so forth. Just as acceptance, then, is
important in the actual settings of negotiation, so too, acceptance
and recognition by the bureaucratic functionaries of the judicial
system are also important. Four of the respondents in our study
indicated that the role of the bureaucrat, and the acceptance
these functionaries exhibit toward women attorneys, may also
constitute a problem area for further investigation.
I notice particularly when I go into a clerk's office in court, they
immediately assume I'm there to look at a file or get some forms or
file something. . . . Most of the clerks in the court, clerk's offices
are women and they, I don't think they want to accept the fact that
there are women attorneys (Respondent III).
Sometimes the clerks in the courts are just very snotty and I think
it's because I'm a woman, especially if they're women clerks, you
know, they just snap at you or just kind of treat you-they don't give
you any respect that, say, they give to the male attorneys (Respondent V).
Sure you run into your problems, but they are not with judges, but
more with the people in his office (Respondent IX).

These responses suggest that clerks can present problems to female attorneys, and often more problems than judges present in
terms of role recognition. Respondent I further describes these
problems, the serious effects they can have, and one strategy that
seems to have worked for her in overcoming them.
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The real difference has been the clerks. And now all the clerks who
were sort of abrupt are just as sweet and gracious as they can possibly be. And I think one of the important things to remember is that
in dealing with the court system, the clerks can do a lot for you.
There are many women clerks who are older who work for judges and
they can control the access to the judge's calendar and if they're
rude to you or treat you very abruptly, it's difficult to do anything.
And all those clerks who used to be so rude and snippy are now very
nice, if you come in with some official title. It's funny.

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

One of the key areas this research sought to explore was the
interaction between judges and women attorneys during the
course of trial. By examining a small select group of judicial
functionaries, in an exploratory fashion, it was hoped that some
of their behaviors could be categorized, so that future research
efforts could pinpoint whether the behaviors noted were related
to expectations judges held concerning the role of attorney and
who should play that role. The results of this exploratory research
seem to indicate that judges do in fact regularly engage in certain
kinds of behavior. However, the behaviors categorized did not
generally relate to the sex of the attorney. Thus, judges did not
generally seem to indicate by their public behavior that female
practitioners were considered in a secondary role to their male
counterparts.
In the dramaturgical view of society, judges adopted strategies that would portray to their audience (juries and observers)
that their performances were credible and in keeping with the
script society had provided them. The data collected seem to
pinpoint certain rituals used by judges when they are on stage.
One ritual that stood out was the ritual of noninvolvement, used
to portray a stance of third party disinterest or impartiality. Certain judicial role players, however, portrayed impartiality by a
ritual involvement in the proceedings called a ritual of active
interest. It appeared ritualistic becase neither the individual confronting the judge, his or her utterances, nor the subject at hand
changed the judge's interaction patterns.
Finally, ritual chastisement seems to be another strategy utilized by judges. Here, a difference in treatment is perceived between male and female lawyers. But this difference, too, seems
aimed at impressing the jury or audience with the judge's third
party impartiality. It is expected by all participants that women
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will not be "yelled at" nor chastised in the same way as men. If,
in fact, both were chastised in the same manner the viewers
might well interpret this as judicial bias against women.
As noted in the beginning of this paper, the role of the woman
attorney is in a state of flux. She may be moving from a situation
where public nonacceptance was the rule, to a situation where it
is now an exception. At least these data suggest this is the case.
Judges may presently be more conscious of their public presentations regarding the area of attorneys' sexual identity. Therefore,
to convince others of the credibility of their performance they
seldom present themselves as anything but unbiased observers
when playing the role of trial judge.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The notion of ritual as discussed above can be particularly
fruitful in further attempts at examining judicial role players. As
Irving Crespi notes in his article on attitudes and their utility in
predicting behavior, measures must be based on situations in
which the attitude is likely to be portrayed." Attitudes are described by him as a combination of belief, performance, and intention, and to measure this variable one must construct questionnaire items based on the typical reality in which the respondent is involved. Therefore, a measure of judicial attitudes toward women attorneys should include items on how judges might
vary their typical ritual behavior in response to the sexual identity of counsel. This and other areas of future research are discussed below.
This research suggests a number of other areas for future
research efforts. There was a clear indication in our data that
women may experience a more difficult time in penetrating and
being accepted into the informal structure of the legal profession
than they experience currently in the formal arena of play. While
the data suggests that judges do not publicly indicate they have
different expectations concerning male or female practitioners,
the expectations that seemed dominant in even some of the recent literature may be expressed more openly in behind-thescenes interactions of the legal profession. Thus, studies are
needed of attorneys and judges offstage, in the informal, less
11Crespi, What Kinds of Attitude Measures Are Predictiveof Behavior, 35 PUB. OPIN.
Q. 327, 333 (1971).
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public areas of interaction. Such studies could still be based on
a participant observation methodology. Although there may be
difficulty in researchers penetrating this inner sanctum, such
penetration is by no means impossible. It has been done with
juvenile gangs,49 problem families,5 0 police officers,5 and, as indicated previously, with congressmen." Caution should be exercised, however, in making sure trained observers are utilized, a
problem to be discussed more thoroughly below. Only after a firm
groundwork of this type of exploratory research has been laid, can
we proceed to the more empirical kinds of studies dealing with
attitudes and their relationship to the process of decision making
within the legal realm.
The data also point to the need for studies of bureaucratic
functionaries within the legal system, i.e., court clerks, and their
relationship with women attorneys. As noted, studies involving
the informal structure and the bureaucratic nature of the profession are important, because, just as failure to be recognized as a
professional in the formal arena can adversely affect career
aspirations, so too, failure to be recognized as a colleague in the
clubhouse or the office can spell difficulty and doom. The observation of one respondent reiterates this point:
I think one of the important things to remember is that in dealing
with the court system, the clerk can do a lot for you ... if they're
rude to you or treat you very abruptly, it's difficult to do anything.

Much more work needs to be done observing judges during
the course of trial. Such observations can lead to a fuller understanding of the ritualistic behavior of all participants and the
meaning of these rituals for the course of justice. However, observations can be a tricky undertaking and the need for trained,
sensitive observers cannot be overemphasized. This study used
law students as observers, and, generally, it was found that they
did an excellent job. In some instances, though, the observers
became over-interested in the legal issues, and, thus, behavioral
issues may have been missed. It is not clear that the answer to
"' See most notably

THRASHER, THE GANG

(1963).

30Here, the most recent well publicized example is the Public Broadcasting Service
telecast of the Loud family, "An American Family."
"' J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) and, more recently, J. GILSINAN, THE
MAKING OF A POLICEMAN: SOCIAL WORLD CONSTRUCTIONS IN A POLICE ACADEMY (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Colorado Library).
" See note 41 supra.
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this problem is to be found in the use of social science students.
They may not be up to the task required, since they may much
more likely be overwhelmed by the mystery of legal jargon and
proceedings. It would appear that people with a background in
both the social sciences and the legal profession would be ideal
candidates for such observations.
Another quality observers need to possess is sensitivity. People who are attuned to the subtleties of social interactions and the
meanings such interactions can reveal should be considered a key
to success. This study relied primarily on women observers,"3 and
as the excerpt below indicates, this strategy may be the best when
the issue being considered is similar.
Interviewer: By and large, you would say that anyone in the courtroom observing the courtroom appearances would not really be able
to detect that much difference and would not be able to detect
anything unfavorable?
Respondent:

I think the women might. I don't think men could.

Interviewer:

It's just very subtle?
Respondent: It's a very subtle thing. I have talked to other women
who regularly try cases. None of us I think articulate it very well.
You can feel it, but it's very difficult to articulate it. I suspect that
some of the same patronizing tones, some of the same sloppiness of
behavior occurs with any minority group in the courtroom, because
I've seen the same thing, the same tones used with black lawyers as
a trial lawyer. The same there-there dear, everything is going to be
all right. Only that's the way I translate it. I don't know how they
translate it, but I've seen it.

It should be noted that this respondent is the same one who
interpreted the paternalism of judges as merely an extension of
their theatrical role. Nevertheless, this portion of the interview
underscores two very important factors. First, that sensitive observers are needed to conduct this type of research. Second, the
ideas expressed in the above statement point to a justification for
this and other research efforts in the field of legal-judicial practice. The purpose of this research and future research in the area
should be to translate and articulate the dynamics of the interac33 A problem with using women observers for this type of project might be an oversensitivity or reverse bias on their part. One would expect, therefore, that, if errors were made
in observations, such errors would be slanted towards a negative view of judicial behavior.
The fact that our observational data did not contain extremely negative descriptions
strengthens the findings.
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tions that occur between and among participants in the system,
whether they be attorneys, judges, defendants, or bureaucrats. It
is only with an understanding of these issues that the system can
be improved so that all the actors can play their parts in a drama
that ends with justice.

NOTE
ECONOMICALLY NECESSITATED FACULTY DISMISSALS AS
A LIMITATION ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION

Academic freedom enables members of the academic community to research, investigate, and teach without having unnecessary restrictions or officious supervision placed on their activities.' The value of this freedom has long been recognized by courts
that realize that if teachers do not have this freedom, the effectiveness of the schools in which they teach is appreciably diminished Academic freedom, therefore, requires protecting teachers
IThis protection is necessitated by the special responsibilities of members of the
academic community:
The unique responsibilities of colleges and universities in the United States
are to extend the frontiers of knowledge, to make available to students the
wisdom and knowledge of the past, and to help them to develop their capacities for critical, independent thought. If these vital tasks are to be performed
with any degree of success, teachers in institutions of higher learning in this
country must be as free as possible from restraints and pressures which
inhibit independent thought and action. They must . . .be free to pursue
truth wherever it may lead.
Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of
Regents, 73 H.av. L. REv. 304 (1959). For a discussion of the scope of academic freedom,
see the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 60 A.A.U.P.
BuLL. 269, 270 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A.A.U.P. Statement of Principles]. See also
Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PaoS. 431 (1963); Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic
Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BuLL.753 (1955); Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 446 (1963); Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure:" Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 475 (1971);
van den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 515
(1963); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1176 (1973); Comment,.Academic Freedom in the United States, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV.
589 (1967).
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Supreme Court said:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
385 U.S. at 603. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 261-64 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
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from outside influences and pressures that could compromise
their ability to study and transmit knowledge to students.3
Because members of the academic community are dependent
upon teaching as a means of livelihood, a threat to their job
security is one method by which academic freedom can be curtailed.4 Dismissal or threat of dismissal has often been used by
school administrators to curtail the freedom of teachers who are
outspoken on controversial issues,5 who are sympathetic to causes
Tenure is the most common method by which academic freedom is protected and
it is designed to ensure
[flreedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities and . . . a
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to
men and women of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure,
are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations
to its students and to society.
A.A. U.P. Statement of Principles, at 270. While tenure does not guarantee lifetime employment, its "essential characteristic ... is continuity of service, in that the institution
in which the teacher serves has in some manner relinquished the freedom or power it
otherwise would possess to terminate the teacher's services." Byse, supra note 1, at 306.
Tenure, however, is dependent upon the teacher's continued efficient and good conduct.
See generally Academic Tenure at Harvard University, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 621 (1973);
Brewster, On Tenure, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 381 (1972); Davis, Enforcing Academic Tenure:
Reflections and Suggestions, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 200; Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary,
Explanation, and "Defense," 57 A.A.U.P. BULL. 1 (1971); VAN ALSTYNE, Constitutional
Rights of Professors and Teachers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Note, Academic Tenure: The
Search for Standards, 39 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 593 (1966).
1 "Undoubtedly, most of the publicized issues of academic freedom have had to do
with attempted dismissals of professors [and] . . . . [Clontinuous or permanent tenure
is a most important means of protecting the principles of academic freedom" from such
dismissals. Machlup, supra note 1, at 760.
' See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (testimony before a legislative
committee); Ancanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (member of activist
homosexual organization); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 908 (1974) (involvement in political activities); Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (anti-Viet Nam war activity); Russo v. Center School Dist. No. 1,
469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1972) (symbolic protest of the quality
of American life); Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1130 (1973) (participation in anti-Viet Nam war rallies); Cook County College Teachers
v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972) (criticism of racism in
educational institutions); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1971) (circulation of petitions); Whiteel v. Southeast Local School Dist. No. 1, 365 F.
Supp. 312 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973) (controversial religious
beliefs); Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972) (attended demonstration
protesting arrest of students); Miller v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 54 F.R.D. 393
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (political involvements); Rackley v. School Dist. No. 5, 258 F. Supp. 676
(D.S.C. 1966) (attended demonstration); Kersey v. Maine Consol. School Dist. No. 10,
96 Ariz. 266, 394 P.2d 201 (1964) (involvement in community dispute); Ray v. Minneapolis
Bd. of Educ., 295 Minn. 13, 202 N.W.2d 375 (1972) (refusal to cooperate in course evaluation).
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antipathetic to positions espoused by the administration,, and
whose pedagogic style is incompatible with that considered proper by the administration. 7
As a result of the economic exigencies facing many school
systems, the job security of teachers has recently been threatened
by staff reductions necessitated by financial considerations.8
School administrations faced with dwindling enrollment and decreasing resources have viewed the dismissal of teachers as an
acceptable means of meeting monetary difficulties.' Such dismissals, however, can constitute a serious threat to academic
freedom if staff reductions are used as a means of either weeding
out dissidents"0 or dispensing with procedures designed to protect
' See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public criticism of school
administration's policies); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (letter written
to newspaper critical of school board policies); Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975) (irreconcilable conflicts with superiors); Skehan
v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366
(U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558) (stands on controversial campus issues contrary to
administration's stated position); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973) (impromptu criticisms of school administration); Duke v. North Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
932 (1973) (public criticisms of school administration); Federation of Teachers, Local
1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) (contractual
dispute); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970) (remarks critical of school
administration).
I See, e.g., Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974);
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 135 (1974); Hetrick
v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1974); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Ewing v. Camacho,
411 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1971); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
Noting the effect of this economic distress on the ability of teachers to find another
job, the court in Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1974), said:
Plaintiff admits that when she was initially employed by [the university], persons qualified to teach . . .on the college level were in great demand. When plaintiff [resumed teaching after several years absence] there
was an oversupply of such persons when compared with demand for their
services. Plaintiff's inability to find employment may well be attributable
to [this] change in the job market . ...
Id. at 205 (footnotes omitted). See also notes 132-33 infra.
'See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974). The college decided to dismiss teachers and abolish
its tenure system over such less extreme alternatives as lowering wages, reducing faculty
size by not filling vacancies, and not renewing the contracts of nontenured instructors.
Id. at 272, 322 A.2d at 858; see text accompanying notes 102-08 infra.
10See, e.g., Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 23-51 infra.
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faculty members from arbitrary dismissals."
A dismissal justified by economic necessity may be improper
for a variety of reasons. The financial exigency, for example, may
be a fiction designed to aid a school administration in eliminating
the employment of a dissident faculty member" or replacing a
tenure system with one less onerous to the school.' 3 Even if the
crisis is genuine, the method of selecting which members must be
dismissed may violate the constitutional safeguards contained in
the due process clause. 4 Courts, when faced with a challenge to
a dismissal justified by financial exigency, must examine the
needs of the administration and the rights of the teachers in order
to determine whether the termination of employment infringes
5
the individual's academic freedom.'
The purpose of this note is to analyze the response of courts
to terminations resulting from a financial crisis threatening the
school. The response of the courts depends, in part, on whether
the teacher is asserting the infringement of a constitutional right,
such as freedom of expression,'" or the deprivation without due
process of the law of a property interest, such as a statutory" or
contractual'" right to employment. Therefore, this note will ana" See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 93-114 infra.
,2 See, e.g., State ex rel. Karnes v. Board of Regents, 222 Wis. 542, 269 N.W. 284
(1936), where the court refused to allow the board of regents to abolish the teaching post
of the plaintiff.
,3 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
" Compare Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974) with
Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974).
" The courts do not use a strict balancing test to determine whether the interest of
the school in reducing its faculty should prevail over the individual's interest in continued
employment; the courts are, however, cognizant of these conflicting interests. See, e.g.,
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d
846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
11E.g., Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974), where the plaintiffs alldged
an infringement of their freedom of expression and a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes 23-51 infra.
," E.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), where the
plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of a statutorily created tenure right to
reemployment without due process of law. See text accompanying notes 59-92 infra.
' E.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249,
322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974), where the plaintiffs were deprived of a contractually
created tenure right to reemployment by the abolition of the tenure system at Bloomfield
College. See text accompanying notes 93-108 infra.
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lyze each area separately and then examine the adequacy of court
protection of academic freedom threatened by financially required staff reductions.
I.

CHALLENGE TO DISMISSAL BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

A teacher's employment cannot be terminated for reasons
which infringe upon his exercise of a constitutionally protected
right.'9 Thus, if a teacher can establish a nexus between his exercise of expression, for example, and his dismissal, the termination
is an unconstitutional infringement of his first amendment
rights.20 In determining whether there is such a nexus,
[w]ith rights of liberty, such as the right of a faculty member to
be free from disability for engaging in speech protected by the first
amendment, the analysis starts with an inquiry into the substantive
reasons for whatever action is taken. If it is found that either termination or nonrenewal was [based on] the exercise of protected
speech . . . [then] the substantive decision is illegal as a matter
2

of constitutional law. '

This analysis, however, may fail if the school alleges that the
dismissal was in fact based upon financial considerations. This
allegation places a heavier burden of proof on the teacher to show
that the substantive reason for the dismissal was his exercise of
constitutional rights.2
" The government cannot condition a privilege upon a waiver of a constitutionally
protected right. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Rampey v. Allen,
501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973).
, Generally, the nexus must be established between a specific exercise of a constitutionally protected right and the dismissal. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Gierenger v. Center School Dist.
No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Clark v. Holmes, 474
F.2d 928 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Hostrop v. Board of Junior Colleges
Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Russo v.
Center School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Duke
v. North Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973);
Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973). For a
discussion of how Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
827 (1975), might not require such a nexus, see Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Freedom
of Expression, 52 DENVER L.J. 82, 84-86 (1975).
" Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed,
43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558), citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
" See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra. The allegation places a heavier burden
on the plaintiff because he must show not only that financial exigency was not the basis
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In Collins v. Wolfson2 the Miami-Dade Community College,

in order to implement a reduction in faculty size, decided not to
renew the contracts of four faculty members.2 The dismissed
employees then brought a section 19832 action alleging that the
"nonrenewals were effected pursuant to an arbitrary and subjective set of criteria employed by the Board of Trustees in ascertaining which teachers would not be rehired .... ",26 In addition
to this claim, two of the plaintiffs-Collins and Rivas-alleged
that the nonrenewal of their contracts infringed their constitutionally protected right of expression.Y
Collins, a nontenured instructor, claimed that "his nonrenewal was retaliatory in nature to punish him for participation in a
well-publicized political demonstration at the Democratic National Convention ....
,,21 The court, however, held that the
appeal should be dismissed as moot because Collins was subsefor the termination, but also that there was a nexus between the exercise of a constitutional right and the dismissal.
- 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974).
2, Of the four faculty members whose contracts were not renewed, three-Collins,
Riley, and Rivas-were nontenured while the fourth-Hernhuter-was tenured. Because
Hernhuter was tenured and, therefore, had a property interest protectible under the fourteenth amendment, he was entitled to a "hearing, the purpose of which would be to assure
that his position was in fact 'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract.
... Id.
at 1104. The other three were not entitled to a hearing before dismissal because they were
nontenured and were thus accorded a lesser degree of protection by the court of appeals.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides, in part, the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen. . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
" 498 F.2d at 1101.
21Id. The first amendment claim of Rivas was quickly disposed of by the court, which
held it could "find no conceivable claim embodied in Rivas' complaint, for he leaves to
mere conjecture the possibility that subjective standards could mask an improperly
grounded failure to renew." Id. at 1103. Thus, a mere allegation, without more, that a
reduction in staff is being used as a subterfuge to remove dissident faculty members is
inadequate to carry the plaintiff's burden of proof. However, a factual basis for such an
assertion may be sufficient to successfully challenge such a dismissal. In American Ass'n
of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div.
1974), for example, the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the abolition of tenure
and the dismissals of certain faculty members were not demonstrably bona fide and the
court refused to sustain the administration's actions. In Bloomfield, however, a contractual right was violated by the administration's actions and the burden of proof in a
situation like Collins would be on the plaintiffs to show the constitutional inadequacy of
the decision.
2 498 F.2d at 1101.
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quently rehired by the college pursuant to a rehiring policy that
gave priority to faculty members dismissed as the result of a staff
reduction."9 The court, therefore, did not find it necessary to determine whether the reason given by the administration or the
reason alleged by Collins was the true basis for the nonrenewal
of the contract.
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit in effect deprived Collins of
his cause of action under section 1983, which provides liability for
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution." 30 The dismissal of the suit by the trial court
and the decision by the court of appeals took away from Collins
the opportunity to show whether constitutional rights had been
infringed and, if they were, whether damages should properly
have been awarded. While reinstatement is often viewed as the
proper remedy for a constitutionally impermissible termination
of employment, 31 it is not an exclusive remedy, and other remedies-such as the award of back pay or punitive damages-are
often found appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the deprivation of his constitutional rights.32 The Fifth Circuit's holding,
in part, results from the fact that the administration justified its
actions by using the financial condition of the college as the basis
for the termination, and a different conclusion might have been
reached if this had not been the basis.3
" Id. at 1102. The court said that, "as a result of [his] restoration, [Collins no longer
had] a live controversy with the trustees." Id. The claim of the third appellant, Riley,
was also held to be moot because he was rehired under the same policy.
The court did not, however, indicate why it thought that there was no section 1983
claim remaining after the rehiring of the plaintiffs. One obvious argument is, because
the plaintiffs were rehired, the administration's claim of financial exigency as the basis
must be valid, for the school would not wish to rehire someone it fired in order to get him
off the faculty. This conclusion does not necessarily follow, because Collins alleged that
he was fired as a punishment and it is this punishment he claimed violated his constitutional rights and, therefore, gave rise to the school's section 1983 liability. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314
(4th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board
of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972); Rauls v. Board of Educ., 445 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.
1971); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Olson v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
12Compare Collins with Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558) and Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1973).
u One reason a different result might have been reached is that Collins would prob-
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The remaining appellant, Rivas, claimed that the criteria
used in selecting which faculty members would not be rehired was
arbitrary and subjective and, therefore, a deprivation of due
process under the fourteenth amendment . 3 In disposing of this
claim, the court held:
[O]nce the need arose to reduce the staff, the Board could employ
any device or standard to implement the reduction, such as arbitrarily drawing lots or otherwise leaving the decision to chance, so long
as the actual reason for the particular separation was not retribution
3 5
against the instructor's constitutionally protected conduct.

The only restriction imposed by the court upon the administrative decision is that the college is "confined to determining who
among qualified instructors is more or less expendable, rather
than deciding who on the faculty has so misbehaved as to warrant
36
dismissal for cause."
The difficulty with the court's analysis is that the administration could easily couch the dismissals in the language of a
permissible standard while in reality using constitutionally impermissible standards.3 7 In Johnson v. Branch,3 for example, the
ably not have been rehired, because there would have been no policy to rehire those
persons whose contracts were not renewed because of a staff reduction. Another is that
Collins would have had a lighter burden of proof, because he would not have to show both
the invalidity of the financial exigency and the nexus between his termination and an
exercise of a constitutional right.
498 F.2d at 1103
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1103.

3 For examples of cases in which a school administration has used permissible
grounds for dismissal as a subterfuge in order to implement impermissible terminations
of employment, see Cook County College Teachers v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff alleged dismissals were retaliation for union activities and public positions taken
on racism in the university; court held that the dismissal was constitutional as it proceeded through the school's normal selection process); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs alleged dismissal based on circulation of
petitions and other antiadministration actions; court held dismissal proper in that it
resulted from a desire to strengthen the school's art and history departments); Johnson
v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) (court sustained the plaintiffs allegation that the
dismissal was based on her civil rights activities over the school administration's claim
that the dismissal was based on her insubordination and refusal to cooperate with her
superiors); Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist. No. 1, 365 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ohio
1972), aff'd 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff alleged that the dismissal was based
on his criticism of the school board, his teaching of controversial subjects, and his personal
religious beliefs; the court held the dismissal was based on his participation in a student
demonstration and was constitutionally permissible); Williams v. Sumter School Dist.,
255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966) (court sustained plaintiffs contention that his dismissal
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reasons given for the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract were
"insubordination" and an "inability to perform those extracurricular duties required of her promptly and in a cooperative manner."3 The court, however, found that these grounds were not
the true basis for the dismissal and, instead, held that the plaintiff was dismissed, in part, because of her involvement in civil
rights activities.
In Johnson, which did not involve a reduction in faculty size,
the Fourth Circuit was able to question the school's credibility
and find that there was no factual basis for the reasons given for
the nonrenewal of the contract. 0 In a fact situation involving a
reduction in staff, however, the reduction in itself provides factual support for the dismissal. Because "someone on the faculty
[has] to go because of [the] reduction," a faculty member attempting to show that he was chosen for an improper reason has
a stronger presumption to rebut." The Fifth Circuit in Collins,
moreover, sanctioned the use "of any device or standard to implement the reduction" as long as the standard was not unconstitutional; however, this latitude in what constitutes a permissible
standard gives the administration greater resources in fabricating
constitutional excuses for what may be an unconstitutional termination of employment. 2
was based on his civil rights activities over the school's claim that the dismissal was
caused by the plaintiff's insubordination and lack of cooperation). See also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 16.09 at 331 (1972), where Professor Davis says that persons
responsible for writing administrative decisions sometimes feel compelled to "dress up [a
decision] in verbiage that will make it look better than it is underneath."
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
" Id. The basis for the allegations of insubordination and refusal to cooperate, the
court found, stemmed from the following matters:
[Bleing 15 minutes late to supervise an evening athletic contest; arriving
at the school building a few minutes after the prescribed sign-in time but
before any class was due to commence; failure to furnish a written explanation for not attending a P.T.A. meeting; failure to stand in the door of her
classroom to supervise pupils as the classes changed; and the failure to see
that the cabinets in her home room were clean and free of fire hazard.
Id. at 178. In his dissent, Judge Bryan said that the reasons given by the school administration were sufficient for not renewing the contract of the plaintiff. Id. at 182 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
40

Id.

Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally DAvIs, supra
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965).
11498 F.2d at 1103. Standards for differentiating faculty members might include
seniority, experience, publications, participation in school affairs, community involve"

note 37, §§ 29.01, .06; S.
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Rivas also claimed that the termination of his employment
deprived him of liberty without due process of law. In rejecting
this claim, the court said that under Board of Regents v. Roth43
only a termination that carries with it the implication of incompetence" or impropriety 5 infringes a person's liberty if there is no
hearing before the termination. A dismissal necessitated by a
staff reduction carries with it no negative implications, the court
held; it merely implies that "someone on the faculty had to go"
and "someone who otherwise would likely be invited to stay must
be relieved."" While it is unclear what constitutes a stigma sufficient to justify a deprivation of liberty under Roth,'7 the court
ignores the possibility that a termination justified by economic
necessity may be interpreted by future employers as a termination in reality based upon incompetence or impropriety."
ment, classroom achievement, interest in the future of the school, and family considerations. See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 259 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
For examples of cases in which the dismissals carried implications of incompetence,
see Scheelhause v. Woodbury Central School Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 255 (1974); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973); Knarr v.
Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1971); Tsakiris v. Phoenix Union High School Sys., 18 Ariz. App. 416, 502 P.2d 1093
(1972); Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747 (1956); Stroman v. Board
of School Directors, 7 Pa. Commw. 418, 300 A.2d 286 (1973). In Weathers v. West Yuma
County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552, 559 (D. Colo. 1974), the allegations of
incompetence included the fact that the plaintiff's teaching methods "were ineffective in
that students did little more than 'take notes' and do 'busy work.'"
" For examples of cases in which the dismissals carried implications of impropriety,
see Ancanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (homosexual conduct);
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973) (told students "I am an unwed mother");
Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (unsubstantiated allegations of sexual
conduct with younger man); Bradford v. School Dist. No. 20, 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966)
(public drunkenness and disorderly conduct); Jerry v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y,2d 534, 324
N.E.2d 106 (1974) (allegations of sexual misconduct with student).
41 498 F.2d at 1103.
4' In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court held that if a termination infringes a person's interest
in "liberty," then he is entitled to a hearing before that deprivation.
"
For a discussion of the repercussions of a dismissal from employment as a teacher,
see Schulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth and
Sinderman, 51 DENVER L.J. 215, 220-24 (1974). In Russo v. Center School Dist. No. 1,
469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973), for example, the plaintiff
was unable to find work after her contract was not renewed despite "a highly satisfactory
teacher observation report. . . and further academic achievement." Schulman, supra, at
222. Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1974), suggests that a
university is "under no duty to determine whether the job market [can] absorb [a
teacher] before" terminating his employment. Id. at 205, citing Perkins v. Regents of
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A teacher challenging a dismissal that is justified by his employers as required by economic necessity has a heavy burden of
proof. The mere allegation that the termination was in reality
based upon his exercise of a constitutional right is inadequate,
because the school's claim of financial exigency in itself provides
a substantive basis for the decision that is not unconstitutional.4 9
Moreover, courts may be unwilling to interfere with the discretion
of the school's administration as to either the necessity of
dismissals or the choice of whom should be dismissed. 0 Thus, in
the absence of a property right based on a contractual or statutory
provision, the constitutional protection afforded a faculty member dismissed as the result of a reduction in staff is often inadequate.5 '
II. CHALLENGE TO DIsMissAL BASED ON PROPERTY RIGHT
A person has a protectible interest, similar to a property
right, in his employment if he has
more than an abstract need or desire for [the continued
employment]. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, indeed, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.,'

This claim of entitlement to continued employment is more than
a mere belief that one will be rehired 3 or a subjective, unilateral
expectation of reemployment." This legitimate claim of entitlement may arise either through the creation of such an interest by
the state55 or by the creation of a contractual relationship. 5
Univ. of Calif., 353 F. Supp. 618, 623-24 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See also text accompanying
notes 131-32 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 236-38 (W.D. Wis. 1974);
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 267-68, 322
A.2d 846, 855-56 (Chan. Div. 1974).
11 If, for some reason, the protection afforded by a contract or statute does not apply,
then the underlying constitutional protection still remains. Compare Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec.
24, 1974) (No. 74-558), with Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974), and
Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974). But cf. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
52 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). For a recent Supreme Court
interpretation of Roth and the property interest it creates, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 134 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202, 208 (E.D. La. 1974).
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court held:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
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If a teacher has a recognized property interest in continued
employment, he cannot be deprived of this interest without the
due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution. 7 When confronted by a challenge to a dismissal that is alleged to infringe
the plaintiff's property interest in continued employment, a court
must determine,
under the applicable state law, the nature and extent of the . . .
right and, if the . . . right has been terminated other than by the
expiration of its term, to consider whether the method of termination comported with the fourteenth amendment procedural due process."

Thus, in situations in which a dismissal was necessitated by financial exigencies, the court must determine whether the termination infringed the rights of a teacher who had a property interest
in his continued employment.
A.

Statutorily Created Interest in Continued Employment

In Johnson v. Board of Regents" the Wisconsin Legislature
reduced by 5 percent the base budget for the University of Wisconsin System and required a decrease in enrollment in the system's campuses. 0 This reduction led administrative officials to
the conclusion that "there would be insufficient funds available
to continue to pay the salaries of all tenured members of the
faculty and staff in all departments of all campuses."'" Faced
with this forced reduction of the budget, university officials decided to discontinue the employment of some tenured faculty
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577.
1 Justice Powell recently said that a "person may have a protected property interest
in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
7 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Schulman, supra note 48.
5'Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1974), petitionfor cert. filed,

43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558).
377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
o Id. at 230.

Id. As in American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974), the administration apparently did not consider other,
less extreme alternatives. See note 9 supra.
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members and created a procedure for determining which faculty
members they would "lay-off""2 and a means by which this deci3
sion could be appealed.1
After following this procedure, the university laid off 38 tenured faculty members who then brought an action seeking declaratory relief." The plaintiffs, claiming that the university's
method of determining which faculty members would be terminated violated the procedural due process guaranteed them by
the fourteenth amendment, relied on a Wisconsin statute as the
basis for their claim. This statute, in part, provides that a
teacher's "employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and
good behavior" and that such employment "may not be terminated involuntarily, except for cause upon written charges." 5
Because there were neither written charges nor allegations of inefficiency or bad behavior, the teachers complained that having
their employment terminated deprived them of a property right
without due process of law. 6
'1 The regents decided to use the term "lay-off" rather than "terminate" or "dismiss"
because
the applicable state statutes did not specify fiscal exigency as a basis for
termination of tenured faculty; that the persons affected would continue as
tenured faculty members (but without pay and without duties); that the
persons affected would be entitled to "first refusal" for reinstatement to their
positions if funds again became available within two years; that efforts to
find other employment for them within the System were being made and
would continue to be made; and that the term "lay-off" avoids an implication that any act or omission of the person caused the University's action.
377 F. Supp. at 231.
' Id. at 232-33.
6, The plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) alleging a deprivation of due process and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) seeking a "preliminary injunction to
require defendants to continue the plaintiffs in their present employment unless and until
minimal procedural due process is afforded them." 377 F. Supp. at 230.
5 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (1974-75 Supp.) provides, in part, as follows:
(1)(a) All teachers in any state university shall be employed on probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior, after appointment and acceptance thereof for a sixth consecutive
year in the state university system as a teacher. An official leave of absence,
part-time or fulltime, or a teacher improvement assignment, shall not constitute a break in continuous service, nor shall it count toward the time required to attain tenure.
(b) The employment of a teacher who has become permanently employed under this section may not be terminated involuntarily, except for
cause upon written charges . ..
66 The procedures that the plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to as a matter of due
process of law are those contained in id. § 37.31(1)(b), which provides, in part, that
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The court first determined that the statutory right of tenure
created by the legislature is not limited by financial considerations. In listing the applicable grounds for involuntarily terminating a tenured faculty member's employment, the statute nowhere
provides that a teacher can be terminated "because of reduced
student enrollment or because of considerations of economy, or
both." 7 To reach a contrary conclusion would result in the anomalous interpretation that the statute afforded more protection to
an incompetent teacher, who could be dismissed only according
to the statutory procedures, than to a teacher in good standing,
whose property interest in continued employment did not require
procedural protection if the reasons for the dismissal were economic considerations."8
The court in Johnson, however, did not require that the full
procedures contained in the statute" had to be followed before the
38 plaintiffs were dismissed." In deciding how much procedure
[wlithin 20 days of receiving the written notice that his employment has
been terminated, such permanently employed teacher may appeal the termination to the board of regents by a written notice to the president of the
board of regents. The board of regents shall hear the case and provides such
teacher with a written statement as to its decision. The action and decision
of the board of regents in the matter shall be final, subject to judicial review
67 377 F. Supp. at 234. In reaching such a conclusion, the court in Johnson is apparently in conformity with Wisconsin case law. In State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d
190, 203-04, 269 N.W. 711, 718 (1959), overruled in part on other grounds, 39 Wis. 2d 595,
159 N.W.2d 630 (1968), the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted section 37.31 and said:
We wish to take sharp issue with . . . the contention . . . .[t]hat the
statute vests sole discretion in the board to determine for itself what...
constitutes good cause for discharge. Such an interpretation of the statute
would tend to completely destroy its obvious objective of assuring security
of tenure to a teacher.
' See text accompanying notes 84-92 infra.
99 CompareWis. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.31(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1974-75) with 377 F. Supp. 23233.
7 Due process can, of course, vary with the substantive rights that are sought to be
protected. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970), the Court said, "The
formality and procedural requisites [necessary to satisfy due process] can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Thus, the statutory procedures are not necessarily the only ones that will
satisfy the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. In Johnson
the court stated that due process required only that the dismissed teacher have the right
to show
that the true reason for his or her lay-off was a constitutionally impermissible
reason; or. . .that, given the chain of decisions which preceded the ultimate
decision designating him or her by name for lay-off, that ultimate decision
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was required by this statutory right to employment, the court
applied the Supreme Court's decision in Arnett v. Kennedy." In
Arnett, the appellant was discharged under procedures he alleged
"denied [him] due process of law because they failed to provide
for a trial-type hearing before an impartial agency official prior
to removal .
"..."72In affirming the dismissal, Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, held that the entity which created the substantive right to
employment could also define "the procedure provided for its
enforcement."73 Therefore, the Court held, the procedure to enforce a statutory right is not constitutional in origin, but rather
was nevertheless wholly arbitrary and unreasonable.
377 F. Supp. at 240. In criticism of the due process protection given by the court in
Johnson, it has been said that
the plaintiffs' had a constitutional claim to "some minimal procedural protection." But that protection was minimal indeed, in that the court declined
to prescribe any faculty participation in the separation decisions, once "reasonably adequate" statements of reasons were provided by the administration, with some opportunity for the faculty member to respond.
The Bloomfield College Case, 60 A.A.U.P. BULL. 320 (1974), quoting Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 240 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
71 416

U.S. 134 (1974).

Id. at 139. The plaintiff, an employee at the Chicago Regional Office of the Office
of Economic Opportunity, was dismissed after publicly stating that his superior had
"attempted to bribe a representative of a community action organization." Id. at 137. The
2

superior then notified the plaintiff that he would be removed from his position as the result
of making the unsubstantiated statement. Id. at 138.
7' Id. at 152. The Court, as justification for this conclusion, said that
that right, a right which had previously existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the procedure by which "cause"
was to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees
which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. . . . Congress was
obviously intent on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed, but was likewise
intent on excluding more elaborate procedural requirements which it felt
would make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in
practice.
Id. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's opinion implies that the owner of a property right, which
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), accorded constitutional protection, may be denied that full protection if the creator of the property interest does not include the procedural protections Roth and
Sindermann held the owner was entitled to have. In his dissent, Justice Marshall notes
that this in effect makes the property interest similar to the privilege of governmental
employment that was found to exist in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 416 U.S. 211 n.7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

only such as "Congress has designated" without any additional
due process procedural protection.74
It could be agued under Arnett, then, that the authority
creating the property interest in employment could, in situations
not clearly delineated by the statute, define how much, if any,
procedural protection is to be given in those situations. 5 As applied to Johnson, the authority of the University of Wisconsin
System to determine the procedural due process to be accorded
faculty members dismissed as the result of economic exigency
would be based upon the statute creating the property interest in
teaching rather than the Federal Constitution. Thus, the statute,
rather than the fourteenth amendment, would determine the protection to be given a tenured teacher; this view, however, was
rejected in Johnson.7 6
Instead, the court noted that the majority of the Supreme
Court did not agree with Justice Rehnquist's opinion that the
statute, rather than the Constitution, dictates the procedural due
process an employee is entitled to receive.77 The district court
concluded that
', 416 U.S. at 152. The Court said that reading in additional constitutional procedural
protections could be done "[o]nly by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress
" Id.
which conferred . . . the right not to be removed save for cause ....
11As in the plurality's opinion in Arnett, it could equally well be argued that the State
of Wisconsin, had it so chosen, could have included the procedural guarantees of the
Federal Constitution. How this should be done, however, is something the plurality does
not state. See id. at 151-52. Given the wide variety of cases in which requisite due process
involved in a hearing might be an issue, the legislature in drafting such a statute would
have to possess an unusual degree of prescience to know what the Constitution requires
as a matter of due process because due process varies so considerably from situation to
situation. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (repossession of consumer
goods); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (nonrenewal of teaching contract);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (repossession of consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation
of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1967) (garnishment of wages); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (discharge of employment from government contractor).
See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process-PrejudgmentSeizure of
Property, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), 52 DENVER L.J. 619, 621-25,
632 (1975), where the author describes "the inconsistent standards of due process." This
problem could be avoided if, rather than accepting the plurality's approach of selective
incorporation by legislatures of the due process clause, the procedural due process required
for termination of employment was independent of statutes. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 207, 211 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71377 F. Supp. at 235.
" In his dissent, which was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, Justice Marshall
noted that
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once the entity creating the position has afforded it the attribute of
permanence or "tenure," then the due process clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment determines the minimal procedural protection which must attend termination or lay-off."8

Because the statute was inapplicable to these particular terminations, the court did not require the board of regents to follow the
statutory procedures for termination.7 9 Instead, the court applied
the minimal due process requirements that underlie the statute's
procedures and held that the fourteenth amendment required
only protection from "termination or lay-off for a constitutionally
impermissible reason. . . and from termination or lay-off which
is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable." 80
In so concluding, the court ignored the plaintiff's claim that
the dismissal was in itself a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Arguably, what violates the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights is not the actual procedures the administration followed in Johnson, but rather the fact that the terminations were
allowed to take place for reasons and under procedures that were
a majority of the Court rejects Mr. Justice Rehnquist's argument that because appellee's entitlement arose from statute, it could be conditioned on
a statutory limitation of procedural due process, an approach which would
render such protection inapplicable to the deprivation of any statutory benefit.
416 U.S. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion in which he was joined
by Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell found the constitutional protections of the fifth and

fourteenth amendments applicable. Id. at 164 (Powell, J!, concurring). In a separate
opinion, Justice White found the "principles of due process" applicable when "a person
is finally deprived of his property" interest in employment. Id. 178 (White, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
377 F. Supp. at 235.
T'The court concluded that
7

the Wisconsin legislature has invested plaintiffs' employment with a sufficient degree of permanence to prevent termination or lay-off, for whatever
reason, without some minimal procedural protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever the elements of that protection may be.
Id. at 235. See criticism of this conclusion in note 70 supra.
" 377 F. Supp. at 239. In the court's view, the "minimal procedures" required at least
furnishing each plaintiff with a reasonably adequate written statement of the
basis for initial decision to lay-off;
furnishing each plaintiff with a reasonably adequate description of the manner in which the initial decision had been arrived at;
making a reasonably adequate disclosure to each plaintiff of the information
and- data upon which the decision-makers had relied; and
providing each plaintiff the opportunity to respond.
Id. at 240. See criticisms of this "minimal" procedure in The Bloomfield College Case,
supra note 70.
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not contained in the statute creating the property interest in
continued employment. 8 1 The property interest of the Wisconsin
teachers was, by administrative fiat, limited by the addition of a
new cause for dismissal-declining student enrollment and legislative paring of the budget.82 The court purported to reject just
such a view,8 3 but by allowing the dismissals to stand it sanctioned the limitation of the property interest.
The court's rationale, moreover, reaches the same result it
would have reached had it followed Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion.S' Under the plurality's approach in Arnett, the university
system acting for the legislative creator of the property interest
may dictate "the procedural limitations which [accompany] the
grant of the interest."81 In Johnsonthis was done when the university system was allowed to decide that tenure would have to be
limited by economic considerations and different procedures were
followed than those specified by the statute.88 The court then
sanctioned these procedures as satisfying the requirements of the
due process clause. 7 Although the court's approach in Johnson
resulted in a judicial sanction of procedures not required under
the plurality's opinion in Arnett, s8 the protection that Roth and
Sindermann accorded an existing property interest in continued
employment has been circumvented by a lower procedural requirement for dismissals justified by economic reasons. The adequacy of the statutory protection of the Wisconsin tenure act is
limited because the creator of the interest and the university
administration can redefine its extent and procedural protections. 9
The weakness of statutory protection of academic freedom is
revealed by the court's response in Johnson to a staff reduction
necessitated by economic considerations. Given the bona fide
" 377 F. Supp. at 230-31. For the procedures and reasons for dismissals, see notes 6566 supra.
R' See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra. See also 377 F. Supp. at 234-35.
377 F. Supp. at 235.
' See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
416 U.S. at 155.
, See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
'7 377 F. Supp. at 240-42.
U See 416 U.S. at 163, where the Court concluded that there was no necessity for
"procedural protection beyond that afforded here by the statute and related agency regulations."
", See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
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nature of the necessity of the dismissals and the ambiguous tenure statute, the court was compelled to abandon the statutory
procedures designed to protect academic freedom. 0 Because all
of the faculty members in Johnson were qualified and because the
employment of some had to be terminated, the opportunity to
prove that the dismissal was actually based on an impermissible
ground was greatly reduced." The plaintiffs in Johnson had to
show that the decision was "wholly arbitrary and unreasonable"
in order to prevail and this, in reality, was impossible because the
underlying basis for the decision-the economic reduction in
staff-meant that the decision could not possibly be wholly arbitrary.2
B.

Contractually Created Interest in Continued Employment

In American Association of University Professors v. Bloomfield College" the Board of Trustees of Bloomfield College, faced
with decreasing enrollment and an increasing cash deficit,' 4
decided to reduce the staff by eliminating 13 teaching positions.
At the same time the board found it necessary to place the remaining professors on a 1-year terminal contract and thereby
eliminate the college's existing tenure system. 5 The plaintiff
" The court accepted as bona fide the administration's decision to reduce the faculty
without requiring the administration to show that less extreme alternatives, such as not
replacing retiring faculty, were not available. See note 61 supra. The court felt that the
decision to terminate was the result of a series of decisions that the due process clause
did not require the court to inquire into. See 377 F. Supp. 236-39.
See 377 F. Supp. at 240.
,' Id. at 239 (emphasis added). If the decision has any legally admissible evidence
sustaining it, such as a showing of economic necessity, it is not wholly arbitrary and will
be sustained by a court reviewing the administrative action. See generally K. DAviS, supra
note 37, §§ 14.07-.09, .13.
:3 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
" Enrollment in 1973-74 was 867 students, down from 1,069 in 1972. Id. at 255, 322
A.2d at 849. The cash deficit "for 1972 was $123,000 and for 1973 $191,000, with estimates
that it will probably rise to $231,000 for the year." Id. at 257, 322 A.2d at 850. The court
said that
enrollment will continue to drop for the following three reasons: (1) the pool
from which the college has historically drawn in terms of age and economic
background is itself being diminished; (2) inability to develop a sufficiently
attractive academic program; and (3) costs. In addition . . . the area is ...
overburdened with educational facilities in terms of existing need.
Id. at 258-59, 322 A.2d at 851. For a thorough discussion of the economic problems facing
Bloomfield College, see Academic Freedom and Tenure: Bloomfield College (New Jersey),
60 A.A.U.P. BULL. 50 (1974).
11 129 N.J. Super. at 255, 322 A.2d at 849.
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brought this action seeking reappointment of those faculty members whose employment had been terminated and a "declaratory
judgment that [the professors'] tenured status is unaffected by
the action of board of trustees."9
The basis for the plaintiff's action was that the contract provided that
a teacher will have tenure and his services may be terminated only
for adequate cause, except in cases of extraordinarycircumstances
because of financial exigency. 7

The contract further stated that "[tiermination of continuous
employment because of financial exigency of the institution must
be demonstrably bona fide."9 Thus, the contract limited the situations in which a tenured faculty member could be terminated
to those in which the trustees' actions were 1) justified by extraordinary circumstances and 2) demonstrably bona fide."
The court first determined whether the current financial difficulties of Bloomfield College constituted the "extraordinary circumstances" which, under the contract, would allow the administration to dismiss tenured faculty. Extraordinary circumstances,
the court held, arise from situations so extreme that the college
is forced to take measures "reasonably calculated to preserve its
existence as an academic institution" and not from those situations in which the college is merely "under financial distress and
. . . 'something [has] to be done.' "' In determining whether
96Id.
'7

Id. at 253, 322 A.2d at 849.

Id. (emphasis added). In the A.A.U.P. Statement of Principles,at 270, subsection
5 of the Academic Tenure section provides that "[tiermination of a continuous appointment because of a financial exigency should be demonstrably bona fide." In 1974, the
American Association of University Professors proposed the following regulation for termination of employment on the basis of financial exigency:
Termination of an appointment with continuous tenure, or of a probationary
or special appointment before the end of the specified term, may occur under
extraordinary circumstances because of a demonstrably bona fide financial
exigency which cannot be alleviated by less drastic means.
Discontinuance of a Program, Employment, Department, or Medical Reasons, 60
A.A.U.P. BULL. 411 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Revision of Regulation 4].
The court said:
That the parties intended that this evaluation [of the tenure] policy
not be left to the college free of restraint is shown by their choice of conditions (1) that the Board's actions be demonstrably bona fide, (2) extraordinary circumstances .

...

129 N.J. Super. at 266, 322 A.2d at 855.
11 Id. at 264, 322 A.2d at 855.
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the former or latter situation faced the college, the court considered the following factors: the duty of the board of trustees to
"manage the business of the college . . . in light of its own best
business judgment free from outside interference" and the "nature and extent of academic tenure."'' °
The court examined the financial difficulties facing the college'02 and concluded that these problems, while severe, did not
justify a conclusion that a "financial exigency" or "extraordinary
circumstances" existed. Because the school's "financial problem
[was] one of liquidity, which . . . had plagued the college for
many years," the school's current distress could be characterized
as neither exigent nor extraordinary within the meaning of the
contract.0 3 The financial difficulties of the college were not sufficient to justify the abolition of tenure; this conclusion led the
court to examine the good faith of the college in deciding to abolish tenure.'0
The administration "failed to demonstrate by a preponder05
ance of the evidence that their . . . action was in good faith.'
Because there was no immediate financial benefit that could have
"0" Id. at 267-68, 322 A.2d at 855-56; see Thomas v. Board of Educ., 89 N.J. Super.
327, 215 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd 46 N.J. 851, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Quinlan v. Board
of Educ., 73 N.J. Super. 40, 179 A.2d 161. (App. Div. 1962). The court in Bloomfield
described the considerations as follows:
[T]he obligation incumbent upon the board of trustees to manage the business of the college, to appraise and project existing and future needs and
resources and to act in light of its own best judgment free of outside interferences; its duty to honor solemnly undertaken tenure commitments, the
objective data relating to the college's financial circumstances, its financial
history, the authenticity of the financial threat; evaluations expressed by
the board of trustees, the existence of real alternatives to the action taken,
and the nature and extent of academic tenure itself.
129 N.J. Super. at 267-68, 322 A.2d at 855-56.
"I See note 95 supra. The court also considered the fact that the college had lost it
status as a prime lending risk, which caused its borrowing costs to increase, and that its
college endownment fund had decreased by 21 percent. 129 N.J. Super. at 258, 322 A.2d
at 850.
03 129 N.J. Super. at 270, 322 A.2d at 857. The court also considered the fact that 12
new, nontenured faculty were hired in the "period during which the action complained of
took place" and that the university owned property, the value of which was "conservatively estimated at between 11/2 and 4 million dollars." Id. at 269, 270, 322 A.2d at 856,
857.
", The court said that the college "cannot reasonably support its claim of demonstrably bona fide exigency." Id. at 271, 322 A.2d at 857.
,05Id. at 268, 322 A.2d at 856.
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been derived from abolishing the existing tenure system, the
court concluded that the abolition "could not have been inspired
by financial exigency."' 5 The true concern of the administration
in abolishing tenure was not in resolving a financial emergency,
but rather in implementing a long-standing desire that "the present tenure system be abolished and that a new term-contract
system be established.' ' 7 Thus, both the dismissal of the tenured
faculty members and the abolition of tenure were improper in
that the reason given for the action-the financial exigency
threatening the institution-was a subterfuge to avoid the college's contractual obligations with its faculty.1 8 The court, therefore, refused to sanction the abolition of tenure and reinstated the
dismissed faculty members.
The adequacy of contractual protection of academic freedom
depends upon the adequacy of the contract creating the protection. In Bloomfield College the contract provided a means by
which the court could gauge the propriety of the college administration's actions. Through the use of precisely defined terms, such
as "financial exigency" and "extraordinary circumstances," the
court was able to determine whether the teachers' rights were
infringed by the abolition of tenure."' The contract, therefore,
provided the court with an adequate framework within which to
ascertain and protect the rights of the teachers.
If, however, the contract does not precisely define the rights
of the parties, then the adequacy of the contractual protection is
effectively diminished. In Cusumano v. Ratchford,"" the applicable language, which was incorporated by reference into the contract,"' provided that notice
106Id.

to Id. at 272, 322 A.2d at 858, quoting a report to the board of trustees from the
college's Commission to Review Tenure and Retirement Policy, dated June 21, 1973. The
court noted that the report "clearly focuses upon the issue of the 'tenure system,' not with
a bona fide attempt to reconcile the fact of tenure with the reality of a true financial
exigency.

. .

."

Id.

The court said that "[clourta have not hesitated to invalidate the dismissal of
tenured personnel where the reasons of economy given were shown to have been used as a
subterfuge." Id., citing, inter alia, Wall v. Board of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967);
Chambers v. Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
'
See 129 N.J. Super. at 263-64, 322 A.2d at 854.
18 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 982.
"I
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should be given at least one year prior to the expiration of the probationary period, if the teacher is not to be continued in service after
the expiration of that period."12

The court held that this language, clearly "precatory on its face,"
was not intended to be "a legal binding document."" 3 A failure
to give notice of intended termination of employment was, as a
result, not violative of the teaching contract. Furthermore, because the mode of termination did not violate the underlying due
process protection of the fourteenth amendment, the court sustained the dismissals."'
CONCLUSION

The protection of academic freedom has always involved a
conflict between the interests of the institution and the individual. School administrators need discretion in day-to-day as well
as long-range decisions as to the composition, size, and quality
of their faculty;" 5 individual scholars need job security in order
to teach, research, and study effectively." 6 The conflict between
these interests increases appreciably when the school administration determines that the deteriorating financial condition of the
institution has become so severe that faculty size must be decreased if the school is to survive.
To resolve this conflict, it must first be determined whether
the financial exigency is, indeed, a financial exigency. It should
not be enough that the school is facing financial difficulties that
a reduced faculty size might alleviate; instead, the financial exigency must be of such severity that members of the faculty must
be dismissed if the school is to weather the crisis." 7 If evidence
exists that the school is not acting in good faith"' or if a financial
crisis does not in fact exist,"' the terminations of employment
should not be sustained because it is quite possible that economic
112Id. at 985.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 101 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
"7 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J.
Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
"'By rehiring, for example, the exact number of nontenured faculty as it dismissed
of tenured faculty, the school might not be exercising good faith. See id.
11' Id.
113

"'
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necessity is being used as a2 subterfuge to mask unconstitutional
reasons for the dismissals. 1
If a financial crisis does exist and there is no alternative to a
reduction in faculty size, the dismissals should be upheld only if
there is adequate protection of the rights of the individual. Dismissals, even though necessitated by financial considerations,
should not be used as a means of eliminating dissident teachers
or faculty members distasteful to an administration. One way of
insuring that this does not happen is to utilize faculty participation in the termination decisions.' 2 ' The American Association of
University Professors has proposed, in cases involving terminations necessitated by financial considerations, that
[tihe faculty or an appropriate faculty body should . . . exercise
primary responsibility in determining the criteria for identifying the
individuals whose appointments are to be terminated.
The responsibility for identifying individuals whose appointments are to be terminated should be committed to a person or a
22
group designated or approved by the faculty.
See notes and text accompanying notes 5-7 and 19-21 supra.
Proposed Revision of Regulation 4. The Association also recommends faculty participation in determining the school's budget. See The Role of the Faculty in Budgetary
'

and Salary Matters, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 170 (1972).
"2

Proposed Revision of Regulation 4. The regulation reads in part as follows:
(1) Termination of an appointment with continuous tenure, or of a
probationary or special appointment before the end of the specified term,
may occur under extraordinary circumstances because of a demonstrably
bona fide financial exigency which cannot be alleviated by less dramatic
means.
[NOTE: Each institution ... will need to decide how to share and allocate
the hard judgments and decisions that are necessary in such a crisis.
As a first step, there should be a faculty body which participates in the
decision that a condition of financial exigency exists or is imminent.
...The case of a faculty member given notice of proposed termination
of appointment will be governed by the following procedure.]
(2) If the administration issues notice to a particular faculty member
of an intention to terminate the appointment because of financial exigency,
the faculty member will have the right to a full hearing before a faculty
committee. .

.

. The issues in this hearing may include:

(i) The existence and extent of the condition of financial exigency. The burden will rest on the administration to prove the
existence and extent of the condition. . ..
(ii) The validity of the educational judgments and the criteria for
identification for termination; but the recommendations of a faculty body on these matters will be considered prima facie valid.
(iii) Whether the criteria are being properly applied in the individual case.
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The teacher whose employment has been terminated should, in
addition, be afforded the right to challenge the decision, regardless of who made it. This challenge should include an opportunity
to question (1) the validity of the financial justification for the
decision, (2) the validity of the criteria for deciding who was to
be terminated, and (3) whether the criteria were properly exercised.'23
While these proposed procedures may protect academic freedom from economically necessitated staff reductions, the problem of implementing them still remains. The due process clause
of the Constitution currently does not require procedures of this
thoroughness to be followed before a school system can terminate
the employment of a nontenured faculty member.'24 While teachers who have acquired tenure under a state statute are afforded
a greater degree of protection than their nontenured colleagues,
this protection may be less than that suggested above'25 and, in
some cases, may be varied by school administrators.'2 6 Contractually created tenure probably affords the greatest possibility of
protection because the procedures can be delineated in the em(3) If an institution because of financial exigency terminates appointments, it will not at the same time renew fixed-term appointments or make
new appointments except in extraordinary circumstances . . . . [A] faculty
member with tenure will not be terminated in favor of retaining a faculty
member without tenure.
(6) In all cases of termination of appointment because of financial
exigency, the place of the faculty member concerned will not be filled by a
replacement within a period of three years, unless the released faculty member has been offered reinstatement and a reasonable time in which to accept
or decline it.
123 Id.
2I Compare Proposed Revision of Regulation 4 with Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100
(5th Cir. 1974), and Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
"2 Compare the procedural requirements of Proposed Revision of Regulation 4 with
that required by the court in Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis.
1974).
"2IE.g., State ex rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 213 La. 885, 35
So. 2d 804 (1948), where the court allowed the school board a reasonable time after the
expiration of a teacher's probationary period to grant tenure under LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:441-64 (Supp. 1975), and Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis.
1974), where the court varied the provisions of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (Supp. 1974-75)
to allow the dismissals for reasons not contained in the statute. Contra, State ex rel. Ball
v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959), overruled in part on other grounds, 39
Wis. 2d 595, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1968), discussed in note 67 supra.
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ployment contract and a court can then order that they be followed by requiring specific performance of the contract.'27
Obtaining such contractual protection, however, may become increasingly difficult. One means of doing so is through the
process of collective bargaining, but there is uncertainty as to
with whom the teachers should bargain,'28 the proper scope of the
bargaining,2 9 and even whether collective bargaining is feasible
in the academic environment. 30 The situation is further exacerbated by the declining base population of students and the financial hardships facing many institutions-particularly private universities. 31 These economic problems are likely to result in fewer
job opportunities and a weakened bargaining position for teachers
who might be unable to effectively negotiate for procedural protection of academic freedom. 32 Even if a contract containing such
protection is negotiated, its provisions could still be avoided by
an administration that refuses to give tenure either by requiring
"ISee American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249,
322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974); cf. Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sarokhan v. Fair Lawn
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 83 N.J. Super. 127, 199 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1962), cert. denied, 42
N.J. 501, 201 A.2d 580 (1964).
'2 See, e.g., Wollett, The Status and Trends of Collective Negotiations For Faculty
in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 2, 23-24, where the author suggests that as many
as nine possible levels exist where negotiation may occur. See also Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 236-38 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
" See, e.g., Moskow, The Scope of Collective Bargaining in HigherEducation, 1971
Wis. L. REV. 33; Sands, The Role of Collective Bargainingin HigherEducation, 1971 Wis.
L. REV. 150.
3 See generally Brown, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: Professors, Associations, and Unions, 21 LABOR L.J. 167 (1970); Ferguson, Collective Bargainingin Universities and Colleges, 19 LABOR L.J. 778 (1968).
131 See Sibler, Paying the Bill for College: The "Private" Sector and the Public
Interest, ATLANTIC, May 1975, at 33.
32 Job opportunities are likely to decrease because many institutions will be forced
to close due to a decline in enrollment and a lack of funds:
Some schools, through imaginative management and good fortune, may be
able to survive the coming situation while complaining of nothing more
serious than "underutilization of facilities." But a great many independent
colleges and universities will be forced to close their doors. Small colleges are
doing so-forty-eight since 1970. ...
The higher-educational resources of the United States have been lessened by such closures, and these are but the start. ...
Id. at 39. The situation is so serious that Mr. Sibler projects that by 1995 the decrease
in students means that the equivalent of "200 universities of 5000 students each or 500
colleges of 2000 students each" will be forced to close. Id. at 38. See note 48 supra.

1975

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

longer and longer probationary periods'33 or by dismissing teachers a few months before they complete the requisite probationary
34
period to attain tenure.
If teachers cannot obtain effective protection of their academic freedom through either contractual or statutory tenure,
they will increasingly be forced to rely on the due process clause
of the Constitution. The "minimal" procedural protections of the
due process clause, however, will have to be expanded if the commitment made in Keyishian v. Board of Regents'3 5 to safeguard
academic freedom is to remain meaningful. What the due process
clause should prevent is not dismissals per se, for in some cases
staff reduction may be necessary for the survival of the school;
rather, the due process clause must prevent a school administration from having unbridled discretion in decisions to dismiss
under the guise of financial exigency. Such discretion will serve
only to threaten the job security of those who teach and think in
an unconventional manner and will "cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom.' 3 To limit this discretion, the faculty must have
a voice in deciding whether a financial crisis truly faces the university and, if it does, which faculty members should be dismissed and upon what basis the decision should be made. This
limitation upon the discretion of school administrators should be
required as a matter of due process of the law.
Charles P. Leder
"
See Excessive Probation:Academic Freedom and Tenure: The Polytechnic Institute of New York, A Report on a Case of Excessive Probation, 60 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 416
(1974).
' See LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1975). In
LaBorde the plaintiff had completed the 3-year probation period required under LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (Supp. 1975) and was told by her principal that she would probably be granted tenure, but she eventually did not acquire tenure. She alleged that the
denial of tenure deprived her of a liberty interest under Roth and Sindermann and a de
facto tenure under Sindermann, but the court disagreed. Instead, it held that she acquired no expectancy of employment despite the completion of the parole period and the
advice of her principal.
M' 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See cases cited note 2 supra.
I" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See generally R. PIRSIG,
ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 214 (1974) where the author suggests that
one of the greatest threats to academic freedom is a stifling conformity that more conventional minds seek to impose upon their colleagues.

NOTE
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES REGULATING
THE HEALING ARTS -

Do

THEY INCLUDE THE POWER

TO REQUIRE A PHYSICAL OR PSYCHIATRIC
EXAMINATION?
INTRODUCTION

Requiring practitioners of the healing arts to be licensed has
long been held to be a reasonable exercise of the police powers
granted to the states.' The rationale for sustaining such licensing
statutes is that these professions have a direct bearing on the
public health, safety, and welfare. Regulating the healing arts
serves as an important means of protecting the public from unscupulous and unqualified practitioners.' What is not clear is the
means by which the administrative agencies can determine
whether a particular applicant is duly qualified-mentally and
physically, as well as educationally-to practice in that particular field.
The traditional test of an applicant's fitness has been a written examination to ascertain whether the individual has a sufficient grasp of the field from an educational standpoint. Within
the recent past, however, boards regulating the practice of the
healing arts professions in several states have expanded their
inquiries to encompass areas other than educational qualification,3 attempting to employ the devices of mental and physical

' Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Ex porte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167,
77 P. 879 (1904); State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20
N.W. 238 (1884); Sherman v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 116 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 P.
879 (1904); Bold v. Board of Medical Examiners, 133 Cal. App. 23, 23 P.2d 826 (1933);
Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935); Kansas State Bd. of Healing
Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical
Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238 (1884); Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State
Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867 (1950); Sherman v. State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 116 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); In re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 319 P.2d
824 (1958).
' Hake v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964); Dixon
v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court,
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examinations to enable them to determine the mental and physical fitness of the applicant to practice in that profession. Appellate courts in these states have handed down substantially different opinions concerning the validity of this exercise of authority.
The purpose of this note is to analyze these examination
requirements in light of the recognized purposes and powers of
administrative agencies. Such an analysis necessarily includes a
consideration of the statutory source of administrative power.
Review of these principles leads to the conclusion that the power
to require examinations, if adequately limited, is an appropriate
administrative function. On this basis, guidelines for defining
and limiting the power are advanced.
A review of the case law underscores the lack of uniformity
in the courts' approaches to agencies' attempts to require a physical or mental examination. Recently, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld an order of the Board of Optometric Examiners
requiring psychiatric and physical examinations as a prerequisite
to reinstatement of the practitioner's license, holding that the
order did not constitute final agency action and was therefore not
subject to judicial review. 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court took a
different approach, holding that revocation of a physician's license on grounds of mental and emotional incompetency would
be upheld if the action were supported by "competent evidence." 5
The Arkansas court's comment regarding expert testimony
clearly implies the need for a physical or psychiatric examination
as a basis for the revocation.' In Florida, however, a dental
board's order requiring a psychiatric examination was vacated as
"arbitrary, unreasonable and a gross abuse of power." 7
The question of a practitioner's physical or mental competence has also been raised in Arizona' and Washington,' although
December 3, 1973; Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
' Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
Hake v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964).
Id. at 510, 374 S.W.2d at 176.
Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966).
Batty v. Arizona State Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941).
Hubbard v. Washington State Medical Disciplinary Bd., 55 Wash. 2d 546, 348 P.2d
981 (1960).
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the question of the legitimacy of an administrative order requiring an examination to establish such competence was not directly
confronted. In Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board,'0 Dr. Batty's
license to practice dentistry had been revoked because of, inter
alia, his previous history of pulmonary tuberculosis. Although the
revocation was sustained on those other grounds, the court held
that since the disease was inactive at the time of the proceedings,
it was not grounds for revocation. The court did, however, state
that "one who has an active case of pulmonary tuberculosis is not
physically qualified to practice dentistry . . . ."" This raises the
question of how to determine physical competence if the practitioner/applicant refuses to undergo voluntary testing and if the
board lacks the power to require such an examination.
The Washington case" concerned the mental competence of
a physician who had previously been adjudicated mentally ill.
After entry of a court order declaring Dr. Hubbard to be competent, the Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board notified
Hubbard that a hearing would be held to determine the status of
his medical license. Hubbard appealed the subsequent revocation
of his license, claiming that the "declaration of competence" had
restored his qualifications to practice medicine. The Washington
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
the Oregon court [which declared Hubbard to be mentally competent] could not, nor did it attempt to, determine appellant's competency to engage in the practice of medicine and surgery. This is a
question which, of necessity, requires the judgment of experts."

The court advised Hubbard that he could apply to the board for
reinstatement of his license and produce evidence of his mental
competency to resume the practice of medicine. The onus of dispelling the presumption of incompetence was clearly placed on
the practitioner. Because there is no real distinction between requiring the practitioner to submit proof of his mental or physical
ability and permitting the board to require such proof before
reinstatement of a license, it seems reasonable to assume that the
Washington courts would uphold an agency's requirement of a
physical or mental examination.
57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941).
Id. at 252, 112 P.2d at 876.
HZ Hubbard v. Washington State Medical Disciplinary Bd., 55 Wash. 2d 546,348 P.2d
981 (1960).
"1 Id. at 553, 348 P.2d at 985-86.
"
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The above cases point out the confusion surrounding the
scope of the licensing powers of an administrative agency regulating the healing arts professions. The validity of the delegation of
administrative power, the language of the particular statute creating the administrative agency and defining its powers, and
principles of statutory construction to be used in the interpretation and application of the organic statute are all factors which
must be considered in resolving this confusion.
I. DELEGATION OF POWER TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Legitimacy and Appropriateness of Regulation

A.

Courts have long recognized the vital and legitimate interest
of the state in maintaining high standards for practitioners of the
healing arts. These professions, so directly related to the public
health, safety, and general welfare, require regulation by experts. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the necessity of regulation of the health professions in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 5
observing that "a state has broad power to establish and enforce
standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of
everyone there. The state's discretion in that field naturally extends to the regulation of all professions concerned with health."'"
The justification for such regulation has generally been the
need for protection of the public from persons who are unqualified
to practice the healing arts professions. 7 In Semler v. Oregon
5 the U.S. Supreme
State Board of Dental Examiners"
Court specifically stated that the healing arts professions are subject to
particularly high standards of conduct and qualifications because
of the public interests involved."
Just as the courts have recognized the need for regulation of
the healing arts professions by the state, they have also readily
acknowledged the impossibility of meeting this need by relying
"

The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure
or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity

Dent v. West Virginia,129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). See also cases cited notes 1 & 2 supra.
13347 U.S. 442 (1954).
'

Id.

"

Cases cited note 2 supra.
294 U.S. 608 (1935). See also Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
294 U.S. at 612.

"
"

at 449.
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solely upon the legislative bodies of the states."0 The degree of
familiarity with the profession required for effective and just regulation exceeds that of most legislators. The responsibility for
licensing has therefore been delegated to administrative agencies
composed of practitioners in each particular field. This delegation of power received the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court
as early as 1923. Its decision in Douglas v. Noble" leaves no room
for doubt about the appropriateness of the delegation of the licensing power to an administrative agency. Supreme courts in
Minnesota 2 and New York23 have also expressed their approval
of this manner of regulation.
Having established that the regulation of the healing arts
professions properly lay with administrative agencies, the courts'
attention necessarily became focused on the extent of the powers
delegated to these boards. Recognizing the principle that the
power to grant a license necessarily implies the power to condition,24 courts have not hesitated to uphold the agencies' actions
denying or revoking licenses, 5 even in the face of the petitioners'
contention that denial or suspension of a license constitutes a
punishment-which the agency lacks authority to impose. 0
The Supreme Court later stated that the scope of an agency's
powers included investigation of an applicant on the initiative of
the board members." Although the case considers the powers of
a state bar association rather than those of a healing arts board,
the language used by the court clearly encompasses any licensing
activity:
20

American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Sage-Allen

Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935).
21 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
22

State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238

(1884).
21 National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. University of N.Y., 8
N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298
(1961).
24 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 540 (1876); State ex rel. Minces v.
Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N.W. 711 (1898).
" Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Ramsay v. Shelton, 329 Ill. 432, 160 N.E.
769 (1928); Klafter v. State Bd. of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193 (1913);
Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Registration & Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 72 P. 247
(1903), aff'd sub nom. Meffert v. Packer, 195 U.S. 625 (1904); Blumberg v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 96 N.J.L. 331, 115 A. 439 (1921).
" Cases cited note 25 supra.
' In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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Where . . . the State may withhold a privilege available only to

those possessing the requisite qualifications, it is of no constitutional
significance whether the State's interrogation of an applicant on
matters relevant to these qualifications

. . .

is prompted by infor-

mation which it already has about him from other sources, or arises
merely from [the state's] good faith belief in the need for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant."

Although the case is obviously concerned with oral investigations
by the board, the same principle should apply when the board is
seeking information about an applicant's qualifications which
cannot be obtained through mere questioning. If there is a legitimate question about the applicant's qualifications, the board
should be entitled to pursue the matter to its satisfaction.
B.

Enabling Legislation

Any discussion of administrative agencies and their powers
must deal with the statutes which create the agency and which
define and limit its powers. The provisions of the statutes establishing the healing arts regulatory agencies vary greatly-not only
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but also within any given jurisdiction as to each individual agency. Before examining representative statutes,2 a brief review of case law dealing with legislation
purporting to delegate authority to administrative agencies and
of general principles of statutory construction is in order.
1.

Standards for Legislative Delegation

The question which arises most frequently in regard to the
delegation of the authority to regulate the healing arts professions
relates to the specificity of standards which the legislature must
include in the enabling statute to define the board's powers. It is
well settled that the legislature may not grant the authority without providing sufficient guidelines; 30 however, there has been
much litigation seeking to define what constitutes "sufficient"
guidelines.
In Bennett v. IndianaState Board of Registrationand Exam28

Id. at 90.

2 Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1423, 32-1451 (West Supp. 1974-75); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-22-101 (1973); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 453-4, 453-8 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 45:9-16 (West Supp. 1974-75).

United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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ination in Optometry 3' the Indiana Supreme Court upheld an
organic statute which gave the board the power to define unprofessional conduct, observing that it is unrealistic to expect the
legislature to "forbid specifically all improper practices likely to
arise. Of necessity, details of its plan must be left to the board.
The statute fixes the standards upon which the board may act. '3
Many other courts have taken this same stance.3
However, there are jurisdictions which carefully enforce the
requirement of specific standards in legislation establishing agencies which regulate the healing arts professions.34 A Florida statute35 established guidelines to be used by the State Board of
Examiners in Psychology in granting certificates to applicants.
The applicant was required, inter alia, to pass a written and/or
oral examination on psychology, and to hold a doctor of philosophy degree with a major in psychology from a board-approved
university. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court declared the
statute unconsitutional because of the legislative failure to define
the field of the examination and to provide standards to guide the
board in its approval of a university.3 Recognizing that agencies
may make rules within statutorily prescribed limits, the court
found such a lack of those limits as to invalidate the statute. 3
Sixty years prior to the Florida decision, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals struck down that part of a statute granting authority
to revoke a license for unprofessional conduct because it contained inadequate standards to guide the practitioner in his con-

duct .38

3,211 Ind. 678, 7 N.E.2d 977 (1937).
32 Id. at 683, 7 N.E.2d at 981.
See cases cited notes 55-56 infra and accompanying text.
Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906); McMurtry
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Reptr. 910 (1960); Husband
v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1961); Kentucky State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Crowell,
220 Ky. 1, 294 S.W. 818 (1926); Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785
(Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 490.04 (1959).
11 Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1961).
31 Id. at 71. Contra, Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App. 2d 124, 40
Cal. Rptr. 171, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1964) (absence of legislative criteria for approval
of a school by the board of medical examiners does not constitute a violation of the
delegation doctrine).
" Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
The statute does not prescribe the manner by which a physician may regulate his conduct. It does not advise him in advance what act or acts may be
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The California Supreme Court took similar action in Hewitt
v. Board of Medical Examiners.9 The California statute authorized revocation of a medical license for professional or moral unfitness. The court cited Matthews v. Murphy0 in finding the statute too vague and without sufficient standards to guide a physician's conduct.
Both the California and the Kentucky courts placed heavy
emphasis upon the proprietary aspects of a license, stressing that
denial or suspension resulted in depriving the licensee of his livelihood. Except for a brief comment on the need to protect the
public from incompetence (which need both courts seemed to
indicate was met by the very existence of the licensing requirements), the decisions appeared to be more concerned with
the wasted expense and educational efforts of the holder of a
revoked license than with public health, safety, and welfare.
Many courts, however, have specifically stated that a license to
practice the healing arts is not property to which the holder has
an absolute, unqualified right, nor is the taking of a license punishment." Both acts, the licensing and denial or revocation of a
license, are intended to benefit and protect the public.
Davis in his Administrative Law Treatise disapproved of
such highly specific legislative standards, preferring instead the
more valuable tool of judicial review as a restriction on the unchecked exercise of administrative discretion. 2 To insist that the
legislature specify the standards as carefully as the previously
discussed cases seem to require is to ignore a principal reason for
the creation of administrative agencies: to obtain the advantages
of the "special knowledge and special skills which characterize
' 4' 3
the administrative process at its best.
It is submitted that the approach of the Indiana Supreme
Court in Bennett v. Indiana State Board of Registrationand Examination in Optometry" and that of the U.S. Supreme Court in
in violation of its provisions. He is not told what is lawful or unlawful.

Id. at 752, 63 S.W. at 786.
31 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906).

," 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
" See cases cited note 25 supra.
,2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-.05 (3d ed. 1958).
,1 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (6th ed. 1974). See also McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 211 Ind. 687, 7 N.E.2d 977 (1937).
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American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States45 is most
realistic. It is impractical to expect the legislative body to define
specifically every act which would constitute "unprofessional
conduct." Most legislators would probably be quite unfamiliar
with the intricacies of the healing arts professions and would
therefore be unable to compile a complete or adequate listing of
those acts which might constitute unprofessional conduct. The
vague standard of avoiding the "appearance of impropriety" has
been accepted by the legal profession," and it would seem that
an overt act of unprofessional conduct is even more definite than
the appearance of impropriety.
2.

Principles of Statutory Construction

Rules of statutory construction have established that an
administrative agency has the implied power to formulate rules
and regulations, even when such power has not been expressly
delegated."
In Kee v. Baber," the Texas Supreme Court upheld the validity of a regulation which exemplifies this practice of filling in the
details of the power expressly granted. An optometrist whose license had been revoked for failure to comply with the regulation,
a compilation of specific procedures to be followed in the practice
of optometry, sought a declaration of the regulation's invalidity.
Finding a relationship between failure to follow standard procedures and incompetence, the court determined that the regulation was a proper attempt to implement the provisions of the
enabling statute.
One principle of statutory construction which has frequently
been invoked to limit the administrative agency's power is
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.11 Courts in Colorado,5" Con,5344 U.S. 298 (1953).

ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9.
Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 20, 251 P. 784, 791 (1926).
" 157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957).
"Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
"
In Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Weiler, 157 Colo. 244, 402 P.2d 606
(1965), the supreme court reversed the medical board's revocation of Dr. Weiler's license
on the grounds of "immoral malpractice" because that was not one of the grounds specified in the statute. The decision noted that "the Board's authority comes solely from the
statute itself and it cannot create new grounds for the revocation of a license." Id. at 250,
402 P.2d at 609.
"
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necticut, 5 ' Indiana, 52 and Texas" have relied on the expressio
unius principle in reversing agency action deemed to be outside
the scope of the agency's authority. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court54 and several state supreme courts" have been more cautious in their application of this rule.
Other state courts have consistently emphasized that statutory construction is to be used as a means of ascertaining legislative intent. That intent, when ascertained, takes precedence over
any principles of statutory construction." A decision of the Kansas Supreme Court provides an excellent model for resolving the
" Adam

v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 137 Conn. 535, 79 A.2d 350 (1951).
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the revocation of a teacher's license on the
grounds that
[ult is generally accepted doctrine that where a statute or ordinance authorizes the revocation of a license for causes enumerated, such license cannot
be revoked upon any ground other than one of the causes specified.
Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 367, 82 N.E. 792, 795 (1907).
" Carp v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 401 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966). The court determined that the legislature, in setting out 10 specific grounds
for the refusal or cancellation of a license, expressed its intention to exclude all others.
, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
[Wie might agree with appellants' contentions [that the rules promulgated
by the ICC were outside of the express or implied delegation of power to
control certain aspects of the trucking industry] if we thought it a reasonable
canon of interpretation that the draftsmen of acts delegating agency powers,
as a practical and realistic matter, can or do include specific consideration
of every evil sought to be corrected. But no great acquaintance with practical
affairs is required to know that such prescience, either in fact or in the minds
of Congress, does not exist. . . . Its very absence, moreover, is precisely one
of the reasons why regulatory agencies such as the Commission are created,
for it is the fond hope of their authors that they bring to their work the
expert's familiarity with industry conditions which members of the delegating legislatures cannot be expected to possess.
Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted). The language of this decision echoes an earlier English
case, Lowe v. Dorling & Son, [1906] 2 K.B. 772, in which the court noted:
The failure to make the 'expressio' complete very often arises from accident,
very often from the fact that it never struck the draftsman that the thing
supposed to be included needed specific mention of any kind.
Id. at 785.
11Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944); Kansas
State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); Cabell v. Cottage
Grove, 170 Ore. 256, 130 P.2d 1013 (1942).
' Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944) (principies of statutory construction have no application where they would vary a clear expression of legislative intent in a matter of vital concern to the state); Cabell v. Cottage Grove,
170 Ore. 256, 130 P.2d 1013 (1942). "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a general rule
of construction of statutes (citations omitted). It is to be applied with caution and merely
as an auxiliary rule to determine the legislative intention." Id. at 281, 130 P.2d at 1023.
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application of principles of statutory construction with the sometimes conflicting construction of legislative intent." The relevant
statute in effect at that time 58 made no mention of malpractice
as grounds for revocation of a physician's license. The trial court
reversed the state board's revocation of a license on the basis that
application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius necessarily
excluded malpractice as grounds for the revocation. In reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court of Kansas addressed the relationship between the principles of statutory construction and legislative intent," noting that the purpose of statutory construction
is the discovery and effectuation of legislative intent. Since the
intent of the healing arts act was clear-the protection of the
public from incompetent practitioners-the principle of statutory
construction on which the trial court had relied was not only
unnecessary but indeed defeated the very purpose of the statute.
Obviously, the extent to which a state has committed itself
to the expressio unius rule and the weight which the state attaches to legislative intent will be vitally important in resolving
the question of whether an administrative agency can justify an
examination requirement.
II.

REPRESENTATIVE STATUTES

Statutes which regulate the healing arts professions can generally be grouped into two categories-those which specifically
grant or clearly imply mental or physical incompetence as
grounds for revocation, suspension, or denial of a license, and
those which fail to mention either as a ground for such disciplinary action. Representative statutes have been selected, and a
discussion of the feasibility of the examination requirement in the
context of each of the statutory types follows.
Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836 (1963).
SKAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2801 (1963) states:
Recognizing that the practice of the healing arts is a privilege granted by
legislative authority and is not a natural right of individuals, it is deemed
necessary as a matter of policy in the interests of public health, safety, and
welfare, to provide laws and provisions. . . to the end that the public shall
be properly protected against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized and
unqualified practice of the healing arts and from unprofessional conduct by
persons licensed to practice under this act.

'T
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Statutes Requiring Physical or Mental Capacity

The first general classification of statutes includes those statutes authorizing revocation, suspension, or denial of a license to
practice any of the healing arts due to physical or mental incompetency. These statutes may do so either expressly or impliedly.
1.

Express Authorization

In the Arizona statutes, one portion of the chapter regarding
regulation of professions and occupations sets forth the requirements for obtaining a medical license. The applicant is specifically required to establish his physical and mental competence. 0
One section in this chapter6 sets forth the procedure for challenging a physician's physical, mental, or medical competence. It
authorizes the board to commence an investigation on its own
report or that of any physician or medical society. The board may
set up either an informal interview or a formal hearing and may
require mental, physical, and/or medical competence examinations. A finding by the board that the physician is mentally or
physically unable to practice medicine safely or is medically incompetent is sufficient to sustain an order suspending or revoking
his license-permanently, temporarily, or conditionally.
There can be no doubt that a board operating under such an
enabling statute has the power to require these examinations at
any stage of the proceeding-whether the applicant is submitting
his initial application, applying for renewal of the license, or is
the holder of an unexpired license which is being challenged. The
only area left to the discretion of the Arizona Board of Medical
*0ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1423 (West Supp. 1974-75) provides:
To procure a regular license to practice medicine.

. . an applicant.

. . shall

submit evidence satisfactory to the board that he meets each of the following
requirements:
(5) That he is physically and mentally able safely to engage in the
practice of medicine and submits to such physical examination, mental evaluation and interview or any combination thereof, as the board may deem
proper to determine the same.

'

The board may require the submission of such credentials or other proof,
written and oral, and make such investigation as it deems necessary adequately to advise itself with respect to an applicant's ability to meet any of
the foregoing requirements.
Id. § 32-1451.
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Examiners is the determination of the circumstances or behavior
on the part of the applicant or licensee which would justify the
examinations, since time and expense considerations preclude
examination of every applicant. The statute does grant the board
absolute discretion in requiring these examinations, but caution
must be exercised to prevent abuse of this discretion. For example, if the board were to require the examination of all minority
applicants but few, if any, white male applicants, it would invite
charges of discrimination. This potential problem is common to
each type of statute and can be eliminated only by regulations
specifying the bases for the examination requirements.
2. Implied Authorization
The second type of statute, impliedly authorizing revocation,
suspension, or denial of licenses for physical or mental incompetency, is exemplified by a New Jersey statute. 2 The general authorization for disciplinary action on physical or mental grounds
is present, but the procedures and specific grants of authority to
require examinations are not. The statute authorizes disciplinary
action both on the basis of an "adjudication of insanity" 3 and on
the basis of a "determination of incapacity."64 While the former
basis requires court action, confusion could arise because the latter basis does not specify the source of the determination.
In view of the generally accepted principle that administrative agencies have the implied authority to promulgage regulations which are necessary to implement their express powers,65 an
examination requirement should be justifiable under such a statute. The statute clearly authorizes disciplinary proceedings
against the licensee for physical or mental incompetence. A decision by the board to take action against the licensee without
benefit of an expert's opinion constitutes a gross abuse of discre"

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16 (West Supp. 1974-75) provides:
The [State Board of Medical Examiners] may refuse to grant or may suspend or revoke a license or the registration of a certificate or diploma to
practice medicine and surgery or chiropractic . . . upon proof to the satisfaction of the board that the holder of such license (a) has been adjudicated
insane, or. . . (d) has been determined to be physically or mentally incapacitated . . ..

u Id. § 45:9-16(a).
Id. § 45:9-16(d).
' Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1,20, 251 P. 784, 791 (1926).
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tion, as the Arkansas Supreme Court clearly indicated in Hake
v. Arkansas State Medical Board.6
The Colorado State Board of Optometric Examiners was
functioning under this type of statute when it entered its order
requiring both a mental and a physical examination in the
Dixon 7 case. The relevant portion of that statute provided for
suspension or revocation of the license of an optometrist for "continuing in the practice of optometry during any period of mental
disability or while afflicted with a communicable, infectious, or
contagious disease of such a serious nature as to render him a
menace to patients."6 8 The Colorado Court of Appeals did not
deal with the question of whether the statute granted the board
the implied authority to require examinations of the licensees,
instead declaring that because the board's order did not constitute final agency action, it was not subject to judicial review.6"
This position is unwise because it gives the administrative agencies almost unlimited power as long as they couch the examination requirement in terms of an "intermediate" decision rather
than a final order. The statute appears to give the optometric
board the implied power to condition reinstatement or renewal of
a license on the submission of a satisfactory report from a physician or a psychiatrist. If the Colorado Court of Appeals was in fact
approving such an exercise of power, it is unfortunate that the
decision did not specifically indicate such approval.
B. Statutes without Requirements as to Physical or Mental
Capacity
A more difficult situation is presented by statutes which neither make the applicant's health a requirement for issuance of a
license nor make physical or mental illness grounds for license
suspension or revocation. The possibility of requiring a mental or
physical examination under such a statute depends upon whether
the statute includes a general statement of intent.
1.

Statutes containing general statement of intent

When the statute has clearly set out the purpose for its pas237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964).
Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 102-1-16 (1963), now codified as Id. § 12-40-119(e)(1973).
6 Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
'
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sage, there may be sufficient grounds to conclude that the agency
has the power to require physical and mental examinations. The
Colorado statute creating the pharmacy board,7' for example,
acknowledges that the licensing of pharmacists is a matter of
public interest and concern which affects the public health, and
requires that its provisions be liberally construed. An agency operating under such a statute may have the power to require physical and mental examinations despite the fact that nowhere in the
act is there any language directly relating to physical or mental
health.7 Where the legislature has stated that the intent is to
protect the public and has urged a broad or liberal construction,
the board should be allowed to require these examinations in the
interest of insuring the abilities of the licensee. It would seem to
be within the court's discretion to take judicial notice of the fact
that to allow an individual afflicted with a physical or mental
impairment to practice the healing arts is not in the best interests
of the public health, safety, and welfare.
Yet, under a strict application of the expressio unius rule,
when neither physical nor mental incapacity is a statutory basis
for disciplinary action, both must be deemed to be specifically
excluded. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in American
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States,7" however, militates
against a universal application of such a rule of statutory construction."
2. Statutes containing neither general health requirements
nor a statement of legislative intent
Legislation similar to Hawaii's statute dealing with the licensing of physicians7" creates a situation in which mental or
physical examinations will be extremely difficult to justify. NoCoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-101 (1973) provides:
The practice of pharmacy is declared a professional practice affecting the
public health, safety and welfare, and is subject to regulation and control in
the public interest. It is a matter of public interest and concern that the
practice of pharmacy as defined in this article, merits and receives the confidence of the public, and that only qualified persons be permitted to practice pharmacy in this state. This article shall be liberally construed to carry
out these objects and purposes.
' See Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Registration & Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 72
P. 247 (1903), aff'd sub nom. Meffert v. Packer; 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
72 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
71See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
74 HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 453-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974).
70
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where in the statute is there any mention of a general public
purpose or of legislative intent, nor is revocation, suspension, or
denial of a physician's license on grounds of his health authorized. The qualifications for licensing concern United States citizenship, good moral character, and educational requirements.75
Revocation or suspension of a license may be based on a number
of grounds, but only two have even an indirect bearing on the
applicant's health: being habitually intemperate and habitually
using any habit-forming drugs.7" A board attempting to require a
physical examination of an applicant might seek to justify its
order on the grounds that the power is necessarily implied because a physical examination may be necessary to establish habitual intemperance or drug addiction. However, application of
the expressio unius principle would limit the examination to discovery of an alcohol- or drug-abuse problem, and would exclude
the possibility of a psychiatric examination.
Because many courts have acknowledged that the purpose of
the regulation of the healing arts professions is the protection of
the public,7 7 the missing legislative declaration of purpose might
be supplied through case law. If the public purpose statement can
be thus supplied, an argument to the court in support of the
exercise of the power to require physical or mental examinations
would proceed as if the purpose were contained in the legislative
declaration.
Davis was undoubtedly suggesting one way of dealing with
problems resulting from an insufficient delegation of statutory
power when he observed that "one major responsibility of every
agency, too often neglected, is to watch for insufficiencies in the
legislation it administers, and to make sufficient recommendations for changes, based upon an understanding of the details of
administration."" An administrative agency functioning under a
statute such as Hawaii's should press for legislation sufficiently
specific to allow the agency to require mental and physical tests
to assure itself of the applicant's competence.
11Id. §
76

453-4.

Id. § 453-8.

, See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 53 (1969).

"
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III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although the power to require physical and psychiatric examinations of practitioners in the healing arts professions is
highly desirable to ensure that only qualified individuals are licensed, granting this power without setting forth appropriate statutory guidelines invites abuses of discretion by the regulatory
agencies. Judicial review of an order for a psychiatric or physical
examination is, of course, one obvious and important means of
protecting the practitioner, but the need for such review can be
substantially curtailed by establishing realistic limits on the
board's power to require these examinations.
These restrictions must speak to two general areas-limitation of the board's discretion in ordering the examinations, and
establishment of guidelines to be considered in evaluating the
applicant's mental and physical fitness.
A primary limitation on the examination requirement is its
purpose, which is not to exclude persons whose social behavior
does not conform to the norm, but only those whose deviations
would substantially impair their ability to practice their chosen
professions. Similarly, a physical handicap should not bar an
applicant from practice of the healing arts professions unless a
direct correlation between the handicap and the resulting incompetence of the practitioner can be proved. Unless the deviation
from the norm, whether mental or physical, is related to the
ability to perform, such a deviation should not justify requiring
a physical or psychiatric examination as a prerequisite to the
issuance or renewal of a license.
The board's discretion to order examinations may also be
limited procedurally. One procedural consideration is the question of what specific circumstances would be required to justify
exercise of the examination prerogative. Certainly sworn complaints regarding aberrant or offensive behavior" and evidence of
the contracting of a communicable disease should constitute
grounds for a required examination. In areas of concern where the
need for an examination is less obvious, the board must move
with extreme caution to forestall allegations of arbitrariness or of
abuse of discretion. Explicit written standards compiled by the
", See Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (such complaints were the basis for the board's action).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

board could supply applicants or licensees required to submit to
an examination with a basis for challenging that requirement,
although it would be impossible to include in such a compilation
every conceivable situation which would justify an examination.
Discussions with professional organizations, individual practitioners, and other agencies regulating the healing arts-both
within and without the state-would be of great assistance in
drafting these standards.
A requirement that the board provide the examinee with a
choice of board-approved examining physicians, rather than just
one, is a second possible procedural limitation on the board's
authority. Furthermore, the examinee could be given the option
of obtaining a report from a psychiatrist or physician of his own
choosing to rebut the report of the board-approved examiner.
Both these procedures would reduce the possibility of bias on the
part of the examining physician.
A third possible procedural limitation on the board's authority might be protection of the practitioner by an increased administrative burden of proof. If the board were required to prove its
case for requiring the examination beyond a reasonable doubt
instead of by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the licenses
of those practitioners against whom the board had less than a
clear-cut case would be spared.
The standards to guide the examiner in his evaluation may
be more difficult to compile, but they are no less important. The
board should at least be required to advise the examining physician of the alleged actions, misconduct, or other condition on
which the examination requirement is based. The circumstances
of a particular case might also justify presentation of a specific
statement of the practitione's duties and responsibilities to the
examiner to assist him in determining to what extent the alleged
infirmities would interfere with the practitioner's capabilities.
If a disability is discovered, the examiner's report to the
board should contain his evaluation of the possibilities of cure or
rehabilitation of the subject practitioner. In the realm of physical
problems, for example, a cataract which impairs the licensee's
vision is an obvious basis for suspending the license until the
cataract has been removed and vision has been restored. But
because it would be manifestly unjust permanently to revoke a
license on the basis of a correctible impairment, the expert's opin-
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ion as to the remedies available to the incapacitated practitioner
and a second examination at a later date to assess the degree of
restoration are imperative.
The foregoing suggestions are to be considered as general
guidelines designed primarily to call attention to the questions
which must be considered in connection with the exercise of a
necessary power of administrative agencies, but one which is subject to gross abuse of discretion. The author claims no degree of
expertise in the practice of any of the healing arts professions and
would readily concur with previously cited judicial opinions 0 recognizing the particular qualifications of administrative agencies
to supply greater details.
CONCLUSION

Neither the legitimacy of the state's interest in the regulation
of the healing arts professions nor the delegation of regulatory
powers to an administrative agency is subject to challenge today.
However, whether such regulatory powers include the power to
require a physical or mental examination is open to question. The
approaches which the state courts have taken to this problem are
as varied as the final resolutions of the cases in which the matter
has been presented. Although only those agencies functioning
under an organic statute which specifically grants the power to
require these examinations can be assured that such an examination order will be upheld, strong arguments can be made in support of the contention that such a power is necessarily implied in
the other types of statutes discussed. Regardless of the type of
statute involved, it is incumbent upon the agency seeking to exercise this power to draft rules and standards sufficiently specific
to protect the interests of the applicants and practitioners who
will be subject to this power.
Carol M. Welch
"oSee note

20 supra and accompanying text.
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